

REASON ROMANTICISM AND REVOLUTION

VOLUME TWO

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CHAPTER I

REACTION AND ROMANTICISM

THE INTELLECTUAL movement after the Restoration and also under the July Monarchy has been characterised as the revolt against the eighteenth century. It was not limited to France; as a reaction against the Great Revolution, it also marked a phase in the history of modern culture. But it was a passing phase which had a deeper and more lasting significance only in Germany. As a matter of fact, the “revolt against the eighteenth century” began in Germany under the banner of nationalism in opposition to the cosmopolitan and humanist ideals of the Great Revolution.

In France, the post-revolutionary romantic movement could not influence politics; nor was it of any philosophical significance. It was primarily literary, and as such made a deep impresson on modern culture. In that respect, it was inspired by the tradition of Rousseau, and on the credit of that parentage it came to be known as the romantic movement. The mystic appeal of neo-catholicism preached by Joseph de Maistre, Maine de Biran and Chateaubriand was inherited from Rousseau; even Madame de Stael, notwithstanding her political liberalism, was a professed admirer of the prophet of irrationalism until she came under the influence of the classicist revival of German literature.

In the last analysis, the post-revolutionary romanticists of France as well as of Germany did stand under the banner of revolt against the eighteenth century raised by Rousseau, though he lived in that age when Reason, Romanticism and Revolution were harmonised to a very considerable extent. Calling themselves romanticists, the leaders of that cultural reaction denounced the “cold rationalism and pagan immorality” of the men of the

Renaissance. They turned their eyes admiringly to the grandeur of the Gothic art, praised the vigour of the early Germanic culture (forgetting that it was also pagan) and recommended return to mediaeval Christian piety and the ways of chivalrous nobility. Some of them, particularly in Britain, found in the Renaissance art and literature a revolt of human will against the tyranny of reason; they interpreted it as the first outburst of the creativeness of man (romanticism) as against “classical immobility”.

Rousseau’s was a revolt against the tradition of the Renaissance; it was an attempt to set the clock of history back. It failed in France; her intellectual life, profoundly influenced by a whole succession of rationalist and secular thinkers, from Descartes to Diderot, could be affected by mysticism and religious revivalism but superficially. In Germany, the post-revolutionary romanticism was not a revolt against the eighteenth century because even in that age of enlightenment a mediaeval social and intellectual atmosphere lingered there;¹ it was therefore a resistance to the penetration of the spirit of the eighteenth century; as such, it succeeded, and influenced subsequent history.

The revolt against the so-called tyranny of reason was a negation of the fact that man is essentially a rational being. Ever since the intellectual Renaissance

¹ “Just as in France in the eighteenth century, so in Germany in the nineteenth century, revolutionary philosophic conceptions introduced a breaking up of existing political conditions. But how different the two appear! The French were engaged in open fight with all recognised science, with (against) the Church, frequently also with (against) the State, their writings were published beyond the frontiers in Holland or in England, and they themselves were frequently imprisoned in the Bastille. The Germans, on the contrary, were professors, appointed instructors of youth by the State, their writings recognised text books and their definite system of universal progress, the Hegelian, raised, as it were, to the rank of a royal Prussian philosophy of government.” Frederick Engels, *Feuerback—The Roots of Socialist Philosophy*.

of the twelfth century, the emphasis on that fact, which could as yet be stated only as a philosophical proposition, had furnished the impetus to man's continuous struggle for spiritual freedom, for liberation from the fetters of religious faith buttressed upon fantasies, fables, superstitions and prejudices, all born of the bliss of ignorance of the primitive man. It was a revolt not only against the eighteenth century; it was a repudiation of all the human progress from savagery to civilisation; it was a negation of the very idea of progress, a denial of the possibility of human perfectibility. Romanticism was a misnomer for such a spirit, the idea of progress and belief in human perfectibility being the most characteristic features of what is called the romantic view of life. It was a revolt against the tradition of rationalism, not only of the eighteenth century; going further backward, beyond the classicism of the seventeenth century, it rejected even the tradition of scholastic theology which had operated as the solvent of the religious mode of thought. Relapsing headlong into the fundamentalist Christian faith, the so-called romanticists of the post-revolutionary years preached a neo-catholicism which called for a revision even of the Thomist theology. "Among the French authors of the beginning of the century, there were three prominent names—Joseph de Maistre, de Bonald, Lamennais—all of whom represented not only a negative reaction against the principles of 1789, but a positive return to those of the Middle-Ages. They dispute the assumptions of the eighteenth century, show that they logically lead to skepticism, and invoke, against that desolating void, the dogma of Divine Revelation."²

"The temper of the romantics is best studied in fiction. They like what was strange: ghosts, ancient decayed castles, the last melancholy descendants of once

² G. Lowes Dickinson, *Revolution and Reaction in Modern France*. Lamennais cannot be legitimately included in the list.

great families, practitioners of mesmerism and the occult sciences, falling tyrants and Levantine pirates. In the main, the Middle-Ages, and what was most mediaeval in the present, pleased the romantics. Very often, they cut loose from actuality, either past or present, altogether.”³

Royer-Collard and Guizot were the most important political thinkers of the time. Both belonged to the Girondist tradition, and were admirers of the British constitutional pattern. Yet there was a great difference between the two: Guizot was a secular thinker, a great historian, a true liberal; whereas Royer-Collard, though not counted among the romanticists, fully shared their religious revivalism, being an ardent advocate of philosophical and cultural reaction. Professor of philosophy in the Paris University after the Restoration, Royer-Collard had lived through the revolution. He was a member of the Convention. The Jacobins having captured power, he managed to escape the guillotine through flight. In 1797, he reappeared in public life as a member of Napoleon’s Council of the Five-Hundred, to advocate “restoration of the moral order reinstated on its ancient foundations, the final and absolute abolition of the revolutionary monster.”

Politically and socially, the revolution could not be undone. Not only did Napoleon consolidate it; Louis XVIII endorsed the accomplished fact as the price of restoration. The new Constitution attempted a compromise between the revolution and the ghost of a monarchy whose social basis had been completely blasted, and which had irrecoverably forfeited its moral sanction derived from the antiquated religious view of life. The reaction, therefore, demanded restoration of religion.

The demand was formulated by Royer-Collard, nearly twenty years before the monarchist restoration, in a memorable speech in the Council of the Five Hundred:

³ Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*.

“The catholic religion rallies under its ancient banner seven-tenths of all Frenchmen. It survived the monarchy, whose birth it preceded. This religion is the basis of the popular moral order; it gives sanction to the tasks which bind citizens together and to the State. The most imperative need of the people is a belief to visualise the future, to place their hopes and fears beyond the limitations of the physical world and human life.” Therefore, as a teacher of philosophy, Royer-Collard combatted the “philosophic bagatelle” of Locke’s sensationalism. He invoked the authority of Pascal and was evidently influenced by Burke’s *Reflexions on the French Revolution*. The post-revolutionary romanticism professed to be a passionate defender of individual liberty; It falsified itself by demanding at the same time that society must be founded on the religious view of life which does not allow man ever to be free as man. Therefore, Royer-Collard argued that there was nothing to choose between absolute monarchy and absolute democracy; he advocated “authoritative democracy”, and visualised the corporate State. In addition to his rank reactionary philosophical views, Royer-Collard incorporated all the fallacies and contradictions of conventional liberalism which brought it to grief.

It was under his influence that a fellow liberal, Benjamin Constant, was not admitted to the Academy. Consistent in his liberalism, he later advocated unrestricted individual liberty, and logically came very near to anarchism. Having rejected Rousseau’s doctrine of complete alienation of individual right, Constant argued: “By liberty I understand the triumph of individuality, as much over authority which would rule by despotism as over the masses who claim the right to subject the minority” to the majority. There is a part of the human being which of necessity remains individual and independent. Society becomes a usurper when it transgresses this frontier, and the majority becomes a rebel. When authority commits such acts, it does not matter

much from which source it is said they emanate, whether it called itself an individual or a nation.” That is romanticism, and it was not to be tolerated in the high academic circles dominated by the spirit of revolt against the eighteenth century. This one fact alone reveals the reactionary nature of that revolt against the “tyranny of reason”.

Madame de Stael was the most distinguished and characteristic product of the period of *sensibilite* “the singular fashion of ultra-sentiment which required that both men and women should be always palpitating with excitement, steeped in melancholy or dissolved in tears.”⁴ That is to say, she was a typically romantic personality. Necker’s daughter, she naturally sympathised with the Girondists, and held that the events of 1791 ran counter to the aim of the profound social transformation heralded by the philosophical revolution of the eighteenth century. But she was equally critical of the Ultra-Montanes who, after the fall of Napoleon, claimed to have inherited the tradition of the revolution of 1789. Referring to the revivalism of Royer-Collard and the mediaevalism of the romanticists, Madame de Stael wrote sarcastically: “It would be interesting to know to-which generation of our forefathers infallibility had been granted.”⁵ Nevertheless, as the most representative believer in the cult of *sensibilite*, Madame de Stael with her youth was a fervent admirer of the eighteenth century prophet of that cult. Her literary fame commenced with her *Letters on Rousseau*, published in 1788. In a maturer age, experience having sobered down her youthful enthusiasm, she became an eloquent champion of liberalism. But an incorrigible romanticist of the school of Rousseau, she could never completely outgrow the influence of the master. Through her celebrated book on Germany, a literary creation of great merit, she

⁴ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 13th Edition.

⁵ *Considerations sur les Evenements de la Revolution Francaise*.

made German romanticism known to post-revolutionary France, and herself became an admirer of German nationalism which, with the mystic dogma of *Volksgeist*, rose to resist the scientific cosmopolitan and humanist spirit of the eighteenth century French culture and the political ideas and social ideals of the Great Revolution. The analogy between the concepts of *Volksgeist* and the *General Will* is obvious. Madame de Stael was quick to perceive the similarity. The romantic spirit of Rousseau was conquering Germany, even if it had failed in the homeland. A masterpiece of literary art, Madame de Stael's book on Germany is a crazy-quilt of romanticism, liberalism and nationalism. "Here perhaps we see the beginnings of the far-reaching and ill-fated alliance of liberal political thought with nationalism."⁶

Joseph de Maistre was a life-long enemy of the "philosophism" of the eighteenth century and held that neither reason nor will was the foundation of human action; it was emotion, sentiment and above all prejudice.⁷ He maintained that governments must be absolute and unlimited; and that obedience was the first of political virtues. "No government without sovereignty, no sovereignty without infallibility, and this last privilege is so essential that its existence must be assumed even in temporal sovereignty."⁸ He pleaded for the restoration of the absolutism of the Pope to whom all temporal authority also must be subordinated, and denounced "the conspiracy of the temporal authority for despoiling the Holy See of its legitimate rights". In his opinion, all authority is ultimately of divine origin, and the Pope's power, therefore, is beyond private judgment. "The Ultra-Montanists or Theocratists were denouncing the ages of private judgment; and were urging that authority should be re-established, and that

⁶J. P. Mayer, *Political Thought in France From Sieves to Sorel*.

⁷ *Essais Sur le Principe Generateur de Constitutions Politiques*.

⁸ De Maistre, *Du Pape*.

society should be built up anew, on the basis on which it had rested previous to the Renaissance and the Reformation.”⁹

De Maistre was ably backed up by his pupil, Louis de Bonald. An out-and-out advocate of feudal restoration, de Bonald held that family, church and State were inter-allied institutions, all governed by the divine law of nature, which is universal and immutable, and as such the only source of authority. With this view, one could not possibly tolerate any human attempt at innovation. De Bonald, therefore, was a fierce critic of the Declaration of Rights and declared that equality was incompatible with order. “Sovereignty is in God, and all power flows from God. The law is the will of God.” It is remarkable that de Bonald appealed to reason even when advancing his reactionary ideas.

The philosophical reaction culminated in the eclecticism of Victor Cousin, who claimed- to have combined sensationalism, idealism, scepticism and mysticism in one system. The intolerance of Royer-Collard and the dogmatism of the Ultra-Montanes were but passing fits of intellectual insanity. The Enlightenment was a landmark in the spiritual evolution of the European humanity; to eradicate its influence was no more possible than to undo the social and political consequences of the revolution. The increase of scientific knowledge during the earlier decades of the nineteenth century cast doubt on some of the assumptions of the materialist philosophy.

It was maintained by the neo-vitalists that life was an elementary category which could not be analysed to the components of dead matter. On that doubtful scientific foundation, post-revolutionary romanticism reared the theory that the individual was the primary reality, and that emotion was the motive power in the individual, being the manifestation of life; intelligence and reason were reduced to the status of secondary

⁹ Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*.

values. The mystification of life lifted man out of his biological background, and made a mystery out of him. On the basis of that pseudo-scientific mysticism, the early nineteenth century romanticists declared that the sustaining principle in man and of his world was not reason, but faith, which was defined as the hope plus the power of hope to realise itself. How could man have the power to realise his hopes simply by virtue of the faith that it could be done? That was a mystery hidden in the heart of nature; reason may speculate, but never solve the riddle. The implication of romantic individualism was thus to deny that man could ever be the maker of his destiny; relapse into the belief in a Providence was the logical corollary.

Political uncertainties and social insecurity after the fall of Napoleon also encouraged religious atavism. "Imagination and feeling, the heart and the spirit, metaphysics and religion, made more and more emphatic claims to a satisfaction which a doctrine reducing everything to sensation and using only analyses could not give."¹⁰ Under the banner of catholic liberalism, religion threatened to break out of the bounds of orthodoxy. The romantic literature gave free reins to imagination and inflamed passions; it encouraged individualism to run amock, challenging the morality of organised society. Finally, revolutionary idealism reasserted itself to invoke the spectre of socialism. Cousin's philosophy proposed to satisfy all and sundry—the enquiring mind, hungry heart, lonesome soul. But, the culmination of the revolt against the eighteenth century, it could not maintain the pose of catholicity for any length of time. Its spiritualist essence soon overshadowed the apparent tolerance for other points of view.

Cousin revived the venerable notion of the Final Cause, and identified it with God. He argued that God could be conceived as the absolute substance,

¹⁰ Ibid.

because absolute substance is the absolute cause. Thus, God is the creator and he creates necessarily. But Cousin disowned any agreement with Spinoza's Pantheism; nor was his absolute substance-cause anything like the absolute unity of the Eleatics. His God was almost an anthropomorphic conception. In any case, it was a conception of such an all-pervasive, all-mighty, all-consuming transcendental entity as left no room for anything real in the physical world of human experience.

Religion could not be restored by the old-fashioned arguments of Royer-Collard and de Maistre. Philosophy must be harnessed for the purpose. Cousin's philosophy tried to resurrect the discredited notion of God so as to reduce man to a marionette to sheer nothingness. At the same time, the pseudo-philosophy of scientific spiritualism could provide the divine sanction to the dictatorship of any man having the ambition to feel himself godlike. Simultaneously, with his age-long struggle for freedom, the incentive for which is a biological urge, man, in so far as he is a victim of his vanity, has all along been haunted by the fear of freedom. This contradiction between a basic biological impulse and the super-structure of a predisposition of primitive human psychology underlies the whole history of mankind and explains the dialectics of spiritual evolution.

Felicité de Lamennais, having been for years an associate of de Maistre and de Bonald, broke away from the Ultra-Montanes to found liberal Catholicism. He drew upon the tradition of the clerics who, in the critical days of 1789, had turned against the old order to join the revolution. Intellectual reaction, which appealed to the authority of religion, was isolated where Catholicism reconciled itself with the revolution. Religion itself was revolutionised; popular Christianity or liberal Catholicism was a revolutionised religion.

Religion is a mental habit cultivated for ages; it cannot be discarded all on a sudden. Cultural and

ethical values had been traditionally associated with it. It takes time to remove the doubt about their secular sanction. Meanwhile, the legitimate fear of a cultural chaos and moral nihilism creates a widespread reluctance to break away from the time-honoured moorings of religion. In that unavoidable period of transition, faith is progressively attenuated, religion becomes a matter of innocent prejudice rather than of an intelligent conviction. The natural religion of the eighteenth century represented this tendency. But it was highly intellectualised and also romanticised. It could do for poets and professors. In the transition stage of spiritual progress, the common people needed the security and solace of religion in a simpler form; in other words, revolution, to be abiding, must democratise religion also.

Under the banner of popular Christianity or liberal Catholicism, the Great Revolution touched the soul of the people. It still needed the guidance of the Church, but the temple of God also must be democratised. Lamennais called upon the parish priests to throw off the yoke of the Pope and his hierarchy, if they wanted to be the defenders of a popular faith.¹¹

Lamennais preached a religion very much similar to the original Christian Gospel, full of moral fervour and democratic will. “In the scales of eternal justice, your will weighs heavier than the will of kings; for it is the people, who make the kings; and kings are made for the people, and not the people for the kings. The heavenly father has not made the limbs of his children in order that they might be broken by chains, nor their soul that it might be bruised by slavery.”¹²

Encouraged by the popular response to the dictum that “the law of liberty is also the law of God”, Lamennais elaborated his social philosophy in a new book. “When you have succeeded in making the foundation

¹¹ *Progres et Revolution.*

¹² *Lamennais, Paroles d'un Crloyant.*

of political organisation the Christian equality of rights, the resurrection which you desire, and which God commands you to desire, will be fulfilled of itself in the three inseparable branches: the material, the intellectual and the moral order.”¹³ His description of the moral order, and of the evils standing on the way, places him amongst the pioneers of Christian socialism. He walked in the footsteps of Mably and Morelly. In him was resurrected the romantic spirit of the Utopians of the late seventeenth century, to be inherited by Enfantine, St. Simon and Fourier.

Lamennais was excommunicated and unfrocked; he died in defiance, out of the Church, declining her sacraments. He thus personified the process of the prejudice of religion withering away after its psychological foundation had been undermined by the advance of knowledge, and its historical sanction challenged by experience.

Abbe Lacordaire and Montalembert were associated with Lamennais in the movement for a “new spiritualisation of the catholic faith” and separation of the Church from politics. Montalembert was a member of the Upper House under the July Monarchy. The following is a specimen of the powerful speeches he frequently delivered in that atmosphere of reaction:

“Catholics are unequal to their foes because they have not really accepted the Great Revolution out of which the new society was born, the modern life of peoples. They are still afraid of it. Many of them still belong to the *ancien regime*, to a system that admitted neither civic equality nor political freedom nor freedom of conscience.. But that *ancien regime* is dead and will never come to life again at any time or anywhere. The new society, democracy, will expand in conformity with its principles. Truly, the Church can venture, without fear or distrust, on that vast ocean of demo-

¹³ *Livre du Peuple.*

crazy. There was nothing in the old order which Catholicism has any reason to regret, nothing in the new it has any reason to dread.”

Chateaubriand is recognised as the leader of the post-revolutionary romantic movement in France, which is said to have died with Victor Hugo. Lamartine was the other most outstanding figure of the movement. But excepting literary style, there was little common to the three men. Such indiscriminate grouping has created a good deal of confusion about the romantic view of life. The romanticism represented by Chateaubriand “can be defined as comprising those Europeans whose birth falls between 1770 to 1815, and who achieved distinction in philosophy, statecraft and the arts during the first half of the nineteenth century.”¹⁴ According to this view, not only prosaic constitutionalist and conservative adherents of Whig liberalism, but rank reactionaries can be classified as romanticists. As a matter of fact, judged by the standard of Hugo, Lamartine and even Madame de Stael, Chateaubriand can hardly be called a romanticist. The claim to the distinction of a Christian reformer like Lamennais is greater. On the other hand, men who made their mark outside the field of *belles lettres*, such as Michelet and the socialist pioneers, truly represented the romantic view of life. The error is to regard romanticism only as a tendency in literature and the arts. A particular view of life finds expression in all the departments of human activity. However, it is a fact that in the nineteenth century romanticism was associated, deliberately or out of sheer unthinking exuberance of idealism, with cultural reaction, and Chateaubriand represented that type of passionate idealism for a wrong cause. He was a rebel against the eighteenth century.

In contrast, Hugo and Lamartine, not to mention lesser lights, had their eyes fixed on a future order of equality and justice, which was to be reared upon the

¹⁴ Jacques Barzon, *Romanticism and the Modern Ego*.

Jruins of the old, discredited morally and intellectually by the Enlightenment, and pulled down by the revolution, politically and socially. “The critical philosopher of the eighteenth century destroyed his own dwelling place. The new generation must build or perish. Whence we conclude that romanticism is first of all constructive; it may be called a solving epoch as against the dissolving eighteenth century.”¹⁵

True romanticism, as represented by Hugo, Lamar-tine, Michelet and others, who boldly looked into the future rather than bemoan the passing of the old order and glorify the past, was also critical of the limitations of classical rationalism. The whole truth of human existence had not been discovered in the eighteenth century. The trail had been blazed; it must be followed up. New knowledge and greater experience had raised unforeseen problems which called for greater human endeavour. Mankind could not for ever live in the eighteenth century; it must go ahead and build new houses, which will again become wayside stations. Realisation of the limitations and inadequacies of the highwater mark reached in the eighteenth century was not revolt against it; there was no desire to turn the tide back on the ground that its surface water was murky. But in Chateaubriand, romantic literature served the cause of reaction.

Philosophically, he was a follower of Rousseau, and as such could not be an uncompromising enemy of the revolution. In his first book, *Essai Historique, Politique et Morale sur la Revolution*, he tried to reconcile his royalism with revolutionary ideas. As regards religion, he was a free-thinker. *La Genie du Christianisme*, published in 1802, the year Catholicism was re-established by Napoleon, made Chateaubriand famous overnight. Worthless as a work of scholarship, the book found an extremely receptive psychological atmosphere. The bold ideas and fascinating ideals of the philosophers which

¹⁵ Ibid.

.had brought about the revolution did not bring the heaven on earth. Despotism and poverty remained. There was a general sense of disillusionment. In such a psychological atmosphere, the average human being seeks solace and security in religion. In the newly published book, which commanded immediate recognition as a masterpiece of literary art, disappointed and bewildered French men and women read “that of all religions that have ever existed the Christian religion is the most poetic, the most human, the most compatible with freedom, art and literature; that the modern world owes it everything; that there is nothing more divine than its teaching, nothing more lovable and dignified than its principles, doctrines and cult; that it favours genius, purifies the senses, develops pious emotions, gives vitality to thought, a noble style to the writer and a perfect form to the artist.”

The moving style was reminiscent of Rousseau, and to readers overwhelmed by its beauty, the sentiments sounded also very much like those of the Vicar of Savoy. The French men and women loyal to the tradition of the cult of *sensibilite* were deeply impressed by the passionate eloquence of the new prophet of the old cult, without realising that they were being incited to revolt against the eighteenth century. The result was that, according to competent historians of literature, Chateaubriand's *La Genie du Christianisme* influenced the French mind perhaps more profoundly than Pascal's *Pensees*.¹⁶ The more correct judgment, however, should be that it made a stronger appeal to sentimentality.

The Rousseauesque romanticism of Chateaubriand finds its fullest expression in *Rene*, the most characteristic-of his literary productions, in which the miseries of a morbid soul are depicted in the minutest detail on the model of the *Confessions*. It was the picture of lost souls tormented by the conflict of loyalties, who were moved by the

¹⁶ Victor Giraud, *Le Christianisme de Chateaubriand*.

Utopia of Chateaubriand's Christianity. His popularity as a political prophet was won by another hit of luck—the accident of his pamphlet against Napoleon (*De Bonaparte, des Bourbons et de la Necessite de se Rattier a NOJ Princes Legitimes*), appearing on the very day the Allied armies entered Paris. It was royalist propaganda, a plea for the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty, which was described as legitimate. Just as *La Genie du Christian-isme* had helped Napoleon to re-establish Catholicism, this pamphlet similarly popularised the Restoration, so much so that Louis XVIII is reported to have said that it was worth more than one hundred thousand soldiers. A certain section of the people of France had got accustomed to being moved by anything from the pen of the great master of style. In gratitude, the restored Bourbon king made Chateaubriand his Foreign Minister. Nevertheless, he died a frustrated and disillusioned man, consoled only by his own conceit. He succeeded in gaining a place of well-deserved honour in the annals of literature; but he failed as the prophet of the reactionary romanticism which pitted irrationalism, intuition, imagination and fantasy against rational thinking, positive knowledge and man's desire to be the master of his destiny. While his other works commemorate a literary genius, the *Memoires* show up the man, vain but disillusioned. He lamented in an embittered eloquence that the old European order, that is, mediaevalism, was in the throes of death, and that the final triumph of the new forces of democracy and republicanism was inevitable. Yet, he was conceited enough to warn the irresistible democratic age not to forget “the truth that property is hereditary and inalienable, property is nothing but liberty. Absolute equality, which presupposes complete submission to> such equality, will produce the hardest slavery.”

And what was the alternative to the sinful ways of errant democracy? “I can find no solution for the future except through Christianity, and catholic Christianity.” The hero of reactionary romanticism died with his boots-

on. But having experienced the Enlightenment and the Great Revolution, France would not emulate him, although it did him the honour he fully merited. Yet, prejudice dies so very hard that even in twentieth century France there are people who read Charles Maurras. But that curious fact is rather a tribute to the tradition of appreciating good literature irrespective of the purpose with which it is produced, and that is the tradition of the classicist culture of the Age of Reason.

The stirring voice of true romanticism, heralded by Lamennais, was raised by Lamartine. Like Chateaubriand, he also won his laurels in the field of *belles lettres*. His *Harmonies* ranks with *La Genie du Christianisme* and Victor Hugo's *Legendes des Siecles*, as one of the three highlights of French romantic literature. In Lamartine, romanticism became the passionate poetry to sing the glory of man. With the decline of the July Monarchy, the intellectual revolt against the philosophy of revolution was getting exhausted. There was a recrudescence of revolutionary idealism. Intellectual respectability and academic honours were no longer conditional upon the fashion of tracing the cause of the reign of terror and other extravagances of the revolution to the scientific naturalism of the eighteenth century and its rationalist tradition. It naturally took France several decades to absorb the shock which set a whole continent ablaze. That period of dismay and the consequent emotional un-settlement over, intellectual equilibrium was restored, the time came for recollecting events dispassionately and appraising their significance objectively and historically. The sober accounts of academic historians like Thiers and Mignet present the Jacobin regime no longer only in the lurid light of cruelty, violence and bloodshed. The purely historical work, thus begun, was carried on masterfully by Michelet, seconded by Louis Blanc and others. Lamartine dramatised the rehabilitated history of the revolution. Love of truth did not allow denial or exoneration of unnecessary cruelties and other senseless extra-

vagances; but, romantically, Lamartine regarded them as ordained by an uncontrollable fate rather than as deliberate crimes. He described the revolution as the modern Hercules who cast down despots, to attain the ultimate victory in a regenerate all-embracing humanity. His famous poem, *Jocelyn*, was an ode to cosmopolitan Humanism, which was to be established by the revolution of 1848. He wrote history also in a poetic language, more full of confidence and enthusiasm than critical analysis of facts and events. "It is said everywhere that this fans the hard tires of revolution, and that this will give the people experience for the revolutions to come. May God so desire."¹⁷ The book concludes with a typically romantic outburst: "We are proud to belong to a race which has been permitted by Providence to conceive such thoughts, and to be the offspring of an age which has impressed such a movement of ideas on the ; human mind. Glory to France for her intelligence, her destiny, her soul, her blood. A nation need not regret her blood when it has flowed for the blossoming of eternal truths. Ideas spring from human blood. Revolutions descend from the scaffold. The divinity of every religion is attested by its martyrs—dead for the cause of the future and labourer in the field of humanity."

His rhetorical oratory and the powerful spell of his poetic appeal having helped the rise of the Second Republic, Lamartine exclaimed: "The new Republic, pure, holy, immortal, popular and transcendent, expedient and great, has been founded." As the Foreign Minister of the Second Republic, he issued a manifesto to the European Powers. That memorable document shows how one could be a romanticist with soaring imagination, deep feelings, strong emotions and even with a fervent faith in the God of Justice and Righteousness, and yet not an irrational revivalist. "War is not a principle of the French Republic, though it was a glorious necessity

¹⁷ *L'Histoire des Girondins*.

for her future in 1732. Between 1792 and 1848, there is half a century. To come back after half a century, to the principles of 1792 or to the principles of conquest of the Empire would be to regress and not to advance. The revolution of yesterday was a step in advance and not backwards. The world and we want to go forward to .brotherhood and peace.”

The youngest and the last of them, Victor Hugo, was the greatest of the nineteenth century French romanticists. Renowned primarily as a man of letters—poet, novelist, dramatist—he did not try to live in the ivory tower of romanticism, only concerned either with the dreamland of imagination or pining for the legendary Golden Age of Christian mediaevalism. He did not conjure out of poetic fantasy the ideal man, whether of a venerable past or of a virtuous future. His poetic genius penetrated the core of the realities of actual life and he dramatised the experiences of the man of flesh and blood

his miseries, his follies, his joys and his ambitions. If Hugo was the last of the romanticists, he was also the .first of the realists, and in that role, one of the greatest also. In him, romantic literature reached the highwater mark. Intuition, imagination and passion were supplemented by .an analytical power, intelligent comprehension and rational will.

Born after the first fury of the revolution had blown

over, Hugo entertained no strong feeling for or against that world-shaking event. Owing to his parentage, he .grew up a royalist and catholic. His first poem was actuated by those sentiments. Until the rise of the Second Republic, Hugo did not hold any pronounced political views, the automatic royalism of his youth having faded away from a life flooded with the dazzling light of an unprecedented literary fame. In 1848. Hugo’s enchanted pen and authoritative voice publicly

championed the cause of democracy. As a member of the Legislative Assembly of the Second Republic, he made speeches passionately denouncing social injustice

and eloquently advocating reforms. It became evident that the greatest lyric poet of the age had not been living in the rarefied atmosphere of pure art, untouched by the ugly artifices of actual life. He was consciously in tune with the realities of the social environments in which he lived, and fully sympathised with the sorrows and sufferings, joys and aspirations of his fellow-men.

Socialism had already appeared as a political creed to-distrust and deprecate democracy even before it was given a fair trial. On the new issue, Hugo spoke soberly, so very unnatural for a romanticist. He was sceptical, neither a rabid reactionary nor a fire-eating revolutionary. "At the basis of Socialism, there are some of the sorrowful realities of our time and of all times." Who could know that better than the author of *Les Misérables* and *Châtiment*? And who had deeper sympathy for the victims of social injustice? Yet, the romanticist Hugo was not an Utopian. He was too rational to be gullible, to believe that the poor are all angels who, given a chance, would build a heaven on earth in no time. Therefore, while fully sympathising with their aspirations, he warned the socialist Utopians: "There is an aspiration for a better lot in life, which is not less natural to man, but which often follows the wrong road in looking in this world for what can only be found in the other." The reference to another world was evidently a fashion of speech. Hugo wanted to deprecate the impatient enthusiasm which believed that the world could be remade overnight. "This attitude inspired by our revolutions, which valued and placed human dignity and the sovereignty of the people so high that the man of the people suffers today with double and contradictory feelings in his misery." That clearly was an autobiographical touch. A superb poet and a great dramatist must be a keen psychologist. As such, Hugo generalised his own experience. And has not the history of the age of the masses borne him out? How many ardent champions of the cause of the people have been martyrs of

her sense and sensibility? Revolution not only consumes her children; she is a patricide also. Faith in man's innate rationality and the resulting sense of justice enabled the humanist poet to find a way out of the dilemma of the man of the people who recoiled from the fanaticism of the knight-errant. "You have made laws against anarchy. Now you make some laws against misfortune!"

Les Legendes des Siecles has been celebrated as the greatest book of the century; in it romantic literature reached its zenith. The whole panorama of human history, from the genesis of the race to a distant future, is visualised vividly in poetic imagination. The unfolding of the majestic drama is seen in the dream of the Mother of Mankind—Eve in the Garden of Eden. The concept of absolute righteousness is the leitmotif of the drama. The grand finale is the attainment of equality.

In *L'Homme Qui Rit*, one breathes the true romantic spirit. The theme is human heroism. Confronted with the super-human tyranny of blind and unpredictable chance, it is overwhelmed, defeated, but not broken nor vanquished. In *Actes et Paroles*, Hugo appeals to "the conscience and intelligence" of man, thus belying the conventional notion that romanticism is an elemental surge of blind passion—an appeal to irrationalism.

Even when he outgrew his inherited Catholicism, Hugo did not become irreligious. He searched for a religion consistent with Humanism. *Religion et Religion* is an anguished cry for a pure faith and a curious protest against creeds and dogmas which deform and debase the notion of God, debase and defile his name. Towards the end of his life, Hugo wrote *Le Pape*, in which the spirit of Christ appears to appeal against the spirit of Christianity; and the ideal Christian is opposed to the self-appointed Vicar of Rome. *L'Ane* is a confession of faith, so to say. Ridicule of the follies of the learned ignorance of the past, that is, of mediaeval scholastic learning, is followed by a passionate

declaration of the confidence in the wisdom of the tree and enlightened man of the future.

Hugo's novels, like *Ghdtiment*, *Les Miserables* and *Notre Dame*, are descriptive treatises on sociology, written in a poetic language, and therefore all the more telling. Man and his conditions, his past, present and future, his experiences and expectations, his virtues and vices, achievements and potentialities, and also his weakness — these are the material which by the master touch of Hugo were transformed into immortal works of literary art. He was a Humanist. With him, romanticism regained its soul.

The humanist soul of romanticism spoke even more majestically through Michelet. Though one of the greatest literary historians, he does not belong to the tradition of the romantic men of letters of the nineteenth century. With him, literature became a means for dramatising history; he wrote history not as a mere chronicle of events, but as a vivid account of man's struggle for freedom through the ages. And history written like that necessarily becomes part of the literary art and proves that it is made by man. The abstraction of Vice's *New Science*, humanised by the romanticism of Michelet, becomes art. The founder of German romanticism has contributed to that process considerably. Through Michelet, post-revolutionary French romanticism feels the impact of the romantic movement in Germany.

Michelet was a man of the people, fully sharing the attitude inspired by the revolution, the psychological basis of which attitude was revealed by Hugo; but the contradiction of that attitude could not kill Michelet's soul. As a sensitive man, he did experience the misery which is caused by the recognition of the painful fact of man's weakness and wickedness, and that the great men of history, the heroes of the revolution, are often not above the failings. But the misery could not overwhelm his confidence in the possibility of human rege-

neration, and the enthusiasm to work for that noble humanist ideal.

Michelet gave a larger, almost a metaphysical, connotation to Humanism, thereby raising it far above the level of the subjectivist individualism—the common feature of the humanist and romanticist view of life. He conceived humanity not as a conglomeration of individual human beings, not as a “concrete universal”, but as an abstraction from empirical facts, and held that humanity was greater than the great men of history.¹⁸ This romanticist conception enabled Michelet not to be depressed by the failings of the heroes of history. He used the term “tout le monde” to express the abstract conception of humanity, which appears in his writings as a person; but he did not idealise the abstraction. It was a democratic concept.¹⁹ The conception of humanity personified in abstraction is the maker of history.

With Michelet, not only does history cease to be a composite biography of heroes and great men; the tradition of the Great Revolution becomes the inspiration of the socialist movement. But he was not a socialist, no more than Hugo. He took a much broader view of revolution: It was to free society as a whole from slavery and tyranny of any kind. The united French nation must be based upon a free proletariat and a free peasantry. But it will be democratic by embracing all as equals in common freedom. “Are not shopkeepers, merchants, civil servants, rich people, all of them the slaves of a relentless social system, the tyranny of which has to be broken down as a preliminary condition to that recon-

¹⁸ Other outstanding political thinkers of the time shared the view. Pierre Laroux, for instance, declared : “Humanity is an ideal being, composed of a multitude of real beings, who are themselves humanity in the germ, humanity in the virtual condition.”

¹⁹ “He is speaking ostensibly of *tout le monde*, that is to say, of everyone in general, and no one in particular—but it is plain from his words that he has in his mind the mass of men as opposed to a minority of genius or culture.” Lowes Dickinson, *Peroluation and Reaction in Modern France*.

ciliation of all classes on which the future of the country ultimately depends.”²⁰ Michelet was evidently attacking the time-honoured spiritual slavery which had recaptured the upper classes in the post-revolutionary period, and also the tyranny of the intellectuals who tried to bolster up the reaction by preaching a philosophy of revivalism and producing a literature which glorified irrationalism and placed heart above head. By attacking spiritual slavery and tyranny of the debauched and prostituted intellectualism, Michelet held up the banner of the philosophical revolution which had been brought about by the Enlightenment.²¹

Michelet and Lamennais before him represented the resurgence of revolutionary passions; Hugo also, though not always consciously. Their having captured the intellectual leadership of France, the short interlude of spiritual reaction, served very effectively by the so-called romantic literature, was over. One achievement, however, was made during the interlude: the romantic literature celebrated the emergence of the individual as a historical force—the individual conscious of himself and his importance. Therefore, the romantic literature, not only of Lamartine and Hugo, but even of Chateaubriand, enriched the culture of the eighteenth century instead of being its antithesis.

²⁰ Jules Michelet, *Le Peuple*.

²¹ “The skeptical and atheistical views which had been current in the eighteenth century were, of course, widely held during the period of the Empire, but they were not allowed expression, and only found vent after the Restoration, when clerical and political reactionaries stirred up slumbering revolutionary passions.” Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF ROMANTICISM

As an instrument of reaction, romanticism played a much bigger role and exercised a more far-reaching influence in the history of modern Germany. There it assumed a philosophical character and determined political theories as well as practice. Before proceeding to examine the significance of romanticism in Germany, it is necessary to define the term.

Romanticism has been defined in a variety of ways. The confusion and error about its place in the history of thought and also in life results from the vagueness about its meaning. Originally, it was a tendency in art; but the theory of art indicates an attitude to life, and life is a part of nature. Therefore, from the very beginning, romanticism was a way of life and as such had a philosophical significance, even if that was not clearly realised and formulated until a later period. There cannot be a culture without a philosophy. The men of the Renaissance, particularly those who represented its artistic and literary aspects, were the first to take a romantic view of life. Historically, romanticism is a form of the revolt of man against the tyranny of the super-natural. Philosophically and culturally, romanticism is identical with humanism. It is the faith in the sovereignty of man and in his unlimited creativeness. The cardinal principle of romanticism is that man makes history—he is the maker of his own destiny. Therefore, if the eighteenth century was the Age of Reason, it was also the age of romanticism. The rationalism of the eighteenth century placed man in the centre of the Universe, without denying that ultimately he is bound by the laws of nature; but it maintained, on the authority of scientific knowledge, that potentially man was

capable of acquiring the mastery of nature progressively.. 'I hat is also the sober philosophical statement of the romantic view of life. It proclaims the sovereignty of human creativeness, but at the same time is not blind to the actual limitations of man's power, the limitations being natural, since man is only a part of nature. This view of romanticism was expressed by Goethe in the classical sentence: "In der Beschraenkung zeigt sich erst der Meister." A belaboured English rendering will be: "The master man reveals himself under limitations."

The development of science is so far the greatest romance of human history. It began as the romantic adventure of man for conquering nature by penetrating her secrets. At the same time, scientific knowledge is rational; science, therefore, is the synthesis of rationalism and romanticism. It broke away from classical rationalism, which by implication denied the sovereign creative-ness of man, when it adopted the inductive method. Romanticism repudiates metaphysical generalisations and insists upon concrete realities, man being one of them; so does science. Romanticism was not revolt against reason, but against the neo-classicism of the seventeenth century, which made a secular teleology out of rationalism. Religion being the earliest expression of human rationality, instinctive belief in order, it remained inherent in classical rationalism even of Descartes and Spinoza, which started from the theological concept of a law-governed Universe. The scientific naturalism of the eighteenth century, notwithstanding the fact that it was anchored in the reason of man, was also a revolt against the essentially ideological classic rationalism. Not only de la Mettrie suggested, "let us follow the direction of experience and not trouble our head; about the vain history of philosophers." The arch-rationalist Voltaire also exclaimed: "Oh Plato, so much admired! You have only narrated fables." The revolt against the eighteenth century, therefore, was fighting a bogey. Sheer irrationalism, spinning a cobweb of

morbid fantasy, mysticism, religious revivalism and sloppy sentimentality, is not romanticism. Revolution is a romantic adventure. The post-revolutionary romanticism was a passionate cry for the restoration of the ancient regime. At best it was a feeble echo of neo-classicism.

Etymologically, derived from the word romance, romanticism is the glorification of what is conventionally believed to be unreal. Hegel identified the real with the rational; therefore, since his time, romanticism has come to be interpreted as irrationalism and anti-realism. If any established order is granted the sanction of rationality, on the ground that the real (existing) is the rational, then the romantic view of life is certainly unrealistic and irrational. Therefore, the German romanticist Karl Maria von Weber protested: "Life is thus, but thus I will not have it. Standing on the intolerable reality, I recreate." The realities of any given situation place restrictions on man's creativity; but at the same time, man is capable of overcoming those restrictions and create new realities. That is the essence of the romantic view of life.

Romanticism, however, has an older history. Ever since the Renaissance, it was the lever of European culture. Even the classically rationalist age of Corneille, Racine, Moliere, Boileau, believed in human perfectibility, while taking a sceptical attitude towards all other beliefs. And belief in human perfectibility without any divine grace is an important feature of the romantic view of life. Pascal's mysticism also did not belittle the decisive importance of man's consciousness, of his significance in the cosmic scheme. "What is man? A nothing with respect to the infinite, a whole with respect to nothingness, a midpoint between all things and none." This sounds mystic. But then follows: "Our whole dignity consists in thinking. Thinking makes-man. Man is but a reed, the weakest in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The Universe need not take arms. to crush him; a whiff of air, a drop of water suffices to?

destroy him. But even though the Universe destroys him, man is still nobler than that which kills him, for he knows that he is being killed.”¹

Not only Pascal, who as a great mathematician could not really be a prophet of irrationalism, as he has been depicted by some historians of culture, as far back as 1690, Perrault wrote: “The human race must be considered as an eternal man so that the life of humanity has had, like the life of a man, its infancy and youth; is at present in its maturity and will know no decline.”² Fontanelle also had an unshakable faith in the future of mankind. “This man, who has lived from the beginning of the world to the present time, will have no old age; he will be always as capable as ever of doing the things for which he was fitted in youth, and he will be more and more able to accomplish those which are appropriate to his manhood; in other words, and to drop allegory, man will never degenerate.”

Abbe de St. Pierre was a still more enthusiastic believer in human perfectibility and historical progress. “His ardent faith in them led him to devise a multitude -of schemes for individual and social improvement, which seemed to most of his contemporaries mere dreams, but which were rarely altogether dreams, and which, even when dreams, were of the kind that precede and cause awakening. He was a precursor of Turgot and Condorcet.”³

Rousseau’s romanticism obviously was not of that tradition. Therefore, after the revolution, it could ally itself with reaction. That false romanticism did not succeed in France, but it was rampant in Germany and partially in Britain. The older movement was for a revival of the original romanticism of the Renaissance art and literature. And inasmuch as the Renaissance it-

¹ Pascal, *Pensees*.

² *Pardlsle. entre hi Anciens et les Moderns*.

³ Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*.

self was a revival of ancient culture and learning, its tradition was classicist as well as romanticist. The

romantic revival of the seventeenth century greatly influenced aesthetic theories and literature. It rose not expressly as a revolt against rationalism, because it was partially a neo-classicist movement. It resulted from the “Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes” described by historians of culture as “the Thirty Years War of Literary Controversy”, which concluded in the beginning of the eighteenth century. Originally, it was a theory of aesthetics developed in Italy during the seventeenth century in opposition to the neo-classicism of the French culture of the age of Louis XIV. From that original character, romantic revival came to be known conventionally as a revolt against reason. Of course, as a theory of aesthetics, it attached greater importance to personal experience, emotion and spontaneity. It was believed to be a cult of irrationalism because of its association with an intellectual atmosphere hostile to the Cartesian philosophy.

But reason was not altogether ruled out by the founders of the romantic theory of aesthetics. Gravina was a Cartesian. He welcomed Descartes’ antagonism to scholastic dogmatism and his all-doubting metaphysics as spiritual liberation. He found in it no hostility to poetry. Even Vico rejected only the materialist implications of the Cartesian philosophy. But “none would have been more ready to recognise the enormous value of the Cartesian method in providing that intellectual freedom, which made his own work possible. Vico, the spiritual heir of Bruno and Campanella, would have found himself powerless to overthrow the tyranny of

‘ mediaeval scholasticism without an alliance with Descartes; he no less than Gravina must have welcomed the aid of the great French thinker in combattiiig the Aristotelian tradition.’⁴

⁴ M.G. Robertson, *The Genesis of tlie Romantic Theory*.

‘1 he spirit of the Renaissance having crossed the .Alps, in the seventeenth century Italy slipped into the backwaters of European culture. There was a marked

-demoralisation of art and devitalisation of literature. The Counter-Reformation had triumphed; the Vatican had regained its deadly grip on the spiritual life of Italy. The home of the Renaissance became the scene of the martyrdom of Bruno and Galileo. “The spirit of the Renaissance literature had evaporated; formulas alone remained; and the champions of these formulas .devoted themselves, with a zeal which often outstripped discretion, to keep them alive by breathing an artificial life into them; they decked them out with a fantastic,

-often grotesque extravagance, or handled them with an ingenuity which appealed rather to the capricious fancy than to sober commonsense.”⁵

The aesthetic decadence reached its climax in the so-called *Marinismo*, the craze for the poetry of Marini who, with a considerable wealth of fantasy, glorified the moral laxity, unbounded individualism, callous selfishness, lack of sense of responsibility, aristocratic snobbishness and other vices which had been unwarrantedly attributed to .the men of the Renaissance, particularly of the latter period. That deplorable degeneration of literary taste brought upon Italy the ridicule of Europe, especially of France where the spirit of the Renaissance had found a magnificent expression in the most brilliant chapter of the history of modern European literature. Pere Bouhour’s unkind remark that Italy was the home of bad taste started the long literary controversy out of which the neo-romantic theory of aesthetics developed in Italy.

Like all other aspects of the intellectual and cultural life of France in the seventeenth century, literary criticise was also influenced by the Cartesian philosophy. “This great thinker (Descartes) who never wrote a line

⁵ Ibid.

-on aesthetics, was virtually the creator of France's aesthetic canon."⁶ Descartes' famous dictum that the highest beauty was the highest truth did certainly become the criterion of French literary criticism in the seventeenth and the early eighteenth century. Judged by that criterion, the Marinist cult of beauty for the sake of beauty was repugnant to good taste. From the point of view of the history of the arts, the Cartesian dictum was of far-reaching significance. By linking up aesthetics with ethics, it made the former also a part of philosophy. In other words, the controversy was essentially philosophical. Italian neo-romanticism, being a protest against the Cartesian influence on ethics, was philosophically reactionary. It did not offer an improvement upon Cartesianism, as was subsequently done by the genuine romanticists who in the eighteenth century France broke away from Descartes' *quasi* scholastic rationalism, and enriched naturalism with the scientific aspect of his philosophy. As inheritors of the spirit of the revolt of man, they heralded the Great Revolution.

Humiliated by French criticism, the more sensitive amongst the Italian men of letters repudiated *Marinismo*. Some of them wrote poems celebrating virtuous love; others fed the flames with their amorous poetry; still

others gave up singing in praise of love and took to writing poetry to sing the glory of Jesus. "The results of the famous controversy were not only merely a spirit of refutation of Bouhour's calumnies, but, what was more important, a serious effort to remedy the shortcomings which a comparison with French achievements had made apparent."⁷ All the Italian men of letters, stung to the quick by Bouhour's criticism, founded in 1690 the *Aca-demia degli Arcadi*, or simply, the Arcadia, with the object of renewing "the sweet studies and innocent customs which the ancient Arcadians cultivated". The

⁶ Emile Krantz, *Essai sur l'Esthetique de Descartes*.

⁷ Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*.

Arcadia was the background of the romantic revival begun with the theory of aesthetics formulated in Muratori's *Delia Perfetta Poesia Italiana* and Gravina's *Region Politica*.

Vico, however, was the real father of the Italian neo-romanticism; because he held that reason had no place in poetry, which was entirely a product of imagination. In Muratori's theory of aesthetics, *fantasia* was a handmaiden of the intellect; and Gravina was a Cartesian. The aesthetic theory of all the Italian contemporaries of Vico was "based on faulty conceptions of the mechanism of mind".⁸ Religious bias, mediaeval mentality and hostility to materialism rendered the very idea of mechanism repugnant to Vico.⁹ Reason could not be altogether excluded from philosophy in the land of Bruno, Campanella, Galileo, not to mention Machiavelli and the men of the Renaissance, who were great artists as well as scientists. Vico himself was the founder of a new science, which revealed history as an evolutionary (rational) process. Nevertheless, in aesthetics, a branch of human activity, he conceded supremacy to imagination. "The imagination is, in Vico's thought, an active, creative force; it is not merely the provider of the materials, the sumptuous images, with which, as in the Muratorian system, genius works; it is genius itself.-Vico's definition of the function of the imagination as a collective force in the early stages of human evolution,, might well have formed the groundwork for a whole system of aesthetic thinking."¹⁰ To hold that intellect and imagination are mutually exclusive is erroneous. In

⁸ J. G. Robertson, *The Genesis of the Romantic Theory*.

⁹ "One reason for Vico's antipathy (for Descartes) was that he, with his strong religious bias, saw in Descartes a serious danger to the authority of the Catholic faith. Descartes prefers to them (historical sciences) his metaphysics, his physics and his mathematics, and thus reduces literature to the knowledge of the Arabs." Introduction to the *Autobiography of Giambattista Vico*, translated by M. H. Fisch and P. G. Bergin.

¹⁰ J. G. Robertson, *Ibid*.

primitive human beings, they are not differentiated; and an element of thought is always inherent in imagination, particularly creative imagination. It was a dogmatic assertion that primitive man lived only in imagination.

However, the philosophical tendency of the new Italian theory of aesthetics was on the whole anti-Cartesian, whereas in France it was decidedly under Descartes' influence. On account of that philosophical difference, the former placed intellect more and more under a discount, and came to be known as romanticism, which meant disregard for realities—a cult of irrationalism.

The controversy was finally composed by Abbe Jean-Baptiste du Bos, through whom France made the greatest contribution to the aesthetic thought of Europe in the early eighteenth century. Du Bos accepted the Italian view to a considerable extent, but he could hardly be called a romanticist. "It was one of his conspicuous merits that he pled earnestly for the rights of genius against the tyranny of the reason; at the same time, he was not easily swayed by enthusiasm."¹¹ Philosophically, he was a Cartesian, and there is evidence that he never completely abandoned that position. Moreover, he came also under Bayle's influence and also of Locke, which, made him sceptical about over-enthusiasm. His great merit was to reconcile the admiration for the classics with the new cult of emotionalism. He held that a harmonious *blending* of the two could be the most reliable inspiration for the creation of great aesthetic values. He was an admirer of Perault and the founder of the cult of *sensibilite* which became so very fashionable in the Age of Reason.¹² Rousseau appealed to that fashion

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² "The first great figure in the movement is Rousseau, but to-some extent he only expressed already existing tendencies. Cultivated people in eighteenth century France greatly admired what they called *la sensibilite*, which meant a proneness to emotion and more particularly to the emotion of sympathy. To be thoroughly satisfactory, the emotion must be direct and violent, and quite-

and passed it on to the romanticists of the nineteenth century. That was the nearest pre-revolutionary France ever came to irrationalism. Rousseau has gone down in history as the founder of romanticism. But the prophet of sentimental romanticism was not honoured at home for any length of time. He wielded a much greater influence in Germany, and partially in England also. Sentimental romanticism in the latter country, however, remained confined to literature, which also soon recovered the balance. In Germany, it inspired a chauvinistic cultural movement and an aggressive political philosophy bound to do incalculable harm.

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After the Thirty Years War, Germany lay prostrate, spiritually exhausted. Until the foundation of the kingdom of Prussia, it was a period of the worst kind of feudal anarchy, which was terminated by the rise of military monarchy to replace the theological kingship of the Middle-Ages. Political development in that direction had begun in France under Richelieu after the religious wars. In Germany, the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg followed suit; but the kingdom of Prussia was not firmly established until the beginning of the eighteenth century. The socio-historical significance of that development was the triumph of the spirit of the Renaissance over that of Reformation: it was secularisation of politics. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation having cancelled

each other, the Renaissance survived the vicissitudes of two centuries of religious wars, social dissolution and political chaos.

uninformed by thought. The man of sensibility would be moved to tears by the sight of a single destitute peasant family, but would be cold to -well thought out schemes for ameliorating the lot of peasants as a class. The poor were supposed to possess more virtue than the rich.” (Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*).

Nevertheless, during that intervening period of militant orthodoxy, rampant bigotry and flagrant intolerance, except in France and far-away England, the aesthetic and cultural tradition of the Renaissance had degenerated into empty formality. In Germany, during the latter half of the seventeenth century, intellectual life had sunk to the lowest level. Whatever literature was produced in that depressing atmosphere, as well as aesthetic taste in general, was under the influence of the post-Renaissance decadent culture of Italy, which “like a kind of blight spread over Europe and eclipsed the rich achievement of the earlier period when the light of antiquity had still dazzled Western eyes.”¹³ The German manifestation of the blight of Marinismo was characteristically called “*Schwulst*”—bombast and buffoonery.

A characteristic feature of the history of German literature was recurring periods of depression unknown in the annals of other European countries. Political vicissitudes were not the sole cause of that misfortune; indeed, they had little to do with it. In other countries, arts and intellectual culture flourished in the midst of social disintegration and political chaos. The most outstanding instance of this apparently paradoxical experience of history was the Renaissance in Italy.¹⁴ The cause of this peculiarity is to be found in the nationalist preoccupation of German literature. The Germans were not able to adapt themselves to the various waves of literary and cultural influence which, emanating first from Italy and then from France, swept Europe for three-hundred years—from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. German literature and culture all along struggled

¹³ J. G. Eobertson, *The Genesis of Romantic Theory*.

¹⁴ Only in the twentieth century, Germany also had a similar experience. Arts and culture reached the highest degree of afflorescence during the years immediately after her crushing defeat in the First World War, when for a short time, tinder the Weimar Eepublic, the liberal cosmopolitan outlook overwhelmed nationalist jingoism among a large number of artists and intellectuals.

against outside influence, particularly the so-called Latinism.

Throughout the Middle-Ages, mysticism was the most outstanding feature of German religious thought. Forerunners of the Reformation, like Reuchlin, were inspired by that mystic individualist culture. The struggle against clerical orthodoxy for Liberalism in thought and scholarship, conducted by Reuchlin, and after him, Erasmus, cleared the way for a healthy German literature. In the period of the Reformation, both Melanchthen and von Hutten sympathised with Latin Humanism. In that period, satirical drama was the only form of literature which emancipated itself from the trammels of religious controversy. Thomas Murner (1475-1537), with his satirical dramas, led the assault upon Lutheran bigotry. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, Johannes Fischart's Rabelaisian satires introduced Humanism in German literature. The country was flooded with translations of the Renaissance Humanists. It was the time of Hans Sachs. Though an admirer of the "Wuerttembergische Nachtigall", Sachs left a vast literary legacy embracing every form of popular literature, which was a substantial contribution to the history of German culture. But as representative of the traditional spirit of German culture, Lutheran bigotry triumphed. The influence of Renaissance Humanism was shortlived in Germany. The conflict between nationalist Protestantism and the ambition of the Pope precipitated the Thirty Years' War, which plunged Germany into a prolonged state of political chaos, social disintegration, intellectual apathy and cultural reaction, Lutheranism degenerated into a paralysing orthodoxy. A pedantic scholasticism held the German mind in fetters-Literature was blighted by a pseudo-classicism.

The stagnation was broken by a revival of mysticism in poetry. It imitated the romanticism of the late Renaissance, and preached patriotism through folk songs. The leader of the mystic romantic school of literature

Opitz (1597-1639) ushered in the era of German *Marinismo*. His book on poetry became the theoretical text book of the German romantic literature for a hundred years. During that period, German poetry and drama degenerated into *Schwulst* (bombast).

Friedrich von Logau (the first Silesian school) was the first to rebel against the shallowness and vulgarity of pseudo-romanticism. His epigrams exposed the vices of the time and held up to ridicule the vain bloodshed of the Thirty Years' War waged in the interest of Christianity. The standard of revolt was carried forward by Grimmelshausen. *Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus* was the best novel of the period. It was uncompromisingly realistic in depicting the results of the Thirty Years' War. On the other hand, German *Marinismo* touched the lowest depth in the second Silesian school of Lohen-stein and Hoffmann Walden.

Pending the slow process of social recovery from the consequences of the Thirty Years' War, intellectual life recuperated under the rationalist influence of Samuel Puffendorf, Christian Wolff and Leibniz.

The cultural and literary revival of Germany began with Brockes at the close of the seventeenth century. He

could be called the pioneer of German romanticism. Having begun his literary career as a Marinist, he was the first to be repelled by the bad taste of *Schwulst* and

-come under the influence of Milton and other early English romanticists. A reverential attitude towards nature and religious interpretation of natural phenomena were the characteristic features of his poetry. His main work *Irdisches Vergnuegen in Gott* introduced natural religion in Germany. In contrast to the religious bigotry, puritanical pose and moral cant of the Reformation, Brockes' poetry breathed the pagan and humanist spirit of the Renaissance. Belief in God could be reconciled with happiness on this earth. Piety did not preclude pleasure. The literary revival initiated by Brockes, now almost completely forgotten, attained maturity in

Klopstock and Kleist. But in the intervening period,, there was a development in the contrary direction.

The shaft of Bouhour's criticism was directed against *Schwulst* also. With his notorious arrogance, he questioned: "Can a German possess spirit"? (The French word "esprit" has a much broader connotation). Stung to the quick, by the French criticism, a group of German writers founded the *Deutschuebende Poetische Gesellschaft* at Lepzig with the object of combatting the vulgarity of the *Schwulst*, and reviving the classical spirit in German literature. Gottsched was the leader of the group. At that time, Boileau was the mentor of literary taste in the whole of Europe So, the new literary movement came under the influence of French classicism. While Leibniz and Thomasius advocated improvement of the German language and the creation of a typically German literature (although Leibniz himself wrote mostly in Latin and French), Gottsched and his group tried to imitate the French style and subordinated themselves to the criterion of French criticism. Plagiarising Boileau, he laid down rules to guide the writing of poetry and particularly drama. He was rather a pedagogue than a poet and fell into the errors of formalism and artificiality. Nevertheless, he was the harbinger of German classicism, and as such prepared the ground for Lessing, although the latter severely castigated his. attempt to put poetry in the straight-jacket. Nevertheless, Gottsched did succeed in driving bombast and buffoonery from the German stage. That itself was an achievement. Without the now almost forgotten Gottsched, there might not be a Lessing.

The Italian influence reasserted itself on German literature through the Zurich school of Bodmer and Breitinger. But in the meanwhile, the aesthetic theory and literary taste in Italy had survived the post-Renaissance decadence. The neo-romantic period of the Italian literature had been ushered in by Muratori and Gravina. Bodmer and Breitinger were influenced by the new move-

ment; they were also attracted by Milton and were not ignorant of Shakespeare. But the Italian influence was predominating. They pleaded for the freedom of imagination in poetry and opposed what they called the pseudo-classicism of the Leipzig school. They held that not reason but imagination was the instrument of artistic creation, and insisted that no restriction should be imposed upon it by prescribed rules of form and style. The main issue of the controversy was the legitimacy of the miraculous in poetry, and the Zurich school won the battle. "The victory of the Swiss meant the liberation of poetry from its long thralldom to the reason; the poet was free to soar."¹⁵

The literary controversy had a philosophical implication. It was the conflict between secularism and the lingering religious bias. The French classical literature of the age of Corneille and Racine heralded the Enlightenment. A German literary revival on that model, as Gottsched recommended had the same historical significance; it marked the beginning of the *Aufklärung*. Italian neo-romanticism was anti-Cartesian and as such was devoutly catholic. It was a reaction against the pagan spirit of the Renaissance. It is true that the Zurich school of literary romanticism was influenced also by the poet of the English revolution. But they were attracted rather by the Puritanism of Milton than by the revolutionary appeal of the *Paradise Lost*. Therefore, with all their Lutheran piety, Bodmer and Breitinger could not produce anything even faintly resembling a religious epic with a powerful revolutionary appeal. That was to be done by Klopstock, who originally belonged to the Zurich school, but was repelled by its narrow pedantry and circumscribed vision. *The Messiah* was the first masterpiece of German romantic literature. As a true romanticist of the Renaissance tradition, Klopstock, while nearing his sixtieth year, hailed the Great Revolution and called upon

¹⁵J. G. Robertson, *Ibid*.

his countrymen to follow the example of their French brothers. Klopstock's nationalism found its noblest expression in his regret that Germany was not the first to raise the banner of freedom.

Under Lessing's leadership, German literary revival moved definitely towards classicism. Although he brushed aside the pedantry of Gottsched, as well as rejected the religious orthodoxy of the Zurich school, Lessing had more in common with the former who, with all his shortcomings, was the pioneer of German classicism. Lessing fully shared Gottsched's admiration for the French literature which heralded the Enlightenment. Maintaining that German literature could not simply be an imitation of the French, Lessing nevertheless was very sympathetically inclined towards the eighteenth century French philosophy and freely admitted that he had learned more from Diderot than from anybody else. At home, he was the severest critic of the half-hearted, cowardly, false prophets of the *Aufklaerung*, who actually hindered spiritual emancipation by confusing philosophy with theology, by preaching a "rational Christianity" as against the old Lutheran orthodoxy. Lessing characterised them as neither Christian nor rational. While Lessing was the founder of German classicism, his contemporary, Hamann, the "Magi of the North", preached romanticism which grew out of the native soil, so to say.

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Curiously enough, one of the greatest Germans and keenest intellects of all times, lived during the period of spiritual coma which preceded the revival of German literature and outburst of German philosophy. Born two years before the conclusion of the ruinous Thirty Years War, Leibniz died before the birth of Lessing. But he was rather a European than a German, of the tradition of Roman universalism, as much at home in Paris as at the Court of Hannover. It was not until the

'eighteenth century that national consciousness was fostered to put an end to cultural cosmopolitanism and Christian universalism of the Middle-Ages. Spiritually living in the idealised mediaeval atmosphere, Leibniz was indifferent or oblivious of the actual condition of Germany. Nevertheless his philosophy was one of the major factors which provided the spiritual impetus to German revival.

The conflict of classicism and romanticism in the German *Aufklaerung* literature and the degeneration of the latter into chauvinistic nationalism, even after the two apparently antagonistic views of life had found a grand synthesis in Goethe, took place on the background of the philosophical consequences of the Reformation. The protracted quarrel over Christian dogmas kept the intellectual life of Germany more or less isolated from the main current of European thought which originated in the Renaissance. Consequently, scholasticism had a longer lease of life. The deplorable condition of Germany in the seventeenth century was brought about "by the intellectual exhaustion of the country after the great struggles of the Reformation, by its political agitation .and its moral degeneration. While all other nations profited by the fresh breath of nascent intellectual liberty, it appeared as though Germany had fallen a victim in the struggle to obtain it. Nowhere did ossified dogmatism seem narrower than among the German Protestants, .and the natural sciences especially had a difficult position. While skepticism, sensationalism and materialism gained ground in France and England, Germany remained the ancestral home of pedantic scholasticism. The restlessly fermenting element, which in France became increasingly active, was not entirely wanting in Germany. But it was diverted by the predominance of religious -views into various curiously involved, and at the same time subterranean paths, and tije confessional schism dissipated the best forces of the nation in interminable struggles ending in no lasting result. In the Universi-

ties, an increasingly rude generation took possession of the chairs and the benches.”¹⁶

During the latter half of the seventeenth century. Germany provided the leadership of the opposition to the new philosophy preached by Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke. Leibniz made a valiant effort to save the lost cause of theology, and he succeeded to such an extent that his philosophy, simplified by Wolff into “rational psychology”, wielded a considerable influence in Germany up to the first half of the eighteenth, century. German romanticism grew in that reactionary philosophical atmosphere. The authority of Leibniz” kept the Cartesian philosophy out of Germany until the end of the seventeenth century. Ultimately, when the new philosophy did break into the last stronghold of reaction, it came as the mystic pantheism of Spinoza to inspire German romanticism.

At the dawn of the modern times, rationalism thus occupied a very minor place in the spiritual evolution of Germany. Leibniz was indeed a rationalist, though of the scholastic tradition; and he used scholastic rationalism to combat the secularisation of reason. Previously, even rationalist theology had been discarded. The Reformation was a throwback to the fundamentalist faith, which had no use for rationalist theology. Melanchthon’s attempt to resurrect Aristotle resulted in an intolerance unsurpassed even in the dark Middle-Ages. Therefore, German romanticism was so very unbalanced, and ultimately turned out to be more reactionary than in post-revolutionary France. As a matter of fact, the reckless romanticism preached by Rousseau found a most congenial atmosphere in Germany; the mystic concept of General Will became the foundation of the German doctrine of the all-powerful State.

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¹⁶ Lange, *History of Materialism*.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, Germany” came out of her intellectual isolation under the leadership of the Prussian King Frederick the Great. He invited to his Court eminent scientists and men of letters from other countries, particularly, France. Not only did Voltaire live three years in Sanssouci; the famous French mathematician Maupertuis was invited to accept the presidency of the Prussian Academy founded by Frederick’s grandfather. It was renamed *Academic des Sciences et Lettres*. Its scientific section was placed in charge at first of the Swiss mathematician Euler and thereafter of Lagrange. Thirteen out of the eighteen members of the Academy were foreigners, mostly French. Even de la Mettrie, evicted from France and Holland, was welcome in the Prussian Court. French became the Court language. “The intellectual atmosphere was so French” as made Voltaire feel that he was still in France. In 1752, Winckelmann said that he had found Sparta and Athens at Potsdam. Voltaire wrote: “In the morning, he is a great king; after dinner, a talented author; and always a humanist philosopher.” Frederick himself described the atmosphere of his Court as “the feast of reason and the flow of soul”.

Enthusiasm, and perhaps also the ambition to be the “Roi Soleil” of Germany undoubtedly carried Frederick too far. “Yet, his neglect of the intellectual springtime of his country, however regrettable for himself, may be regarded on the balance as a blessing. It was far better for the German mind to develop on its own lines than to be cramped by the patronage of the Crown.”¹⁷ In his little treatise on German literature published in 1780, Frederick described Germany as he found her in his youth. “The root of the trouble is in the language, *a demi bar bare*, which it is impossible even for a genius to handle with effect. Let us be sincere and frankly confess that so far *belles lettres* have

¹⁷G. P. Gooch, *Frederick the Great*.

not prospered on our soil. Germany had produced philosophers, but not poets or historians. German culture had been thrown back by the Thirty Years War.” What was to be done to improve the situation? The first task was to perfect the German language. The classics of all languages, ancient and modern, should be translated, so that writers and readers might learn from the best models. France had shown the world what could be achieved. In the seventeenth century, her authors set the standard for the whole of the continent. Germany should learn from her. Philosophy should be taught in its historical evolution, from the Greeks to Locke.

That was an ambitious, but realistic programme of spiritual revival of a country which had sunk to the lowest depth of stagnation. If Frederic failed to appreciate the splendid outburst of German genius during his lifetime, the historical significance of his bold pioneering could not be minimised. It was under the impact of the French Enlightenment that the belated German Renaissance took place. And it stands to Frederick’s credit that he anticipated the coming of the Golden Age. He wrote: “Let us have some Medicis, and we shall have some geniuses. An Augustus will make a Virgil. We shall have our classical authors; every one will wish to read and profit by them. Those bright days of our literature have not yet come. But they are drawing nigh. I announce that they will appear, though I am too old to witness them. I am like Moses, and I gaze from afar at the Promised Land.”

The Renaissance came to Germany through France and Frederick acted as the usher. That fact, however, had an unfortunate effect. It created an inferiority complex in the average German mind, which, though overwhelmed for a time by the humanist cosmopolitan spirit of the *Aufklaerung*, became the evil genius at German history. From Fichte, German romanticism came to be an irrational outburst of a morbid psychology, But before it so degenerated, romanticism attained the

fullest glory in Germany, and in that period of maturity it was neither a cult of irrationalism nor the antithesis of classicism. The historical connotation of the German word *Aufklaerung* is thought illuminated by reason; obedience to tradition and authority was to be replaced by individual judgment, which could be formed only through free enquiry.

“The romantic doctrine is in fact no less a daughter of the Renaissance than the faith of Boileau himself. The antagonism in classic and romantic thought has, indeed, a strangely unsubstantial basis, when it is examined closely. To understand not the antithesis of classicism and romanticism, but their synthesis, is the way progress lies.”¹⁸

Romanticism so interpreted was represented by Herder and the Weimar poets; but Herder soon differed from the latter's form-idolatry. With Goethe and Schiller, romanticism was a literary trend; with Herder, it was a philosophy. Goethe also came around to the more comprehensive view; but then he called himself a classicist, although he never abandoned the romantic conception of self-culture, which was the cardinal principle of his personal philosophy. While Herder raised romanticism to the level of a philosophy, Goethe was the most perfect personification of that view of life—a spiritually free man, who could transcend the limitations of his environment, creative in every respect—in literature, science and philosophy; the first “whole man” representing the totality of human genius since Leonardo.

The roots of German romanticism as developed by Herder might be traced to Vico; but it had nothing to do with Rousseau. It originated in Hamann's revolt against Kant, when the latter moved away from the ground of science to construct a system of transcendental metaphysics. He undertook the critique of pure reason not only under the influence of Hume's scepticism; he was, as Cassirer has shown, deeply impressed by

¹⁸ T. fl. Robertson, *The Genesis of Romantic Theory*.

Rousseau's revolt against reason.¹⁹ So, the positive aspect of German romanticism was not a cult of irrationalism. It was a development of scientific naturalism, which was enriched by a greater appreciation of the role of man in history. Subjectivism is not necessarily irrational; there is no such thing as purely objective knowledge.

The proclamation of the sovereignty of man, that he is capable of making his own destiny, ceased to be a dogma opposed to the old dogmas of religion when a new insight into the historic and pre-historic past revealed that human history is not the process of the unfoldment of a divine purpose; that, on the contrary, it is the sum total of human endeavour from time immemorial. The new understanding of history provided a scientific foundation to the romantic view of life, which centers around the faith in man's creativeness. With the rise of the scientific philosophy of history, the humanist faith of romanticism became an empirical proposition. Vico had blazed the trail; but it was Herder who made a philosophy of romanticism. He viewed man as a part of nature, all the widely differing forms of human development being natural processes. Kant interpreted human development as the growing faculty of the rational free will opposed to the operation of nature. In contrast to the Kantian super-natural anthropology, Herder defined history as 'a pure natural history of human powers, actions and propensities modified by time and place'.²⁰

In such a view of human development, as a part of the process of biological evolution, the distinction between instinct and intelligence disappears; the corollary is the abolition of the dichotomy of intuition and reason. Herder's romanticism thus was far from being a revolt against reason; on the contrary, it conceived nature, including man, as a natural process. Herder thought that instinct was associated with the lower level of biological

¹⁹ "Ernst Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe*.

²⁰ *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte*.

.evolution, and intelligence with the higher. In other words, instinct is the primitive form of intelligence, and intelligence is discriminating instinct.

Deduced from an identical source—"the natural history of human powers, actions and propensities"—ethics and aesthetics became united in Herder's romanticism. He conceived art as the expression of the totality of human feelings and human life; logically, he attached greater value to the content of artistic creations than to their form, and emphasised the moral element in art. But Herder was not a moralist; he was a humanist. Reminiscent of the Cartesian dictum—"the highest truth is the highest beauty"—he held that there was a close connection between the good and the beautiful. Herder rose above the controversy between classicism and romanticism in literature by declaring that the criterion to judge aesthetic values was not form; it was not a mere matter of taste; but their human content. He merged the romantic theory of aesthetics into the humanist philosophy.

In the earlier part of his long career, as the pole star of Germany's Augustan age, Goethe was more of a romanticist than Herder. In *Goetz van Berlichingen*, he idealised the picture of the robber-knights of the sixteenth century and ushered in the fateful *Sturm und Drang* period of German romanticism, fateful, because the glorification of the role of heroes in history encouraged the cult of Teutonism, which Goethe himself subsequently denounced as a barbarous extravagance. The *Sorrows of Werther* won for Goethe the reputation of the greatest writer of contemporary Europe. Sentimentalism is the main theme; but the underlying gospel is that the world belongs to the strong. The *Sturm und Drang* concept of romanticism was reinforced. It reaches its climax in the earlier part of *Faust*, where eternal dissatisfaction is described as the essence of life. Having long "been "disgusted with knowledge", the young Faust cries: "Let us appease burning passions in the depth of natural sensuality. Let us hurl ourselves into time's dynamic

sweep.” Yet, in an advanced age, Faust complains that he has never lived, and buys from Mephistopheles the offer of a satiated life at the price of his soul. The heroic concept of life becomes “demoniac” under the storm and stress of experience. At that stage, Goethe himself recoils from the reckless romanticism of his youth; but the cult of: life-worship, which is nothing but sublimated selfishness, became the essence of post-Aufklaerung romanticism—the glorification of the lawless becoming of the hero and his demoniac greatness went into the making of the fantastic but fearful concept of the superman. The giant of the romantic age lived long enough to be repelled by the result of the extravagance of his own youthful enthusiasm and to pronounce the verdict: “The classical I call healthy, and the romantic, the diseased.” Goethe warned Germany particularly against the romanticism which revived the heroic lore of the Nibelungen Saga, condemning it as a return to the pre-Roman barbarism.

In the second part of *Faust*, Goethe’s view of life changes. It becomes the epitome of the history of the time, and also a mirror of the poet’s own life, enriched by experience and a more realistic conception of man’s place in history and his duties to society. It depicts a picture of the struggle between romance and realism, sentimentality and sober judgment, faith and reason, emotional abandon and critical conscience, naivete and cynicism.

In *Faust*, there is a whole philosophy of life deduced’ from ripe experience and based upon a profound wisdom. It is not a closed system of hypothetical propositions and final truths logically deduced from them; it is a system of thought, in the process of evolution, modified as well as enriched by expanding experience. It is a vivid picture of life actually lived, “such as no European poet had given to the world since the Renaissance”.²¹ Therefore, *Faust* has been described as the “divine comedy of eighteenth century Humanism”.

²¹ *Encyclopedia Britannica* (13th Edition).

A philosophy of life depicted in the process of crystallisation, out of the unstable amalgam of experience, unstable because of the unpredictable elements of life, is expounded autobiographically in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. Poetry, after all, is not all fantasy. Subjectivism short of selfishness does not blast the foundation of objective truth. To harmonise ethics with aesthetics is the essence of the romantic view of life. Goethe succeeded where most men of the Renaissance had failed. Therefore, he can be called the perfect embodiment of the spirit of the Renaissance—the archetype of the modern European. As such, he closed the idle controversy between romanticism and classicism by denying the supposed contradiction between the concepts of freedom and law. “Genius above all is willing to obey the law, for genius knows that art is not nature. And only law can give us freedom.”

CHAPTER III

ROMANTIC EXTRAVAGANCE

TOWARDS THE end of the eighteenth century, Rousseau's influence spread to Germany, and romanticism became an ally of cultural and philosophical reaction. Revolting against the "mechanical spirit of science", it cultivated poetic mysticism in tune with the post-revolutionary reaction in France. As against the classical romantic ideal of individual freedom, it preached the cult of the "spiritual whole". At the same time, it exalted the notion of the particular heroic personality in opposition to the cosmopolitan, democratic, humanist individual. Logically, reason was subordinated to emotion, and the *Folksgeist* was placed above individual judgment. A distorted version of Darwinism came in handy to provide a pseudo-scientific sanction for the cult of the superman. "Caught in an obscure welter of motives, thought turned readily in the direction of Darwinism—a philosophy which, distorted from the ideas of its author, was playing havoc with political and moral ideas in Western Europe as well as in Germany. Henceforth, the political thought of Germany is marked by a curious dualism—an abundance of remnants of romanticism and lofty idealism; and a realism which goes to the verge of cynicism and of utter indifference to all ideals and all morality; but what you will see above all is an inclination to make an astonishing combination of the two elements—in a word, to brutalise romance and to romanticise cynicism."¹

The typically German romanticism began to take shape in the beginning of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the ideas and ideals of the Great Revolution.

¹ Ernst Troeltsch, *The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politic*.

Its object was to provide a pseudo-philosophical sanction to nationalism, which was rising to resist the powerful appeal of the revolution. The *post-Aufklaerung* German romanticism, therefore, was indeed a revolt against the eighteenth century. It was a reaction to the penetration of French culture, which at that time represented the high-water mark of modern Europeanism.

In Prussia, a cultural revolution was imposed from above; but in the rest of Germany, particularly in the regions bordering on France, the Enlightenment had spread in a normal manner. Imitating the Italian tyrants of the Renaissance period, German Princes patronised learning, literature and art. Leibniz lived at the Court of Hannover; Klopstock, Lessing, Kleist and their contemporaries, in Saxony; and the little Duchy of Weimar could be called the Athens of the later eighteenth century. And learning and culture everywhere welcomed the influence of France.

In the nineteenth century, German romanticism identified itself with Nationalism, which drew inspiration from Herder's idea of the folk soul and also from the *Sturm und Drang* romanticism of young Goethe. But with Herder, folk-soul was an anthropological concept. He conceived the process of historical evolution as an "organic, plant-like unfolding of folk-souls." It was indeed a romantic notion, borrowed most probably from Vico and full of dangerous implications. Nevertheless, Herder conceived it as a hypothesis of his cosmopolitan Humanism. All early romanticists imagined that the mystic folk-soul was the fountain-head of the inspiration for beautiful literature. After the French Revolution, glorification of the German folk-soul became the credo of romanticism. "The lyrical poets of the (German) romantic school were inspired by the new national sentiment. In contrast with the spirit of humanity of the eighteenth century, the conception gained currency of an essential genius peculiar to each people, manifested in the works of its past and the spontaneous output of

the popular masses—beliefs, tales, songs, in which German romantics sought their material.”²

Romanticism was claimed as a specially German virtue—an outburst of the Teutonic soul. “Romanticism is Germanic and reached its purest expression in those territories which are freest from Roman colonisation. Everything that is regarded as an essential aspect of the romantic spirit—irrationalism, the mystic welding together of subject and object, the tendency to intermingle the arts, the longing for the far-away and the strange, the feeling for the infinite and the continuity of historic development—all these are characteristic of German romanticism, and so much so that their union remains unintelligible to the Latins. What is known as romanticism in France, has only its name in common with German romanticism.”³

This neo-romanticism had its roots in the image of the two conflicting souls which haunted Goethe in the earlier part of *Faust*. Eventually, that poetic obsession gave birth to the highly tendentious doctrine of the contrast between *Kultur* and civilisation. The latter was Latin, Western; whereas *Kultur* was German. Fichte expounded this doctrine in his famous *Speeches to the German Nation*. He reminded the Germans that they were the *Urvolk* who spoke the *Ursprache*, which gave them the contact with the forces of nature. Therefore, declaimed the philosopher of German nationalism, German minds returned more easily than those of other nations to the instincts and concepts of the primitive world, from which the West, under the joint influence of classical thought and Christianity, had sought to escape. German nationalism was thus admittedly a revolt of barbarism against civilisation; *Kultur* was the virtue of Rousseau’s noble savage. Only, when the savage comes

²Charles Seignobos, *The Rise of Modern European Civilisation*,

³Gustav Pauli, quoted in *Geschichte der Deutschen Kunst* by George Dehio.

to the civilised world to demonstrate his virtue, he turns out to be anything but noble.

“If Western Europe, international in mind and tendency, looks upon civilisation as a system of ways of behaviour and spiritual ideas that are humane and susceptible of universal application, the Germans understand by *Kultur* an intimate union between themselves and the natural forces of the Universe, whose action they alone are capable of apprehending, and as a tribal discipline designed to turn those forces to account. Fichte insisted, only the Germans know the method of realising this intimate Union.”⁴

German nationalism was romantic in the sense that it rejected the “arid rationalism” of the West. As the philosopher of the universal history of humanity, revealed in the light of anthropology and philology as an evolutionary process, Herder has been immortalised as the “gate-keeper” of the nineteenth century. But ironically, German nationalism, inspired by his concept of the folk-soul, discarded his cosmopolitan-humanist philosophy and interpreted history as a “lawless becoming”, breeding-ground of supermen and *Fuehrers* of immaculate conception, and therefore naturally absolved from all responsibility.

“Whoever believes in the existence of a natural, eternal and divine law, I mean, in a common and universal basis of humanity, and sees the very essence of humanity in this universal basis, will see in German thought a queer mixture of mysticism and brutality. But whoever considers that history is an unceasing creation of living individual forms, which are ordered according to a continually variable law, will see in Western ideas the product of an arid rationalism, a levelling atomism—in short, a mixture of platitude and pharisaism.”⁵

If Fichte was the philosopher of romantic nationalism,

⁴A. Kolnai, *War Against the West*.

⁵Ernst Troelsch, *Deutscher Geist und Westeuro-pa*.

its most fanatic preacher was Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, affectionately called by his disciples, Father Jahn, because of the long beard the young man bore as a standing protest of the caveman against civilisation.⁶ Together with the poet Arndt, Jahn became famous as “the populariser of the teaching of the folk-soul.” Herder had just died; he must have turned in his grave. For a book on the German language, Jahn got a doctorate from the Leipzig University. While as student, he came under the influence of the neo-romantic movement founded in 1800 by the Schlegel brothers. With the basic credo of folk-soul, the new school of German romanticism raised the issue of “the organic versus atomistic society”. Romanticism began to betray itself; free development of individual personality was its original credo. A most fanatical convert to the new creed of a falsified romanticism, Jahn “purified” his book on philology by purging it of all “ungermanic words”. The tradition of the Nazis was more than a hundred years old. Jahn presently went further in his fanaticism. He declared that he was opposed to the slogan, *Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite*, not because it was the cry of the Great Revolution, but because they were French words.

Jahn preached that the unconscious force of the folk shaped history. This mystic force he called the *Volkstum* — “that which the folk has in common, its inner existence, its movement,, its ability to propagate. Because of it, there courses through all the veins of folk a folk-like thinking and feeling, loving and hating, intuition and' faith.”⁷

Jahn's fantastic ideas were collected in a book called *Volkstum*. In it, he wrote that the Greeks and the Germans were “humanity's holy peoples.” That was anticipating Hegel, who wrote a whole philosophy of

⁶ Jahn actually lived in a cave for some time, and like a besieged caveman used to roll huge holders down on the jeering: crowd.

⁷ Friedrich Ludwig Jahn's *Werke*, edited by Karl Euler.

history to prove that the Greeks and the Germans alternately incarnated God. Hegel was not a romanticist; by his time, romanticism had ceased to be a fashion; metamorphosed as culturally chauvinistic nationalism, it had become the ominous shadow of a terrible reality cast ahead. Jahn anticipated not only Hegel, but Hitler also. He called for the biological purity of the folk. "Animal hybrids have no genuine power of propagation, and hybrid peoples have just as little posterity. The purer a people, the better; the more mixed, the worse."⁸ The Mediterranean peoples belong to the hybrid race; they have no folk-souls; therefore, they have no future. Thanks to their isolated existence, the Germans were the only pure race with the folk-soul; the future belongs to them.

Placed side by side with Fichte's *Speeches to the German Nation*, Jahn's *Volkstum* was treated as the gospel of German nationalism. The two, an uncouth ruffian and a philosopher, were honoured as "the spiritual godfathers of the newer Germany."⁹ Another irony of history!

The bastard of German romanticism was still to degrade it to its very opposite; individualism was to be sacrificed for the satiation of the collective ego—the folk-soul. Jahn called for "the participation of the individual in the happiness and suffering of the whole." And the romantic soul of Germany responded to the appeal. That abject self-abnegation was the apotheosis of German romanticism.

Richard Wagner was "the last mushroom on the dunghill of romanticism."¹⁰ In 1830, according to his own testimony, Wagner "became a revolutionary at one bound". He declared that art's mission was to "rise above national vanity to a feeling of universality," and prayed that "the master will come who writes in neither Italian nor French

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ J. Friedrich, *John Als Erzieher*.

¹⁰ Max Nordau, *Degeneration*.

nor German fashion.”¹¹ In that ecstatic state of mind, he went to Paris—“the capital of world culture”. Under the influence of the “French ideas of rationalism and atomistic liberalism”, Wagner proudly called himself an “anti-mystic materialist”. Three years after, he returned to Germany, a morbid Francophobe. In his autobiography, he wrote: “What awoke my longing for my German homeland was the feeling of homelessness,” born of atomistic individualism, wrongly identified with the romantic view of life. The reaction was to lose himself in an organic collectivity. In that rebound, he composed *Meistersinger*, which concludes with the chorus warning Germans against the corrupting influence of the West. Nietzsche called the *Meistersinger* a “lance against civilisation”.

After the abortive revolution of 1848, romanticism found a philosophical umbrage in Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the omnipotent free will. Wagner’s *Tristan* breathed that new philosophy. He repudiated his former “optimistic faith in reason and progress”, and declared that “nothing really happens but what has issued from this Will—a headlong blind impulse.” He discovered that there was a German music and a Jewish music, the one good and the other bad. To glorify the good German music, he dramatised the Teutonic myths, the romanticism against which Goethe had sounded a warning. Wagner’s was the swan song of German romanticism. He cried: “Be brave enough to deny the intellect,” to be tossed by Schopenhauer’s Will—the dark brooding force which the pessimistic philosopher hated and which he wanted to be resisted and destroyed by human spirit. But Wagner preached complete abandon, abject surrender: “Ye err when Ye seek the revolutionary force in consciousness and would fain operate through the intellect. Not Ye will bring the new to pass, but the folk which deals unconsciously and, for that reason, from

¹¹ Richard Wagner, *Mein Leben*.

.nature-instinct. Revolution is the movement of the mass towards acquisition and employment of the force hitherto in the hands of the unit. The mass attains to the same force as the individual, and only on this standpoint is freedom possible.” On the authority of Rousseau, Robespierre had declared that liberty must be imposed on the minority which disagreed with the General Will; and Wagner gave the cue to the Nazi Storm-Trooper who said: “We spit on freedom, the folk must be free.” They recognised their indebtedness to the romanticist Wagner by eulogising him as “the revolutionist against the nineteenth century.”¹² German romanticism thus was not only a revolt against the revolutionary eighteenth century, but also the liberal-democratic nineteenth century.

The romantic revolt in Germany had such a far-reaching significance because it found a new sanction in the predominating philosophy of the nineteenth century. The empiricism of the eighteenth century philosophy, particularly of Locke and Hume, had weakened the subjectivist foundation of the Cartesian system. German idealism from Leibniz to Schopenhauer revived subjectivism, which provided a philosophical support to the pseudo-romantic cult of self-love. The Leibnizian monad became the ideal of romantic individualism, self-development, the fundamental principle of ethics. Goethe’s cult of self-culture evidently had a bearing on monadology. But subjectivist morality may also lead to moral nihilism, as demonstrated by the extravagances of the aberrations of the nineteenth century romantic revolt.

“The romantic movement, in its essence, aimed at liberating the human personality from the fetters of social convention and social morality. But egoistic passions, when once let loose, are not easily brought again into subjection to the needs of society. The romantic move-

¹² K. R. Ganzer, *Richard Wagner, Der Revolutionaer Gegen das Neunzehnte Jahrhundert*.

ment brought the revolt into the sphere of morals. By encouraging a new lawless ego, it made social cooperation impossible, and left its disciples with the alternative of anarchy or despotism. Egoism at first made man expect from others a parental tenderness; but when they discovered with indignation that others had their ego, the disappointed desire for tenderness turned to hatred and violence. Man is not a solitary animal, and so long as social life survives, self-realisation cannot be the supreme principle of ethics.”¹³

Romanticism in philosophy reached the climax in Fichte. For him, the ego was the only ultimate reality; it exists by postulating itself. The metaphysical concept of the ego was presently attributed to the folk. The ego of the German people was the supreme reality. As Bert-rand Russell remarks, Fichte carried his collective subjectivism to “a kind of insanity” when he declared “to have character and to be a German undoubtedly mean the same thing.” The insanity was so very contagious that Goethe’s satire of it became a favourite slogan of nationalism. In Faust, a romantic youth exclaims: “In German you are a liar if you are polite.”

Romantic egoism consumed itself. Since the ego is the only ultimate reality, there cannot be a plurality of egos. The concept of the folk-soul, therefore, meant elimination of individual egos, even of the insane philosopher himself. Fichte was the philosopher of totalitarianism. Schelling pushed romantic philosophy a step further in his conception of the World-Soul. The Universe is an indivisible organism, greater than the sum total of all its parts. On that philosophical foundation, Hegel built his metaphysical theory of the State. The Leviathan made no room for individual freedom. Having thus betrayed its own ideal, romanticism became an instrument of reaction.

This development of German philosophy was deter-

¹³ Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*.

mined by its point of departure, which was a neo-scholastic tendency intended to combat the scientific naturalism and Humanism of the eighteenth century. Not only Leibniz, but Kant, Fichte and Hegel also represented that retrograde tendency, which found its fullest expression in Schelling and Schopenhauer. It was a revival of theology and subordination of knowledge to a mystic pantheistic conception of will. Hume's scepticism is generally believed to be the starting point of Kant's critical philosophy. The fact, however, is that Kant regarded Hume's ideas as disruptive, to be combatted to safeguard metaphysical orthodoxy. His affinity with Rousseau was responsible for his sympathy with the Great Revolution in the earlier stages; and it was equally under Rousseau's influence that he provided a philosophical justification to the reactionary romantic revolt. But his apparently empirical epistemology introduced intuitionism in philosophy, though on a pseudo-scientific ground. *A priori* categories of knowledge-conceded irrationalism a place in philosophy. "His-philosophy allowed an appeal to the heart against the cold dictates of theoretical reason, which might, with a little exaggeration, be regarded as a pedantic version of the Savoyard Vicar."¹⁴

Schopenhauer divested Kant's philosophy of its-scientific verbiage and revealed its core of irrationalism— of the tradition of Rousseau. By placing will above knowledge, he supported the romantic revolt, but abandoned the ground of philosophy, to relapse into religious mysticism. The romantic revolt, in its turn, degenerated into the irrational cult of cultural nationalism, which proved to be the greatest pest of the twentieth century. The tallest romanticist of the period realised the danger of nationalism. Goethe characterised it as a disease which "is the more virulent the more backward is the people." He also said: "Patriotism corrupts history." And Nietzsche, the last great exponent of romanticism,

¹⁴ Ibid.

described nationalism as “this disease and madness most inimical to culture”, Asking the Germans to forget Wagner, Fichte and Bismark, he prophesied: “Sluggish, hesitating races would require half a century ere they could surmount such atavistic attacks of patriotism and soil-attachment, and return once more to reason, that is to say, to good Europeanism.”

* * * *

The romantic revival of the Italian and German literature drew inspiration from Shakespeare, Milton and Addison. English literature had a tradition of its own, a tradition of non-conformism with the classicism of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Since Shakespeare had refused to conform with the classical rationalist criterion of poetry, the tradition of English aesthetics was romantic. Dryden tried to tip the scale on the side of classicism, but he had to make concessions to the native tradition. Finally, on the basis of a critical appreciation of the national literature, particularly of Milton, Addison formulated a theory of aesthetics which influenced the romantic movement on the continent. “In his suggestive paper on imagination, Addison laid the foundation of the whole romantic aesthetics in England. The new theory of creative imagination provided the basis on which the great German poetry of the later eighteenth century was reared.”¹⁵

Milton, like Dante and Goethe, was a class by himself. Regarded as the genius of English Puritanism, he nevertheless rejected Calvinist orthodoxy. His *Areopagitica* was a passionate protest against the intolerance of religious bigotry, cast in the classical Athenian style. The principle of the freedom of speech, to make the truth triumph, defended boldly by the more rationalist Independents, came to be an article of faith of Libera-

¹⁵, T. G. Robertson, *The Genesis of the Romantic Theory*.

lism. But at the same time, Milton anticipated Rousseau in expounding the doctrine of an aristocratic democracy. He was a democrat who demanded the people to submit to the wisest and the best, to raise government beyond popular mutation, and to elevate civic duty into religion. He declared that, by the trial of just battle long ago, the people lost their right, and it is just that a less number compel a greater to retain their liberty rather than all be slaves.

Milton's idea about the origin of civil society was very much like that of Hobbes. But he lacked the latter's rigorous realism, and believed in the fall of man, which belief inspired the great epic *Paradise Lost*. So, Milton can be called a romanticist. "He is the best example of the stirring of men's souls to their very depths by the great issues of the time; the pitch of self-sacrifice to which they rose in devotion to their ideals, the foundations of the democratic movement in new religious conceptions."¹⁶

But the English nature-poets of the nineteenth century were influenced by German romanticism as well as by Rousseau's flight from reason. But in the beginning, their revolt was purely aesthetic, against the utilitarian standards of modern civilisation. In a sense, a healthy movement, it became absurd when Darwin's praise of the earthworm for its usefulness was derided by comparison with the aesthetic grandeur of Blacke's admiration of the beauty of the tiger. But for the invidious comparison, one could appreciate the aesthetic sense in the admiration of the beauty in the wild and the fearful. Yet, it went too far when the romanticists attached aesthetic value to everything strange, grand and terrifying, such as the Middle-Ages, Gothic architecture, deserted castles, so on and so forth. "Something which at one point is eccentricity or even madness, at another extravagance, at another the imagination that

¹⁶ *Encyclopedia Britannica*. 13th Edition.

makes known the unknown, and that always has a little of the desire of the moth for the star, has never dropped out of English letters and English life. It is almost always accompanied by distrust of anything exact, completed, regular, planned. Life is conceived as a force that is weakened and eventually destroyed by any kind of constraint. Life must ever attempt the impossible, and fail; for the alternative to the attempt and the failure is death. Law, reason and convention try to set bounds to human activity, and make life impossible. Therefore, those who are on the side of romance will be for Nature against Art, and for all that *grows* against all that it made”¹⁷

All these might have been harmless aberrations, if, under German influence, British romanticists did not find a spiritual ideal in the idea of nation. It landed them in the camp of political reaction.

If revolt against reason was the essence of romanticism, then Burke was the greatest romanticist. To oppose the revolutionaries who addressed their appeal to human reason, Burke denied that reason was the right basis of politics, and maintained that, for a good government, belief in tradition, the lesson of accumulated experience and a hereditary ruling class incorporating the assets, were of supreme importance. His revolt against reason and revolution served the most unromantic purpose of providing conservatism with a philosophy.

Wordsworth, Coleridge and Southey were adolescents at the time of the Great Revolution, which they all hailed with enthusiasm. The fascinating ideas and lofty ideals of the revolution were propagated in England by William Godwin. His *Political Justice* introduced the young poets *to* a philosophy which combined scientific rationalism with romantic enthusiasm. But given to sentimental nature-worship, they were influenced more by Rousseau's romanticism than by the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Consequently, when the revolution failed to attain the

¹⁷ Crane Brinton, *The, Political Ideas of the English Romanticists*.

Utopia, poetic enthusiasm was dampened. Disillusioned romanticism allied itself with the enemies of the revolution. The conception of nature and humanity of the Lake-poets was mystic and sentimental; it had little in common with scientific naturalism of the eighteenth century which inspired the ideology of the revolution. Disillusionment with the development of the revolution helped them to shake off the superficial loyalty to the ideals of cosmopolitan Humanism. Reactionary romanticism was flourishing in Germany. Wordsworth made a pilgrimage to the land of Goethe and Schiller; he came back with the realisation that the motherland had a stronger hold on his affection than he had imagined. Southey said that the Peace of Amiens “restored in me the English feelings which had long been deadened and placed me in sympathy with my country.” The romantic poets rallied behind Burke when he raised the standard of revolt against the eighteenth century and called for a crusade against the Great Revolution. Burke’s “romantic” politics was a negation of democracy. “The people are not answerable to their present supine acquiescence; God and nature never made them to think or to act without guidance and direction,” which could come only from the old aristocratic families—the great oaks that shade a country.”¹⁸ And the romantic poet Coleridge is ranked with the Tory Canning as one of the worthiest disciples of Burke! Already in 1798, Coleridge wrote: “I have snapped my squeaking baby trumpet of sedition, and the fragments lie scattered in the lumber-room of penitence.”

Coleridge, not quite a visionary like Wordsworth, tried to work out a whole system of philosophy to justify the reactionary role of the romanticism of the Lake poets. Drawing inspiration from Schelling, he hoped to reconcile a reinterpreted and purified Christianity with a transcendental philosophy. He proposed to base politics on that

¹⁸ Letter to the Duke of Richmond.

synthesis of philosophy and religion. Declaring that the curse of the age was the divorce of philosophy and politics from religion, he would combine scientific psychology and religious inspiration in an idealist philosophy under the sovereignty of a mystical Christianity. The mystic religious trend of British romanticism found the purest expression in Blake's Natural Theology.

Byron and Shelley were the leaders of a romantic revival in England. They were also nature-worshippers, but for them "Nature" was an emotionalised version of the Reason of the philosophers of the Enlightenment. They revolted against the compromise their elders, the Lake poets, had made with the established social order, its laws, conventions and constraints. Proclaiming that change was the only law they obeyed, they wanted to change the given conditions of society and life. But they could not visualise the desired change in a historical perspective. Their romanticism was a burning faith in the creativeness of man, but it was not intellectually disciplined. The heart got the better of the head; imagination and enthusiasm were not buttressed on a solid; foundation of knowledge and critical realism. Therefore, the heralds of a true romantic revival tended towards anarchism, and their magnificent revolt, expressed in sublime poetry, ended in despair.

To be more successful, the romantic revival must be inspired by the tradition of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Reason and romanticism, law and freedom, intelligence and will, are not mutually exclusive. They are inextricably interwoven in the biological becoming of man. By grasping that basic fact of human existence, man moves forward on the endless road to freedom, which is not an ideal, but an experience. Human life itself is the greatest romantic adventure.

CHAPTER IV

LIBERALISM : ORIGIN AND TRADITION

THE PHILOSOPHICAL doctrines and political principles which contributed so very considerably to the Enlightenment had originated in England. The philosophers of the French Revolution were more influenced by Locke than by Descartes. Their mechanistic naturalism, based upon the physical and biological knowledge acquired during the previous two-hundred years, drew inspiration from the Renaissance and also from the Epicurean tradition revived by Gassendi. But directly, it was the outcome of the materialist rationalism of Hobbes. Nevertheless, while the revolutionary ideas germinated in England crossed over to the continent to inspire the Great Revolution, the country of their origin came under the reactionary influence of the Reformation. Under that influence, the revolution in Britain ended in a compromise.

The Humanism of the Renaissance led to the rationalism of the seventeenth century, the devastating critique of Bayle, the urban secularism of Montaigne and the iconoclasm of Voltaire—all contributing to the Enlightenment. But Protestant Puritanism degenerated into religious bigotry, cultural reaction and social conservatism. The British Government, controlled by the political disciples of Locke (Whigs), opposed the Great Revolution. Powerfully voicing “the revolt against the eighteenth century”, Burke forced a differentiation in the Whig ranks, which split up between the conservative liberals and the radicals, the former joining the Tories against the menace of revolutionary democracy.

But rationalism survived Burke’s onslaught. In the nineteenth century, Britain replaced France at the van of modern civilisation. A still-born child of the revolu-

tion in France, democracy found a safer home across the Channel. The eighteenth century was the age of reason in alliance with romanticism. The Enlightenment was the result of that alliance. Therefore it was the fecundest period of modern history. The Enlightenment spread the liberating message of man's creativeness in the tradition of the Renaissance, which, in its turn, was inspired by the heritage of ancient wisdom, culture, learning and knowledge. But the liberal rationalism of the nineteenth century drew its inspiration to a great extent from the Reformation, and therefore reinforced conservatism as against romanticism. "It was neo-classicism—a feeble imitation of the intellectual grandeur and cultural effulgence of the age of the Sun King on the continent or of the Elisabethan period in England. After the romanticism of the Lake Poets had landed them into the manly embrace of Toryism, Shelley and Byron represented the last flare of literature of the liberal age of prosperity and optimism.

The creativeness of human spirit, at the same time, found a magnificent expression in science. Having survived the romantic devagations of the Great Revolution, in the nineteenth century, reason quietly sowed the seeds of a far greater revolution. At the same time, man conquering nature with the power of rapidly growing scientific knowledge was the greatest romantic adventure.

Owing to the fact that the evolution of liberal thought in modern times synchronised with the growth of certain economic institutions—mercantilism and industrialism—and actually subserved their purpose, it has been called the ideology of the rising bourgeoisie. Economic factors and social changes, no doubt, influence ideas; but the economic interpretation of history or the sociological approach to the history of philosophy is often misleading. Nevertheless, it is no longer confined to the Marxists. Others have taken up the Marxist method of explaining the development of ideas. Professor Laski, for example, has done so in tracing the roots and growth

of Liberalism. "What produced Liberalism was the emergence of a new economic society at the end of the Middle-Ages. As a doctrine it was shaped by the needs of that society."¹ Historically, that is hardly an accurate statement of fact. There was little of Liberalism in the economic society of the sixteenth or even the seventeenth century. The mercantilist bourgeoisie was politically associated with the rising Nation-States asserting the divine right of despotic kings as against the supremacy of the Roman Church. As it has been pointed out by more penetrating historians, "there was a good deal more of Liberalism of a sort in the Middle-Ages than there was in the sixteenth century, the age of new despotism . . . of through-going economic regulation in the interest of the Nation-State."² Professor Laski himself modifies the statement quoted above. "It is customary to call the whole period between the Reformation and the French Revolution the age of mercantilism; and it is certainly true that until the latter part of the eighteenth century there was no wide appreciation of Liberalism in the economic field." The roots of Liberalism as a philosophy of life can, indeed, be traced in the intellectual ferment of the sixteenth century and earlier. But the philosophy was not appreciated by the bourgeoisie until a much later time. Liberalism, therefore, was not created by the needs of the new economic society. As a philosophy, it developed independently, according to the logic of the evolution of thought. Later on, a particular class accepted it. That sequence of historical facts does not warrant the statement that Liberalism is the ideology of the bourgeoisie or, in other words, is the philosophy of capitalism.

Yet, critical scholars and sober historians, such as Max Weber, Sombart, Troeltsch, Hauser and Tawney, who

¹ Harold J. Laski, *The Rise, of European Liberalism*.

² A. L. Rowse, *The End of an Epoch*, Chapter on The Rise of Liberalism."

do not share Professor Laski's sympathy for the Marxian economic interpretation of history, have tried to trace a causal connection between capitalist economy and Protestantism, which is supposed to be the source of inspiration of the liberal outlook of life. Marx Weber, for instance, argues that the rise of capitalist economy was very much helped by the puritanical doctrines of Protestant Christianity so as to warrant the judgment that the latter were preached to serve the purpose.³ Although Weber's classical work has been enlisted in support of the Marxian interpretation of history, and provided the impetus for a vast literature on what may be called sociological historiography, it only shows that Protestantism was professed by the rising bourgeoisie because it was congenial to their temper and appeared to suit their economic purpose. That, however, does not prove a causal connection; nor is a similar relation between capitalist economy and Liberalism established.

Professor Tawney traces the simultaneous development of Puritanism and capitalist economy, and shows how the two influenced each other. But nowhere does he dogmatically assert that the connection was exclusive or causal. "Puritanism had its own standards of social conduct, derived *partly* from the obvious interests of the commercial classes, *partly* from its conception of the nature of God and the destiny of man. These standards were in sharp antithesis, both to the considerable surviving elements of feudalism in English society, and to the policy of the authoritarian State, with its ideal of an ordered and graded society. . . . Sapping the former by its influence, and overthrowing the latter by direct attack, Puritanism became a potent force in preparing the way for the commercial civilisation which finally triumphed at the Revolution."⁴

It is suggested that the social doctrines of the

³ Max Weber, *Protestant Ethics and the Rise of Capitalism*.

⁴ R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*.

religious pioneers of Liberalism were partly influenced by the interests of the commercial classes, but only partly. The basic principles about the nature of God, and man's relation to him, were conceived independently of that partial influence. Religious beliefs, philosophical principles, social changes, economic developments of the same historical epoch are mutually influenced. But to attach primary importance to one of them and trace the origin of the rest to it, is evidently wrong. "While from the point of view of historical struggles and social changes, a body of doctrines can be conveniently regarded as a by-product, from the point of view of theory and of the values of human experience, it may have an importance over and above the historical conditions that brought it into being. Without going so far as to regard it as an end in itself, it is obviously something more than a byproduct."⁵ That is a more realistic appreciation of the relative significance of the various factors going into the making of history. Only, it may be noted that religious doctrines and philosophical ideas can be greatly influenced by the operation of social factors, but they are never brought about by the latter, do not originate in them. They have their own history, past and future. The two histories, the history of thought and the history of social events, are in some periods so very intertwined that they cannot be easily disentangled. Hence the confusion about their interrelation.

The interrelation is correctly described by a recent constructive critic of Liberalism. "As a way of life, Liberalism reflected the intellectual, social, economic and political aspirations and ideals of the rising commercial classes. In consequence, the relationship between Liberalism and capitalism was an intimate one. But it would be a mistake to see in Liberalism only a convenient rationale for capitalism. For the liberal ideology was something more than a mere excrescence or mental

⁵ A. L. Rowse, *The End of an Epoch*.

reflex expression of an economic system. It was the embodiment of the seventeenth century mentality and as much a cause as an effect of the economic system that was developing at that time out of the collapse of feudalism. It was not simply an economic philosophy and way of life, but a political, social and intellectual philosophy and way of life as well. Liberalism and Capitalism, moreover, developed concomitantly and simultaneously. And since Capitalism is as much a system of ideas as it is a way of doing things, it was as much the product of the mentality of the rising commercial classes as the mentality was the product of the system. Both Liberalism and Capitalism are derived from the individualistic *Weltanschauung* that came into existence with the Renaissance and the Reformation.”⁶

Locke was the prophet of modern Liberalism, and he attached supreme importance to property. On that authoritative evidence, Liberalism has been characterised as the philosophy of capitalist acquisitiveness. Professor Laski, for instance, asserts: “The idea of Liberalism is historically connected, in an inescapable way, with the ownership of property.” But one needs only to read Locke without any prejudice to be convinced that his conception of property had little in common with the parasitic capitalist ownership of the means of production. He denned property as the product of one’s own labour, and argued that man was the owner of his body, and therefore he is the owner of whatever he creates with his hands. He “hath mixed his labour with it and thus removed it out of the common estate.”⁷ Locke further declared that reason, which rules supreme in the state of nature, taught “that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possession.”“ There speaks not the philosopher of capitalist exploitation, but a prophet of

⁶ John H. Hallowell, *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology*

⁷ Locke, *Two Treatises on Government*.

Communism. Indeed, the connection between philosophical Liberalism and Communism is logical, whereas that with capitalist economy is fortuitous. By insisting upon property, Locke anticipated the socialist and genuine democratic contention that without economic security liberty is meaningless. In the political thought of his time, the concept of liberty was abstract and metaphysical. Locke put in it a concrete material content. His doctrine of property was tantamount to the socialist demand for the fruits of one's own labour. It was a message of liberation, not only for the serfs, who were not owners of their bodies, but also for the slaves of future capitalist totalitarianism. The property of Locke's conception actually included, in addition to material goods, with which one "hath mixed his labour", life itself and liberties. Therefore, he declared that civil society was established with the object of the preservation of property.

If to regard Liberalism as the ideology of the rising bourgeoisie is wrong, to trace its origin in the Reformation is an equally false reading of history. Luther's original doctrine that religion was a matter of individual conscience objectively had a liberating significance. But he did not stand for the spiritual liberation of man. Religious reform advocated by him was meant to break the power of the Pope. With that object, he invoked the power of the German Princes. Consequently, the Reformation, far from serving the cause of rising Capitalism, reinforced Feudalism and helped the rise of Nation-States under despotic monarchs. As defender of absolute monarchy, claiming to rule by divine right, Lutheran-ism became the greatest menace to religious freedom-Liberalism would hardly be proud of that parentage. It has been suggested that "*Babylonish Captivity*" contained the outline of a programme of political liberty. If the origin of political Liberalism is to be sought in the history of revolt inside the Christian Church, it is more noticeable in the Conciliar writers of the fifteenth cen-

ture than in Reformation. Luther struggled for the freedom of the feudal Princes and the Protestant clergy. "For pure political liberty he never cared at all. The whole bent of his mind was really in favour of secular authority. He really believed in its divine origin and in that of human inequality."⁸ The traditional Christian doctrine is that inequality in this world is the consequence of the fall from Grace. The implication is that it is unnatural. Luther believed that human inequality was providential. It is evident that the liberal political theory of democracy can find sanction rather in Catholicism than in the Reformation.

If earlier traditions are excluded, the origin of Liberalism and democratic political theory can be found in the movement for the secularisation of politics, which preceded the Reformation. So long as political authority claimed super-natural sanction, it was absolute. The idea of democratic control could arise only after the secularisation of political authority. The Reformation made a contribution to the movement for the secularisation of politics, and in that sense, it can be appraised as a contributory cause to the rise of Liberalism and Democracy. But at the same time, it represented a reaction as well, Luther's hostility to Aristotle did not weaken the hold of theology. Indeed, the Reformation ushered in an era of unprecedented bigotry, which plunged Europe in the long period of religious wars. During that period, hold of theology was no weaker than in the Middle-Ages. The result of Luther's denunciation of Aristotle was the elimination of rationalism from Protestant theology and also from politics. The authority of the Scriptures was asserted even more dogmatically than before. The process of the secularisation of politics was retarded by the practice of justifying every social institution by an appeal to the Scriptures as interpreted by Protestant casuistry. The demand for the transfer of human allegiance from the

⁸ *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. II.

religious to the civil authority was a feature of the sixteenth century. But it was completely silenced in Calvinist countries. Lutheran Princes pretended to embody civil authority as against the spiritual power of the Pope exercised through the Catholic hierarchy; but they buttressed their civil authority on divine right. Luther justified their tyranny as divine retribution for man's sins. He never showed the least sympathy for representative institutions. The Conciliar movement was more democratic than the Reformation.

Pending the centuries of struggle for supremacy between the spiritual and temporal power, occasionally, the latter asserted itself; the struggle itself implied a claim to the independence of civil authority. The Reformation was not the successful culmination of that struggle. On the contrary, for the first time, the two powers were completely united in the Protestant Princes. Politically, the Reformation can be characterised as the restoration of theocracy. The Nation-State of the sixteenth century was a theocratic State. Even Melancthon who, compared with Luther, was certainly a Liberal, declared that there was nothing nobler than the State—the shadow of Hegel cast ahead. It was not an accident that the prophet of modern Statism belonged to the Lutheran Church.

Notwithstanding the reactionary tendencies of the Reformation, and the following period of religious intolerance, the older movement for the secularisation of political authority succeeded in the sixteenth century in laying the foundation of Liberalism. The democratic demand for representative institutions had also been raised inside the Church by the Conciliar movement. The pretension to divine right did not enable the theoretically theocratic monarchies to prevent the State developing as a secular institution; and as such, it could not be beyond the possibility of human control. The power of the Prince might be absolute; but the State was administered by fallible men who did not possess any

divine right, and the King could not transfer it without forfeiting his kingship. By challenging the validity of the ecclesiastical laws, for the conscience of the laity, Melanchthon undermined the prerogative of the King to make laws on the authority of his divine right. For those laws would also *be* of the ecclesiastical nature. A place was made for civil laws given by secular authorities. As the culmination of the process of secularisation, the State replaced the Church as the emblem of civil society. That great revolution was theoretically justified by Hooker, who defended the Anglican High Church against Puritanism. Suggesting for the first time that the State had its origin in a contract between the ruler and the ruled, he formulated the fundamental principles of Liberalism and democratic political theory.

The outlines of modern political theory were drawn in Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, written to combat the Calvinist demand for a union of the Church and the State, the former being the dominant factor. Hooker maintained that it was wrong to derive from the Scriptures rules of secular conduct; that God has laid down no universal precepts, but has left men free to decide their behaviour according to the expediency of time and place, always under the rule of the Law of Nature and Reason. Locke drank deep in the fountain of Hooker's wisdom and preached the philosophy of modern Liberalism. He was neither a Calvinist nor a Puritan, but an Anglican. The English Reformation had little analogy with the movement in Germany. Led by a King, its issues were purely secular. There was no theological dispute of any importance between the Church of England and the Mother Church of Rome. Liberalism rose out of the Reformation in England, because its germs had sprouted in the Middle-Ages when the Catholic Church was the sanctuary of rationalist thought and progressive learning. The Reformation proper, which took place on the continent, was an interlude; it was rather a setback

to the agelong striving for intellectual progress and spiritual freedom.

The most substantial contribution to the rise of Liberalism in the seventeenth century was made by the confessional disputes between monarchs and their subjects in certain parts of Europe. That new factor to disturb the unity of the mediaeval Christian order resulted from the Reformation, although Germany under Luther V, direct influence remained free from that fruitful disturbance, but for which “there could have been in the seventeenth century few relics of any form of popular liberty or of any check on monarchical tyranny.”⁹ The evil effect of the Reformation, which fortified the belief in the divine right of kings, to justify the revolt of the German Princes against the Holy Emperor, and thus sanctified the absolute power of the Princes as against their subjects, was countered in other countries by the existence of subjects who did not share the confession of the King. That situation gave birth to the most important question for the jurists and moralists of the time. Was resistance to the monarch in defence of religious liberty, the freedom of conscience, permissible? Luther as well as Calvin, together with the other leaders of the Reformation, could not conceive of any such disruptive question ever arising. They were all advocates of the monolithic Nation-State, which would not tolerate any confessional controversy any more than the least encroachment upon the absolute civil authority of the monarch. But confessional differences between subjects and the sovereign spread in the Netherlands, France and Britain, and on that foundation were formulated the principles of modern Liberalism and Democracy: Freedom of conscience, of worship, toleration, popular right to resist tyranny, so on and so forth.

The infamous massacre of St. Bartholomew in France provoked the most passionate manifesto of popular

⁹ *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. III.

liberty in the form of two memorable publications which made history. One was *Franco-Gallia* by the famous jurist Francis Hotman. The appeal was not to civil law sanctified by the divine right of kings, but to history, to the numerous vindications of liberty in the past ever since the time when tyrannicide was a virtue in ancient Greece. On the evidence of history, Hotman justified the right of resistance of the *Estates General* and other popular bodies. His book has been rightly appreciated as amongst the earliest treatises on modern constitutional history.

The other book, *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos*, published anonymously about the same time, was of still greater importance. It could be called the manifesto of the revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The idea of an original contract was expounded in that book written before Hobbes and Locke, not to mention Rousseau, but with a very important proviso: "The people agreed to obey on condition of good government, and only on this condition." The foundation of the State presupposes surrender by the people of such parts of their natural liberty as are essential for the preservation of peace and order. The surrender, therefore, is neither complete nor irrevocable. The Huguenot pioneer of Liberalism was more democratic than Rousseau. He ex-palmed : "Is it reasonable to suppose that men who are by nature free and equal could have been so devoid of sense as to surrender their property and lives to a government except on conditions?"

But the Huguenot movement as a whole was not democratic. It was under Calvinist influence. The right of resistance claimed for communities on religious grounds was denied to individuals; the latter were enjoined to seek remedy in prayers and tears, a practice popularised by the Puritans in England. The Huguenots advocated what might be called "representative government"—the right of resistance belonged to public functionaries assembled in the Estates.

A similar tendency was represented by the Whigs in England—those pioneers of modern Liberalism. They were great landlords—the beneficiaries of Henry VIII's Reformation, and therefore loyal to the throne until Tory Erastianism compelled them to revolt against the Anglican Church. Confessional difference led them to resist the King's absolutism. They were Dissenters, not Puritans. Their politico-religious doctrines had been sarcastically described as "Puritanism and water". In the middle of the seventeenth century, Selden raised the issue of divine right of Kings *versus* contract between the King and the people as the source of civil authority. The conservative Liberalism of the Whig bourgeoisie was soberly expounded by that great jurist: "Kingship is divine, and based on patriarchy; yet, a King is a thing men make for their own sakes, granting privileges on condition that he guards their liberties; the moment he neglects this, the privileges are forfeit and he comes within the power of law."¹⁰

More or less similar doctrines were preached by number of other writers, one of whom declared: "Rulers are by God's will, but are accountable to man, God creating the office, man setting its limits."¹¹ That was a far cry from Revolt of the Angels called the Reformation. Luther entrenched monarchy in God's authority; Whig Liberalism denied God's, absolutism, and, reversing the venerable dictum, declared: "God proposes, but man disposes." The relation between Liberalism and the Reformation is very tenuous indeed; and the pioneers of Liberalism in England hailed from the Whig aristocracy, whereas in Germany the Reformation served the cause not of capitalism but of the feudal Princes.

The subtle attack on the authority of God galvanised the doctrine of divine right. Filmer was the leading spokesman. He maintained that the origin of kingship

¹⁰W. Selden, *Table Talks*.

¹¹J. Ware, *The Privileges of the People*.

was patriarchal or patrimonial. Treating the Bible as a sociological record, he applied historicism to politics, and regarded the origin and development of human society as natural. But with this modern method, he came to the conclusion that monarchy was the only legitimate form of State, and that the monarchist State was divine because it was natural.¹² Filmer's writings are believed to have influenced the course of the English revolution to a considerable degree. His defence of divine right was successful. "Divine right was one way of expressing obedience, orderliness, continuity; it made 1660 and 1689 bloodless revolutions and saved the throne from a bastard in 1679."¹³

On the other hand, Filmer's successful defence of reaction and apology for restoration gave an impetus to liberal political thought, to be expressed boldly by Sidney. But the Whigs were no more democratic than the Huguenots in France. They also demanded "representative government", offering themselves as the trustees of the people. Therefore, they disowned Sidney's republicanism. They would have even less of the more intemperate Harrington. Yet, Sidney did not say anything more revolutionary than Locke did soon after him. That was yet another evidence against the view that Liberalism was formulated as the philosophy of the rising bourgeoisie, and that the needs of capitalist economy brought about the Reformation.

Sidney was neither a Whig nor a Puritan. Ridiculing Filmer, he wrote: "Protestantism and liberty will both flourish under a Popish Prince (who) taught that his will is law."¹⁴ In a vigorous style, which has been recognised as a remarkable contribution to political literature, Sidney declared: "A king who breaks the law ceases to be a king; the people can judge and depose kings; parlia-

¹² R. Filmer, *Patriarcha Non Monarcha*.

¹³ Cambridge Modern History, Vol. VI.

¹⁴ *Algernon Sidney, Works*, edited by J. Robertson.

ment is as old as the nation; a free people may assemble when they please.” If that was much too revolutionary for the conservative-liberal Whig party, Cromwell also did not stand for such republicanism. Therefore, when he hanged Sidney for treason, the former acquiesced. The “Glorious Revolution” even disowned Milton for his republicanism. At Oxford, the poet’s political pamphlets were dedicated to the flames together with the works of other Republicans.

While the seeds of modern Liberalism sown in the soil ploughed by Grotius, Hobbes and others were still sprouting into tender plants, to flower into the republicanism of Milton, Harrington and Sidney, ultimately to bear the fruit of Locke’s philosophy, Whiggery made a compromise between the laws of God and man-made laws, between the divine right of the king and the popular right to restrict royal prerogative. The plea was that the balance should be held by those who by birth and estates were the most vitally interested in security and orderly progress, “so that the nobles should not be forced to unite with the commons to make head against the Crown.” The conservative Liberalism of the Whig party as formulated by its most authoritative exponent, Daniel Defoe, paradoxically maintained that parliament had often harmed the country, but *vox populi* saved it. Who raised that voice, traditionally said to be the voice of God? The king. Defoe characterised the Crown as the emblem of the people’s will, and suggested that, against a tyrannous legislature and persecuting High Church men, the Crown and the people should unite to produce the “patriotic King.” Louis XIV had made the experiment successfully in France. In England it was even more successful. Incipient Liberalism remained bogged in a compromise with mediaeval prejudices until the Great Revolution shattered the illusion set up by the Glorious Revolution. Philosophical and political issues, clouded until then, were clarified by Burke’s brilliance, which turned over the apple-cart of the Whig party, and gave

an impetus to liberal thought, as Filmer had done for Whiggism a century earlier.

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In order to trace the roots of Liberalism and democratic ideas, and to appreciate their true significance, one must not begin with any preconceived notions, but be guided by the logic of the evolution of thought, by the objectivity of the dynamics of ideas themselves. For centuries, patterns of thought had been cast in the religious mould. Modern science itself was inspired by the ideological view of a lawgoverned Universe. Rationalism was born in the theological schools of the Middle-Ages. The origin of scepticism, the powerful solvent of faith, tradition and authority, can be traced in the scholastic disputations of learned theologians. Modern social and political ideas similarly grew out of the historical background of religious controversies and metaphysical speculations of a disinterested intellectual pursuit. The speculations of the sixteenth century about the origin of civil society not only undermined Christianity by an implicit rejection of the biblical doctrine; it also laid down the foundation of Liberalism and democratic political theory. The notion of contract is much older than Rousseau, Locke or Hobbes. It rose out of the background of the “theological age” of the sixteenth century. Indeed, it was suggested by earlier mediaeval writers. “Religion alone gave the leverage to liberty which otherwise would have perished in the development of the central power.”¹⁵

The theoretical justification of monarchist absolutism was provided by the early attempts (of Marsiglio, Bodin and Machiavelli) for the secularisation of the civil power. It was reinforced by the Reformation,- which preached the divine right of kings. Democratisation of politics resulted from the revolt of religious minorities*

¹⁵ J. N. Figgis, in *Cambridge Modern History*. Vol. III.

against the Erastian tendency of absolute monarchs. In the sixteenth century, the tyranny of the centralised civil power (monarchist Nation-States) was so overwhelming that any resistance could not possibly be organised except by an appeal to conscience, by making it a religious duty to revolt against tyrants. That is why *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* was such a powerful contribution to the literature of the epoch. It raised such questions as: (a) whether subjects are in duty bound to obey their rulers when their commands are contrary to the law of God and (b) whether it be lawful to resist a ruler who is purposing to abrogate the law of God? It is evident that the voice raised in the sixteenth century against religious persecution heralded not only the Puritan revolt of the seventeenth century, but also the Great Revolution of the eighteenth.

“It was only religious earnestness, the confessional conflicts and the persecuting spirit of the sixteenth century that kept alive political liberty, and saved it from a collapse more universal than that which befell republican ideals at the beginning of the Roman Empire.”¹⁸

Eventually, the doctrine of natural law was opposed to the tyranny of monarchist centralism, which had followed feudal anarchy. As revived in the sixteenth century, that ancient doctrine tended towards secular rationalism. The assumption of an original contract based upon the doctrine came to be the starting point of democratic political philosophy. A doctrine so very full of a subversive significance and revolutionary potentialities, nevertheless, was endorsed by famous ecclesiastical writers like Althusius and Hooker. Althusius held the sixteenth century view of the State; it was omnipotent and holy, allowing no independence to the ecclesiastical authority; he was an Erastian. Indeed, his conception of the State was mediaeval; there was no room for the-individual; it was a State of the Estates—a confederation

¹⁸ Ibid.

of communities. It was a patriarchal hierarchic conception. Yet, Althusius held that the civil government was based on a contract, and the people as a whole was the supreme authority. It was, indeed, a totalitarian conception of democracy; but so was Rousseau's; and totalitarian implication has been the curse of modern democracy. The sixteenth century ecclesiast, however, was more democratic than the eighteenth century prophet of democracy. According to Althusius, sovereignty was inalienable; it always remained with the people. Closer to Locke than to Rousseau, Althusius, therefore, is to be regarded as a pioneer of Liberalism.¹⁷

Hooker discovered a divine sanction for democracy in his conception of the Natural Law. If kings ruled by divine right, the sovereignty of the people was also of divine origin. Religion provided the most powerful weapon to combat monarchist absolutism; it was, indeed, a leverage of liberty. "Her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men and all creatures of whatever condition so ever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their joy and peace."¹⁸

Tracing the roots of Liberalism and democratic ideas, one could go still farther back in history. The notion of contract is as old as history. Leaving the prehistory of the Old Testament out of account, the idea of original contract can be traced in Greek philosophy, Roman Law and the theological literature of the Middle-Ages. The Stoic conception of individuals as moral entities was taken over by Christianity. It proclaimed the equality of men because of the common possession of souls, which unified them in a universal moral order.

¹⁷ Vide J. Althusius, *Politics*.

¹⁸ Richard Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*.

The latter being rational, ideologically conceived, men were also endowed with Reason, which enabled them to restrain passions and evil emotions. The faith of Christianity could not penetrate the world of Hellenic culture unless it was enriched by the latter's legacy of rationalism. Christian theology inherited its mysticism from Plato, rationalism from Aristotle and morality from the Stoics.

Nevertheless, the individuality and equality of men proclaimed by Christianity, being gifts of a super-human power, ultimately man was not free—either to will or to create or to legislate. Human will was good inasmuch as it was an expression of the Divine Will; otherwise, it was the voice of Satan. Man could create only as an agent of God. In short, men were individual moral entities of equal worth only in the eyes of God; they realised their intrinsic merit through complete surrender to God, by Grace. For the practical purposes of life, they were mere illusions. But the boundless faith of the Christian Middle-Ages was based on Reason, and that was the saving grace, because of which Christian thought was the harbinger of modern Liberalism.

The “Renaissance of the twelfth century” was an intellectual ferment in the world of Christian faith. The ancient heritage of reason served as the catalyst. The Nominalists were the forerunners of the revolt of man in the fifteenth century. The germs of modern Liberalism can be detected in the religious revolt of the thirteenth century against papal absolutism. Speaking in behalf of the “Spirituals” of the Franciscan Order, “William of Occam defended the right of a persecuted minority against constituted authority. He appealed in the name of conscience and liberty. He raised the question of the right of minorities to resist coercion. He preached secularism by holding that the Emperor's power was not in the gift of the Pope; but at the same time, he would not grant absolute power to the Emperor. He maintained that the Emperor derived his authority from the “College of Electors.” A broader democratic franchise could not

possibly be conceived in those days. In the fourteenth century, European society was organised within the framework of the Church. Notwithstanding the struggle for centuries, the temporal power was still subordinated to the spiritual, which reigned supreme. But democratic ideas and institutions grew out of the prolonged struggle for reform of the Church government. How to curb the absolutism of the Pope was the political problem of the age.

Early in the fourteenth century, Marsiglio of Padua, that early advocate of secularism, and harbinger of the Renaissance, argued that the Pope and the Church hierarchy, being human, should not be permitted to pass the final judgment on the disputed articles of faith. He suggested an elected General Council in which inspiration would consult Reason to provide for the guidance of all, the clergy as well as the laity, an authoritative interpretation of the Divine Law¹⁹ The democratic idea of a General Council was taken up by Occam, who pleaded that the Church government should be constitutionalised by setting up a council which, representing the clergy as well as laymen, would be a body of Christian scholarship (reason) and faith. The General Council which came to be a powerful institution during the two following centuries was the forerunner of modern parliaments; the two great monastic orders—Dominicans and Franciscans—were the constitutional props of the General Council, they themselves being democratically constituted internally. Those highly significant political results followed from the purely intellectual struggle for the freedom of enquiry and judgment inside Christian society.

The Conciliar movement can be called the school of early political education. Its theory was clearly democratic; it demanded that the Church government, the only government of the time, must be representative, on

¹⁹ *Defensor Pacts.*

the ground that the whole body of the Church, including the faithful congregation of laymen, was the source of its law, the Pope and the hierarchy being mere public servants. The Church was identical with the entire community, and the sovereign power rested in the whole body. The logical implication of the theory was very disruptive for papal absolutism; nevertheless, it was boldly pointed out by Occam. That the General Council could depose the Pope, was a matter of common agreement. Wycliffe and John Huss were the heralds of modern democracy, and the heretical movement which shook the structure of the mediaeval Christian social order was revolutionary. It clearly brought out the political implications of the Church reform movement.

The doctrine of the divine right of kings, which, reinforced by the Reformation, enabled monarchist absolutism nearly to kill democracy at its birth, was a conception of the early democratic thought. It was first preached by Wycliffe, the leader of the English peasant revolt, and the inspirer of the heretical movement all over Europe. He declared that the king was the Vicar of God. That was a bold challenge to the power of the Pope; and democracy rose out of the struggle against papal absolutism. With the doctrine of the divine right, the temporal power was opposed to the spiritual power. Secularisation of politics was the condition for its democratisation. Wycliffe preached that in the affairs of this world, the royal power was of greater dignity than that of the clergy; and therefore the king had the right and the duty to remedy the abuses of the Church government.

As far back as 1433, Nicholas Cusa expounded fully the democratic implication of the Conciliar theory, so that the coming menace of monarchist absolutism was also challenged. On the authority of the common law, he maintained that no law, civil or ecclesiastical, royal proclamation or papal decretal, was binding unless approved and accepted by the community for which it was given. Cusa heralded the democratic doctrines of Natural Law

and natural equality of men, conceived and developed only in and after the sixteenth century, when he declared that the king should obey the law, because the law made the king.²⁰

The notions of equality and fraternity can be discovered even earlier. The peasant revolts at the close of the Middle-Ages were inspired by those ideals, preached by early Christianity. And Liberalism can be traced back all the way to Greek rationalism. Secularisation of politics resulted from the doctrine of the divine right of kings, and the movement for secularisation produced democratic ideas challenging the established order, monarchist as well as sacerdotal. Marsiglio of Padua, a contemporary of Occam, raised the first significant voice demanding secularisation of the civil authority. The philosophical basis of the political theory expounded by him was clearly of the Aristotelian tradition inherited through the Arab rationalist Averroes. Marsiglio actually believed that his *Defensor Pads* was a supplement to Aristotle's *Politics*. But except for the naturalist and rationalist point of departure, there was very little in common; and that was the point of departure also of the modern liberal and democratic thought heralded by the mediaeval jurist when he declared: "Human law is a command of the whole body of citizens, arising directly from the deliberation of those empowered to make law, about voluntary acts of human beings to be done or avoided in this world, for the sake of attaining the best end in this world."²¹ The case for the separation of reason and faith, pleaded by the Nominalists ever since the Renaissance of the twelfth century, provided not only the theoretical foundation for the demand of the independence of secular authority, but also for its democratisation. In the passage quoted above, Marsiglio expounded the doctrine of representative government-

²⁰ Nicholas Cusa, *De Concordantia Catholica*.

²¹ Marsiglio de Padua, *Defensor Pacis*.

Thus born in the bosom of the Church, and also in the revolt against the mediaeval religious social order, the germs of liberal and democratic thought found a clearer expression in the various doctrines of Natural Law and the origin of civil society developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Heralded by a long succession of pioneers, it was eventually given the form of a system of philosophy by John Locke. In Britain, Locke's immediate predecessor was Hooker, who summarised in his *Ecclesiastical Polity* the entire tradition of mediaeval political thought as represented by Thomas Aquinas.

Though its roots are thus ramified in past history, and can be traced through the Middle-Ages all the way back to Aristotle, modern liberal and democratic thought as it was formulated and elaborated in the seventeenth century contained entirely new elements. Secularism was its most distinctive feature, which was derived from the resurgence of science and the resulting philosophical revolution. At the close of the Middle-Ages, the problem of the imaginary relation between God and man, which for so many centuries had been the main concern of speculative thought, was replaced by a growing interest in the problems of the relation between man and man. Secularisation of politics was the condition for its unreserved democratisation, and Humanism laid down the foundation of true Liberalism. The decline of Liberalism after it had reached the high-water mark in the eighteenth century was due to the fact that originally, as formulated by Locke, its secularism did not go far enough; it was anti-clerical, but not irreligious; its Humanism was not naturalist in the scientific sense, but inclined towards natural religion; its rationalism, though not Ideological, was yet metaphysical; it placed reason in man, but conceived it not as a part of his biological being, but as the function of something transcendental; finally, its recoil from romanticism implied rejection of secular humanist ethics, and relapse into religion in search of a transcendental sanction for morality.

While the rich tradition of scholastic rationalism and of the struggle against papal absolutism and for democratisation of the Church government contributed considerably to the development of Liberalism and democratic political theories, it resulted directly from the secularisation of philosophy, the deposition of theology from the proud position of the queen of sciences, and the turning of the human mind from the vain speculation about an after-world to the problems of life on this earth. Though Machiavelli and Hobbes have rightly gone down in history as the creators of the theory of the modern secular State, the philosophical under-current, the process of the spiritual liberation of man, began with Marsiglio of Padua and culminated in Hobbes. John Locke as generally recognised as the philosopher of Liberalism. But that historical distinction belongs also to Spinoza, who was a greater philosopher. As political theorists, both were disciples of Hobbes. Philosophically, Spinoza stood nearer to the master; therefore, his political theory was more uncompromisingly democratic. Locke's Liberalism remained largely under Hooker's influence, and because of that could not break away completely from the religious tradition. Helvetius and Condillac rid it of the weakness; but in the post-revolutionary period, English Liberalism cast off the revolutionary influence of the Enlightenment, and reverted to the religio-conservative tradition of Locke.

The philosophical foundation of Liberalism was laid by Hobbes, because in him political thought was secularised without any reservation. He was the first to go to the roots of the baffling problem of the relation between the civil and sacerdotal authorities, between the State and religion. What is of still greater importance, is that Hobbes was the first to realise that a clear and unambiguous definition of sovereignty was the condition for a solution of the problem which had for centuries confused a long succession of learned ecclesiasts, clever jurists and speculative philosophers. The fundamental

principles of Hobbes' theory of sovereignty is that there is no difference between the sovereign and the people; the two are identical. It is true that Hobbes appears to identify the people with the sovereign. But a closer examination reveals the democratic essence of the theory. It is a double-edged sword.

Assuming that sovereignty belonged to the king, either by divine right or the original compact, the lawyers of the Tudor period exercised their ingenuity to devise constitutional limitations to the king's prerogative. Hobbes exposed the fallacy of the superficial approach to the problem of sovereignty. If sovereignty was derived from divine right, how could it ever be limited by man-made laws? And, on the other hand, all who claimed to hold sovereign power as per the original compact, king or the parliament or the protector, had in practice transgressed the supposed limitations. All these conflicts and contradictions were bound to arise unless sovereignty was conceived as expression of the people's will. That evidently is a democratic theory. Hobbes could dispose of the divine right of kings, because his theory of sovereignty was unreservedly secular, and therefore it was also democratic. "Temporal and spiritual are two words brought into the world to make man see double, and mistake their lawful sovereign. A man cannot obey two masters, and a house divided against itself cannot stand. Seeing there are no men on earth whose bodies are spiritual, there can be no spiritual commonwealth among men that are yet in the flesh."²²

The king appeared prominently in Hobbes' definition of sovereignty; but the reference, in the last analysis, was clearly not to a personal ruler. It was to the general will of the community. "The face is the face of a Stuart King, but the voice is the voice of a commonwealth."²³ Sovereignty results from the transfer of "the

²² Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*. *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. VI.

natural right of all to everything”; these rights, therefore,, are the source of sovereignty. They need not necessarily be transferred to the king. Hobbes assumed that originally it was so; therefore, he identified sovereignty with the Crown. But nowhere did he say that the “natural rights of all to everything” could not be transferred differently to give rise to an alternative symbol of sovereignty. The crucial point is the origin of sovereign power; Hobbes is quite clear on that point: it is the community.

Hobbes’ approach to the question of sovereignty was entirely original. For the first time, a political theory was deduced from fundamental principles. Since the time of St. Augustine, political theories had been deduced from the Scriptures. Politics was a part of religion, and as such dominated by theology. No earlier secularist, neither Marsiglio nor Bodin, could get out of the vicious circle. Machiavelli tried; but he was no philosopher.. His political doctrines lacked depth. They rather prescribed rules of political practice, which were vitiated by cynicism. Hobbes deduced his doctrine of sovereignty “from the principles of nature only”. He freed political philosophy from theology, and detached the early democratic movement from the religious prejudices of the Reformation. “None went to the root of the matter, as Hobbes did. Men took refuge in one despotic form after another. Through the welter of fogs and darkness, the trenchant theory of the *Leviathan* cuts its ruthless way like a blast of the north wind. It is clear-sighted where others were blind; consistent where they were confused, single in aim where others were entangled in contradictions. The mid-seventeenth century was a great creative time, but creation had hardly got beyond the stage of chaos. Hobbes saw better than anyone from what quarters of the sky light was to come.”²⁴

The supreme importance of Hobbes’ political theory

²⁴ *Ibid.*

was that it was expounded as an integral part of a philosophy, which was vigorously rationalistic and as such completely free from all religious and theological prejudices. The State ceased to be shrouded in metaphysical mysteries. Hobbes' philosophy 'embraced the entire scheme of the Universe, explained in terms of geometry and mechanics. Psychology and physiology were shown as biological processes in the context of a mechanistic cosmology. In between, there came society, described as the most complex of all bodies, formed according to, and governed by, natural laws. The entire scheme of the Universe, including man with his body, mind and soul, was self-contained, and therefore independent of any outside influence, control or guidance. The great revolt of man against spiritual slavery reached the climax in Hobbes' philosophy; as the charter of human freedom, it laid down the foundation of Liberalism and Democracy.

The fear, anger and hatred which Hobbes' philosophy provoked on all sides proved that it did not represent the interest of any class; that Liberalism was not the ideology of the bourgeoisie. It proved that ideas develop according to their own logic. The profoundly revolutionary philosophy of Hobbes was opposed with equal vehemence by the ecclesiasts, royalists, puritans and also by the rising bourgeoisie. "Instinctively, all, of whatever creed, felt that there was an enemy. Hobbes' doctrines were denounced as pernicious to all nations, destructive of royal titles, an encouragement to usurpers, unhistorical, unscriptural, immoral." Hobbes was "an Epicurean, a Cromwellian, foe of conscience, and religion, and an atheist." From the point of view of the rising bourgeoisie, he was regarded as "the foe of property, an enemy to chartered companies, corporations and trade."²⁵

The conventional view that Hobbes was the theore-

²⁵ *Ibid.*

tical apologist of monarchist absolutism is contradicted by the fact that Charles II is reported to have applied to him the biblical description "his hand against every man, and every man's hand against him." The leader of the Royalist Party, Clarendon, said that the *Leviathan* was written to please Cromwell; and he was not far from being right, because Hobbes did not make a secret of it that his views were valid for any *de facto* government. Only, as one of the greatest iconoclasts of all times, Hobbes was no more an apoloigist of the Anglican Clarendon than a flatterer of the Puritan Cromwell. But in so far as the Cromwellian cause was democratic, it could find support in Hobbes' philosophy which exposed the venerable fiction of the divine right of kings.

As a bold pioneer, Hobbes was far ahead of his time. No section of the contemporary society could accept his philosophy. It was a philosophy of the future, and was not appreciated until the nineteenth century. But if Whiggism was "Puritanism and water", the philosophical Radicalism of the nineteenth century was Hobbesian rationalism plus piety. Liberalism had grown out of the movement of ideas in the Middle-Ages. It was not a .creation of the bourgeoisie. But eventually, the latter found it suitable for their social purpose and adopted it. The credit of laying down a solid philosophical foundation of modern Liberalism really belongs to Hobbes, .because in no other political doctrine of the time is the basic principle of individualism so clearly stated. Hobbes held that nature had made made men essentially equal in faculties both of body and of mind. The attempt to create a political philosophy independent of theology led to a pragmatic approach to the problems of jurisprudence, civil government and social relations. That tendency culminated in the utilitarianism of the philosophical Radicals of the nineteenth century. It was a hand-to-mouth policy which really solved no problem. It established the English tradition of glorifying make-shifts into conventions, a jumble of which,

in course of time, was given the validity of a constitution. Upon the welcome liberation from the thralldom of theology, the pendulum of political thought in Britain swung to the other extreme. It became an article of faith that, human nature being incalculable, political thinking could not be strictly logical.

Hobbes had introduced rationalism in politics. The uncompromising secularism of his general philosophy enabled him to make this great contribution to political thought, and thereby make a political philosophy possible. He regarded reason as inherent in the biological being of man,²⁶ and with a rigorous logic deduced a whole political philosophy from that premise. Human nature is composed of reason and desire; all impetus to human action results from the latter, while the former functions as the regulating factor. Natural Law is “the dictate of Right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members as much as in us lies.”²⁷ Reason forbids man to do “that which is destructive of his life; and not to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.”²⁸ This fundamental hypothesis of Hobbes’ political philosophy also indicated the possibility of a secular psychology. Reason and instinct (desire) are not antagonistic; both being biological properties, the origin of neither is transcendental nor shrouded in mystery. Human creativeness results from the cooperation of the two basic urges. A secular rationalism and a scientific (as against speculative) psy-

²⁶ True Reason is no less a part of human nature than any other faculty or affection of the mind. True Reason is a certain law.” *De Give*.

²⁷ “By right Reason in the natural stage of man, I understand-not an infallible faculty, but the art of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may either redound to the damage or benefit of his neighbours.” (Ibid.)

²⁸ *Leviathan*.

chology logically deduced therefrom were the twin-pillars which supported the imposing structure of a political philosophy.

Grotius had heralded rationalism by freeing the ancient doctrine of the Natural Law from its traditional association with theology. He had gone to the extent of suggesting the possibility of a mechanistic interpretation of nature, detached from the idea of God. Yet, his rationalism retained a large measure of metaphysical teleology, which was a characteristic feature of the naturalist philosophy generally of the seventeenth century. Though divorced from the theological tradition, the Natural Law was a teleological conception. It was completely revolutionised by Hobbes. There are no immutable laws written in nature. The whole system of nature, including man, is a chain of causes and effects. Becoming conscious of this relation, man discovers the Natural Law. "The law of nature is a dictate of right reason."²⁹ "A law of nature is a precept, or a general rule, found out by reason."³⁰ The twentieth century science corroborates the subjective rationalist view of the Law of Nature as anticipated by Hobbes three-hundred years ago.

It was an integral Naturalism that Hobbes preached. In it, the dichotomy between man and nature disappears. Man is a part of nature, and nature is a rational process. Man's spiritual liberation is complete. The Humanism of the Renaissance becomes scientific Naturalism in Hobbes' philosophy, to lay down the foundation of liberal thought and democratic practice.

The principle of individualism is logically deduced, on the one hand, from the naturalist Humanism of Hobbes' philosophy and, on the other hand, from his rationalist doctrine of the origin of society. All other theories about the foundation of society were either based

²⁹ *De Give.*

³⁰ *Leviathan.*

upon the theological or teleological conception of Natural Law, or postulated an *ad hoc* compact. The one ruled out the possibility of a humanist philosophy based upon the principle of individualism; the other destroyed democracy at its birth: The basic biological urge of self-preservation compelled the realisation of the necessity of individuals combining in the struggle for existence. Reason, also a biological function, dictated certain rules for the governance of the community, and regulation of the relations of its constituent individuals. The rise of the community does not mean abdication of the individual. It is created by individuals to serve their respective self-interest more effectively.

Any political philosophy presupposes a definite view of human nature. Starting from the view that human nature is selfish, in the sense that self-preservation is the basic biological urge, and that the very selfishness gives birth to reason, Hobbes constructed a political philosophy which maintains that to promote the growth of the individuality of its members is the function of a social organisation; and thanks to its rational individualism the political philosophy of Hobbes, logically if not explicitly, lays down the most solid theoretical foundation of democracy.

“Hobbes was at once the complete utilitarian and the complete individualist. The power of the State and the authority of the law are justified only because they contribute to the security of individual human beings, and there is no rational ground of obedience and respect for authority except the anticipation that these will yield a larger individual advantage than their opposites. Society is merely an artificial body, a collective term for the fact that human beings find it individually advantageous to exchange goods and services. It is this clear-cut individualism which makes Hobbes’ philosophy the most revolutionary theory of the age.”³¹

³¹ G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*.

Assuming that Hobbes was an apologist of absolutism, which is not true, the most rigorous rationalism of his philosophy could only serve the cause of Liberalism and Democracy.³² Hobbes' philosophy is a classical instance of ideas unfolding themselves by their own logic with no causal connection with the context of social events. The development of European thought towards rationalism, naturalism and secularism was an unbroken process from the Renaissance of the twelfth century to-Hobbes. Liberalism was a continuation of that process.

The progressive implications of the philosophy of Hobbes were set forth clearly by Locke to become the principles of Liberalism. Though he disagreed with Hobbes on purely philosophical questions, that is to say, as regards scientific Naturalism, and was more in sympathy with pious Hooker, Locke nevertheless followed Hobbes in detaching Liberalism from the tradition of the Reformation. He deprecated the practice of quoting Scriptures in controversies about the source of civil authority. Indeed, he rejected the appeal to any authority. "We cannot see by other man's eye; masters take men off the use of their own judgment."

Born of a Puritan family, Locke went to Oxford. Repelled by the intolerance of Presbyterianism as well as the fantacism of the Independents, who dominated the ancient seat of learning, young Locke lost enthusiasm for the parental confession. Thereafter, he came under the influence of the liberal divines of the Anglican Church. In the light of his relation with Hooker, the inspiration of his demand for moral restraint on power can be traced in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas and other mediaeval political thinkers. Yet, Locke's *Essay Concerning Human*

³² "It was a dangerous innovation to appeal to reason (the attempt, to settle the controversy between the king and the people-by logical deductions from abstract assumptions) for the justification of despotism. To do so was to acknowledge the authority of a; tribunal whose verdict was likely to be adverse." (*Cambridge Modern History* Vol. VIII.)

Understanding logically related with, if not consciously deduced from, Hobbes's mechanistic psychology, went to feed the eighteenth century French philosophy which was rooted in the Epicurean tradition of Montaigne, the subjective rationalism of Descartes and the devastating irony and subtle criticism of Bayle. Scepticism had undermined authority. Man's faith in the super-natural had been shaken. Hobbes's philosophy of scientific Naturalism and Locke's psychology of sensation, logically related with it, gave man a new faith—the faith in himself. That was the core of Liberalism.

Man has natural rights which can be discovered by right reason. To protect those rights is the function of law and the purpose of its administration. Voluntary submission to law, discovered by right reason and made for common benefit, meant surrender of the natural rights. But the origin of social compact did not preclude retention of civil liberties to be defended, if necessary, by revolt against the sovereign power. Requiring some inevitable surrender of natural rights, civil government is an evil, and therefore its power and function must be strictly limited. These are the principles of political Liberalism. They are supported by the philosophical proposition that man's reason is the highest law; no law can be binding which is opposed to right reason.

It is evident that Liberalism must stand or fall with the concept of reason. The appeal to reason is an old story; but reason was placed either outside the human being or beyond human comprehension. As a court of appeal veiled in mystery, it could not improve man's position. Reason had to be conceived as a human property—a biological function, before it could be the symbol of the liberation of man. Such a conception of reason presupposes scientific knowledge, which in the seventeenth century was still inadequate for the purpose. Nevertheless, it could be logically deduced from hypothetical premises. Hobbes did that to lay down the foundation of modern Liberalism.

CHAPTER V

FALLACIES OF LIBERALISM

NAPOLEON COULD not cross the English Channel; but the impact of the Great Revolution reached Britain in the form of the Radical doctrines preached by Thomas Paine, William Godwin and others, to provoke the outburst of Edmund Burke. The *Reflexions on the French Revolution* was a broadside against the eighteenth century —the age of reason. Burke vehemently denied that reason could ever be the right basis of politics. To denounce the French Revolution, he borrowed his arguments from its prophet. Rousseau had glorified mystic moral sentiments, the feelings of religious reverence and communal loyalty as against reason. Burke maintained that all those noble sentiments could be welded together into a “deeper wisdom” which should be preferred to ““mere logical clarity” as the guiding principle of politics and of life generally. Rousseau’s romanticism rationalised by Kant, was still to be woven into the Hegelian political philosophy with its metaphysical conception of the State. Taking full advantage of Hume’s nihilistic scepticism, Burke anticipated Hegel in heralding the “inner spirit of the nation” as the source of law. An ungrateful disciple of Rousseau, Burke built a bridge between Hume’s rigorous logic of anti-rationalism and Hegel’s pan-logism. Reason is not an individual property; human behaviour is determined by sentiments, emotions, respect for tradition, loyalty to the community. These are not irrational; they represent the process of a gradual unfoldment of reason implicit in the consciousness of the race or the nation. At the same time, Burke defiantly denied that society was natural, and maintained that it was an artificial creation; and that it was impelled by obscure instincts and properties.

Curiously enough, Burke affirmed that his irrationalism, negation of individualism and mystic nationalism were deduced from Locke's philosophy. And there was a good deal of truth in his assertion. In fact, the contradictions of Locke's Liberalism—contradictions between the mediaeval tradition inherited through Hooker and Hobbes's scientific rationalism—were brought out clearly by Burke. While he gave the Tories a philosophy, Burke also pleaded for empiricism in politics, and political pragmatism; the principle of utility came to be the first article of faith of nineteenth century Liberalism.

Burke was the brain of the Whig party; his defection plunged conservative Liberalism into a deep crisis. A considerable section of the Whig aristocracy followed Burke over to the Tory camp, and the Radicalism of the supporters of the Great Revolution tended to go beyond the limits of classical Liberalism.

Burke not only preached the cult of irrationalism glorified as wisdom. The corollary therto was a demand for the restoration of religion. In that respect, he could also invoke Locke's authority. His attack on the principles of the Great Revolution and derision of the idea of democracy provoked a campaign of political pamphleteering which brought about a regeneration of Liberalism. One of the radical defenders of the principles of the Great Revolution, Jeremy Bentham, went back to Hobbes, and on the basis of his naturalistic rationalism reformulated liberal doctrines as what came to be known as philosophical Radicalism.

The campaign was opened by a school mistress, Mary Wollstonecraft, who was to be the wife of Godwin and mother of Harriet Shelley. Hers was a passionate appeal to reason: "You have a mortal antipathy to reason, but if there is anything like argument or first principle in your wild declamations, behold the result—that we are to reverence the rust of antiquity, and those unnatural customs which ignorance and self-interest have consoli-

dated into the sage fruit of experience.”¹ The first and the most thoughtful, though intensely passionate, of the thirty-eight replies to Burke’s tirade against the ideas and ideals of the eighteenth century, Wollstonecraft’s vindication of human rights was an emphatic reaffirmation of the revolutionary principles of Liberalism. It was of the classical French style of the eighteenth century. It almost succeeded in harmonising the moral fervour of Rousseau with Voltaire’s caustic sarcasm. It was a fullblast onslaught on authority and defiant revolt against religion. Anticipating biological discoveries of the twentieth century, Mary Wollstonecraft subjected Burke’s platitudes to a merciless analysis and exposed their absurdity.

“What do you mean by the moral constitution of the heart? And inborn sentiments? What moral purpose can be answered by extolling the good dispositions when these goods dispositions are described as instincts? For an instinct moves in a direct line to its ultimate end, and asks for no guidance or support. But if virtue is to be acquired by experience or taught by example, reason perfected by reflection must be the director of the whole host of passions. Reason must hold the rudder or let the wind blow where it listeth.”²

Paine, Holcraft and Godwin followed in quick succession. Paine was the heart and soul of the Radical movement. He breathed the spirit of the Great Revolution. “Lay then the axe to the root and teach governments humanity.”³ But it was not the mystic romanticism of Rousseau that Paine preached. His democracy was not totalitarian; it was humanist. And he was fully imbued with the secularism of the Encyclopedists. “Vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyranny.”⁴

¹ Mary Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Man*.

² Ibid.

³ Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man*.

⁴ Ibid.

The creed of Radicalism enunciated with passionate eloquence in the earlier books of Wollstonecraft and Paine, was expounded in a sober language by James Mackintosh. He condemned Burke's emphasis on "precedents deduced from the good old days" as "apology for conservatism," and pleaded: "We should pay more attention to reason and justice, and less to tradition and custom."⁵ Mackintosh looked upon the French Revolution as a more complete application of the principles of Locke and the English Whigs of 1688. The revolutionists, he argued, were applying the principles which had been worked out by the philosophers of Europe during the preceding century. The relation between their doctrine and politics was analogous to the relation between geometry and mechanics. The Rights of Man was a set of fundamental moral principles.

William Godwin was the philosopher of Radicalism. His parentage goes beyond the eighteenth century Encyclopedists—to the moralists of an earlier time, such as Mably and Morelly. His ideas, therefore, tended to transcend the limits of Liberalism, and his vision was turned upon an ideal which lay beyond the liberal democratic State—on a communist social order. A consistent elaboration of Liberalism, Godwin's philosophy clearly pointed towards Socialism. In him, the ideology of the bourgeoisie logically evolved into the revolutionary philosophy of the proletariat, proving that the characterisation of neither is true. Godwin held that the institution of private property was the root of all social evils. But he believed that the desired social revolution would be brought about by a change of public opinion. Counting upon the intrinsic rationality of human nature, he visualised a psychological and moral revolution rather than any violent transformation of the established political and social institutions. He was the ideal revolutionary, who could, at least in imagination, temper romanticism with reason.

⁵James Mackintosh, *Vindiciae Gallicae*.

In its earlier stages, modern scientific enquiry, particularly in the field of mathematics, astronomy and physics,, was closely associated with philosophical speculation Newton called physics natural philosophy. Interpreted by Voltaire, it developed into the mechanistic naturalism of the eighteenth century. But the post-revolutionary liberal thought broke away from secularism, and tended to profess a pantheistic natural religion. In England, the Dissenters opposed it to the orthodoxy of the High Church as also to the tradition of Puritan bigotry. Associated with a pantheistic cosmology, reason was metaphysically conceived; the nineteenth century liberal rationalism thus expressed itself in the belief in a pantheistic moral order. That was not only a long way from the rational order of nature of the seventeenth century philosophy, but also a break with the tradition of scientific naturalism. Indeed, it” was a relapse all the way back into the ideological rationalism of the Stoics, which had been taken over by the Protestant Christian Jurists as the metaphysical sanction for the laws of the Lutheran and Calvinist national States.⁶ In the last analysis, the Christian dogma of original sin persists in this system of thought: the metaphysical moral order is rational because reason imposes restrictions on the natural inclinations of man. Neither

⁶ Even in the nineteenth century, utilitarian Liberalism was allied with the Evangelical movement. In an article on “Fitzjames Stephen and Liberal Doctrine,” the *Times Literary Supplement* (Nov. 27, 1948) wrote : “The close alliance between the Utilitarians and the Evangelicals, which explains most of English history in the first half of the nineteenth century, was not an accident. Both had arisen in protest against the arid conservatism of the eighteenth century, with its extravagant respect for forms. Bentham recalled common lawyers to reason as Wesley recalled Anglicans to the Gospel.”

“The central issue of the philosophical controversy of the Victorian age was how to accomodate Christianity in a society undergoing vast changes in its structure, its wealth and its technology.” (Alien Willard Brown, *The Metaphysical Society*.)

reason nor morality is inherent in human beings; both result from the sense of obligation. The concept of conscience, therefore, occupies the centre of the system. It is the dictate of Reason.

In the context of the transcendental and ideological system of thought, the liberal doctrine of individual liberty was bound to stultify itself, and be vulgarised in practice. The post-revolutionary revolt against reason had placed a high premium on the idea of free will; the concept of individual freedom had been carried to the extent of irresponsibility; the ideal of freedom had thus appeared to deny morality. A reaction to that romantic extravagance, nineteenth century Liberalism held that human freedom and a rational order of nature were reconciled by the rule of impersonal laws discovered by Reason. The law was objective and just. The contention was that the rule of such laws did not curtail individual freedom; it only implied the acceptance of certain eternal truths and values which distinguished human beings from the lower animals. The distinctive human faculty of conscience gives birth to the sense of obligation under law. Therefore, a liberal democratic social organisation would be free as well as moral, its laws being deduced from the just law of the moral order of nature.

The dangerous possibility of freedom becoming license thus obviated by the doctrine of impersonal laws, Liberalism summarised its social philosophy and political theory in the phrase *laissez faire et laissez passer*. The more popular first part of the liberal dictum was predicated on the second, *le monde va de lui-meme*, by the French Physiocrats on the authority of the mechanistic cosmology and secular rationalism of the seventeenth century.

As the final cause of its mechanistic cosmology, Newtonian natural philosophy had, indeed, postulated a God; but he was *ex machina*. The mechanism, once set in motion, ran by itself. Although this cosmological conception was further developed by British physicists, in the

nineteenth century, contemporary liberal philosophers deviated from scientific naturalism to relapse into the Stoic doctrine of a metaphysical moral order as interpreted by Protestant theology. God did not remain outside the mechanism of nature. *The* anthropomorphic conception of the Final Cause was replaced by pantheism. The order of nature was a moral order because God, conceived as the sum total of the final truth and eternal values, was immanent in it. The purpose of human existence was to be free to live in harmony with the moral order. The purpose is fulfilled through the control of evil passions inherent in human nature, by conscience, that is to say, the sense of moral obligation. With nineteenth century Liberalism, *laissez faire et laissez passer* ceased to be a dictum deduced from the mechanistic naturalism of science; it was a doctrine of pantheistic teleology. The conception of a secular rational order— of a law-governed Universe—was replaced by a rationalised faith in a Providence. It is the best of all possible worlds; it is as it is, because it could not be different. The dogma of predetermination crept imperceptibly into the liberal rationalism of the nineteenth century, to reduce the principle of individual liberty to a legal fiction.

In practice, the liberal doctrine of *laissez faire* served the purpose of rising Capitalism; and the rule of law came to be the rule of a minority which under the given circumstances had the power to make laws. Liberalism appeared to provide a moral justification of the economic exploitation of man by man and a philosophical sanction for the modern political theories which subordinated the individual to the State. Green as well as Bosanquet introduced into Liberalism the Hegelian metaphysical theory of State.

The post-revolutionary political reaction and considerations of capitalist economy, of course, influenced liberal thought as it developed in the nineteenth century. But the fundamental cause of the deviation from its original principles of rationalism and individualism was

inherent in the ambiguities and contradictions of Locke's philosophy.

Locke's theory of human understanding was based upon the rationalist psychology of Hobbes. But he was not as completely free from religious prejudices as his predecessor. Hobbes had traced the origin of society and principles of politics to human reason; Locke deduced them from the laws of nature, which he conceived as laws of God.

Taken over to France, Locke's philosophy was freed from its fallacies by Condillac,⁷ to provide a powerful impetus to the scientific naturalism of the eighteenth century. The revolutionary philosophy of Hobbes, having been of the continental tradition, did not strike deep root in Britain, where religious prejudices, of Puritanism as well as of Anglicanism, lingered to influence the ideology of the rising bourgeoisie, though England was becoming the workshop of the world.

Berkeley's attack upon Materialism and atheism was delivered on the vulnerable point of Locke's epistemology. The ambiguity of his rationalism and the theological penchant of his conception of the natural law were also the points of departure of Hume's empiricism, which shook the faith in the scope of human understanding and validity of human knowledge. The influence of the two most outstanding English philosophers of the eighteenth century sapped the vigour of humanist rationalism.⁸ Supernaturalism and transcendentalism⁹ were restored in

⁷ Condillac pointed out that Locke's rejection of the Cartesian concept of "innate ideas" did not go to the extent of discarding the belief in the innate faculties of the soul.

⁸ Hume's criticism of the doctrine of natural law and attack on rationalism not only inspired Burke's outburst against the democratic principles of the French Revolution; through Kant, they also went into the making of Hegel's pseudo-romantic neo-mediaevalism.

⁹ In any case, Hume's positivism had the paradoxical effect of producing an elaborate metaphysics, a religious revival and a firmer belief in absolute ethical values." (G. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*).

the form of natural religion, allied with which Liberalism in Britain degenerated into political pragmatism and economic cannibalism practised on the plea of individual initiative and liberty.

A reaction to the grand revolt of man against spiritual slavery, which was the fountain-head of Liberalism and which reached the high-water mark in Hobbes's philosophy, began already with Locke.¹⁰ In the disgusting atmosphere of doctrinal fanaticism and confessional bigotry, Locke's advocacy of religious toleration was indeed a blessing. But its historical significance was a compromise in the agelong struggle between faith and reason. In his earlier writings, Locke had inclined to lay emphasis on a clear demarcation between religion and civil authority. But later on, he pleaded for an alliance and harmony between the Church and the State; religion should be tolerant and broadminded, and the State recognise religion as its basis. Originally, Locke had regarded religion as man's private affair; in that sense, it could continue without causing any confusion. But unable to find an alternative sanction for morality, Locke fell back upon religion: only a common religion could provide a generally accepted standard of moral behaviour. And what is the essence of religion? Faith in something supernatural, beyond the reach of human understanding. Locke's Liberalism made room for faith at the cost of reason.

Utilitarianism with all its fallacies did revolutionise the idea about the purpose of law and function of civil authority. They were no longer to be judged by some imaginary metaphysical standard, but pragmatically; they were to promote public welfare. At the same time, the relapse into transcendentalism is obvious. Locke had

¹⁰ The epistemological weakness of the philosophy of sensation resulted from Locke's reluctance to accept without reservation Hobbes's materialist rationalism. In political philosophy, he actually tried to refute Hobbes on the authority of mediaeval traditions inherited through Hooker.

provided utilitarianism with a divine sanction: "God has by an inseparable connection joined virtue and public happiness together; that which is for public welfare is God's Will." It is God's will that public welfare should be promoted by good laws made by virtuous men. In other words, man can be virtuous because God wills him to be so. It is the old idea of Grace. Already with its prophet, Liberalism thus moved away from its original ground of Humanism. The cause of the deviation was its inability to find a secular sanction for morality. That problem baffled political philosophers throughout the nineteenth century. It has not yet been solved, because generally philosophy has failed to keep pace with the growth of scientific knowledge.

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The principle of utility, which came to be the foundation of liberal ethics and politics, did not follow logically from Hobbes's rationalist theory of the origin of society. According to that theory, the concept of a community is fictitious; the reality is the cooperation of individuals; and the cooperation results from the urge of self-preservation. The notion of a choice between pleasure and pain as the motive of human action does not have any place in Hobbes's theory, which is rationalist in the sense that the urge for self-preservation is a biological heritage, the biological evolution being a determined process. The choice between pleasure and pain and the urge for self-preservation are two very different ideas. The former presupposes a high level of consciousness whereas the latter operates even before consciousness becomes intelligent perception. In other words, the one is intelligent discrimination, while the other is mechanistic biological adjustment. The original cooperation of human beings was not a matter of choice, preference of pleasure to pain; it was biologically determined by the urge for self-preservation. There

was no alternative unless the new species was to be still-born.

These far-reaching implications of Hobbes's *theory* of the origin of society were not fully grasped by Locke, although he could not visualise "the new ways of ideas" except in the light of the former's mechanistic psychology. Philosophically, Locke was a follower of Hobbes, though with reservations; and it was as such that he inspired the utilitarian ethics of Helvetius, which was brought back to Britain by Bentham as philosophical Radicalism. Moreover, the general trend of progressive political thought at the time of Locke resulted from the doctrine of the natural law, which gave birth to the idea of the liberty and dignity of man as an individual. Notwithstanding his religious preoccupation, Locke interpreted natural law as sanction for the claim of innate, inherent and inalienable rights of each individual. He went further and held that the function of society and government was to defend and preserve individual rights.

At the same time, through Hooker, Locke also inherited the Aristotelian belief, held throughout the Middle Ages, in the reality of the corporate existence of society. The rejection of that belief, buttressed upon theology, was the precondition for the rise of the idea of democracy and Liberalism. Therefore, freedom and primacy of the individual constituted the essence of that idea. Yet, Locke's defence of the English Revolution was based upon the mediaeval anti-democratic belief in a fiction. Following Hooker, and as if to prepare the cue for Burke, Locke differentiated the English society from the English government, and argued that the former had persisted in time, while the latter had changed whenever necessary. He interpreted natural law in the mediaeval sense by declaring that it was the permanent and self-perpetuating moral order which expressed itself as the inalienable rights of persons and communities. Locke's Liberalism at its very birth, thus, was a defence of conservatism;

and as such, it became the orthodox political creed of the Whig aristocracy, who led the bourgeois revolution and established the capitalist economic order.

Taken over to P'rance by Montesquieu and Voltaire, the truly liberal aspect of Locke's philosophy was developed in two directions: Helvetius constructed the system of utilitarian ethics on the basis of the hypothesis that desire for pleasure and dislike for pain were the prime motives for all human behaviour; and Condillac improved upon the theory of knowledge that ideas were ultimately derived from sense perceptions. Utilitarian ethics and philosophical Radicalism both were, since then, identified with Liberalism. After its discrediting alliance with Whig orthodoxy and conservatism, during the half a century of post-revolutionary reaction, Liberalism in England came to be known either as utilitarianism or philosophical Radicalism. Both were believed to have been deduced from Locke's philosophy. In reality, they were divergent currents of thought—one empirical, the other rationalist. Yet, both could be referred back to the same source, because of the ambiguity and self-contradiction of Locke's philosophy.

Locke's appeal to reason as the final authority was not unreserved. He conceived reason neither in the classical metaphysical sense nor as a biological function. His definition of reason was ambiguous and self-contradictory: it is enquiry into the certainty of knowledge; but in practice, it is wise to be guided by probability, because probability is deduced from conformity of our own experience or the experience of others.¹¹ For Locke, reason was simple commonsense, which he rated higher than logic.¹² Therefore, he is recognised as the founder of empiricism. The utility principle of the nineteenth

¹¹ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding.*

¹² "He is always sensible, and always willing to sacrifice logic rather than become paradoxical. He enunciates general principles which are capable of leading to strange consequences; but whenever the strange consequences seem about to appear, Locke blandly

century Liberalism was deduced from that aspect of Locke's philosophy. Therefore, it was a departure from the rationalist position of original Liberalism.

Locke's theory of knowledge, as improved by Condillac, was a great contribution to the scientific naturalism or materialist rationalism of the eighteenth century. The *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* begins with arguments for refuting the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas. Nevertheless, Locke's rejection of the doctrine was not unreserved; because he retained the belief in "the intuitive power of Reason to grasp manifest truths." Condillac argued that all mental processes could be explained in terms of sensations, and therefore Locke's alternative to innate ideas was as superfluous an assumption as the latter. Further improved by Cabanis in the light of the growing knowledge of physiological processes, sensationalism outgrew the fallacies of Locke's empiricism, to be incorporated in the materialist philosophy as finally set forth by Holbach. It clearly stated the fundamental principles of Liberalism and democratic practice: Society is good because its purpose is to give men freedom to their own (individual) welfare; liberty is an inalienable right, because without it there can be no prosperity. The cynic smiled at the Utopian notion and enquired how the "miracle" could ever be worked. The answer of the philosophers of Liberalism and advocates of democracy was a proclamation of their faith in the innate rationality of man and the consequent human creativeness. Men are rational and therefore capable of judging what is good for them and follow their own judgment. Enlighten them, remove the obstacles created by ignorance and supersition, and the light of reason will shine to show them the right way. Each following his true self-interest, general good will follow.¹³

refrains from drawing them. To a logician, it is irritating; to a practical man, it is a proof of sound judgment." (Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*.)

¹³ Holbach, *The System of Nature*.

While the truly liberal aspect of Locke's philosophy, thus elaborated, was incorporated in the mightiest manifesto of man's freedom, Hume carried empiricism to its logical consequences which blasted the philosophical foundation of Liberalism. The principle of utility, applied to ethics as well as to the problems of social relations, was empirical. Therefore, it was antithetical to Liberalism, although in the nineteenth century the latter became synonymous with utilitarianism. Cut adrift from the rationalist and individualist philosophical moorings, Liberalism logically betrayed itself and moved towards its negation either by chauvinistic nationalism or by social collectivism. The process to the former direction was promoted by the philosophy of Fichte and Hegel, whereas Karl Marx was the prophet of the latter.

CHAPTER VI

UTILITARIANISM

FREED FROM all its ambiguities and fallacies by Hume,, the empiricism of Locke developed into a complete rejection of rationalism. Analysing the concept of reason, Hume reached the conclusion that there was no principle of right or justice or liberty deducible from the Law of Nature. Generalising the conclusion, he declared that, if the confusion created by the concept of reason was cleared away, the belief in the rationality of natural laws must be discarded as an unnecessary and groundless .postulate. Hume's criticism was not only directed .against the rationalist natural religion associated with the eighteenth century Liberalism; it also denied the possibility of a rationalist ethics, and maintained that judgment of values was entirely conventional, without any logical or factual criterion. A rigid distinction between reason, fact and values was a major premiss of Hume's devastating scepticism, which made Locke's empiricism "consistent but incredible". "He represents, in a certain sense, a dead end; in his direction, it is impossible to go farther."¹ Contemporary logical Positivism is a legacy of Hume, it being in the tradition of his reckless empiricism.

Locke believed in the possibility of a rationalist ethics. Hume held that there was no demonstrable connection between reason and morality. He disputed that there was any objective criterion of morality, and maintained that it was a matter of mere convention. "Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason."² This basic contention is backed up by Hume's definition

¹ Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*.

of ethics: “The only object of reasoning (about morals) is to discover the circumstances on both sides which are common to these qualities (estimable or blameable), to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand, and the blameable, on the other; and thence reach the foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived. And as this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances.”²

If Hume’s major premiss is granted, then it must be admitted that his arguments destroy the fundamental principles of Liberalism and Democracy. The doctrine of natural law must be scrapped; the belief, deduced therefrom, in natural rights, in self-evident truths, and in objective standards of morality, therefore, should also be discarded; cherished values like justice and liberty could claim no immutable moral sanction. The only criterion of judgment is utility; the highest court of appeal is convention, in other words, convenience. But whose convenience? Of those in positions of privilege and power. For all practical purposes, that was the implication of utilitarianism.

Although he did not use the term, Hume has gone down in the history of philosophy and ethical theory as the founder of utilitarianism. In the last analysis, utilitarianism is a theory of morals.³ As a political theory, it is only an application of Hume’s empirical ethics. “The essential doctrines of utilitarianism are stated (by Hume) with a clearness and consistency not to be found in any other writer of the (19th) century. From Hume

²*Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.*

³ Since Cudworth and Price, the typical English ethics had all along been utilitarian.

to John Stuart Mill, the doctrine received no substantial alternation.”⁴

Hume’s scepticism went to the extent of doubting the existence of the Self. Another foundation of Liberalism was thus blasted. The idea of individual liberty becomes meaningless when the very existence of the ego is doubted. The implication of the doubt is very far-reaching: the belief in man’s creativeness is an illusion, because it presupposes the existence of self-consciousness, and in the absence of the Self, this condition cannot be fulfilled. From yet another direction, Hume’s scepticism reached the conclusion of denying the creativity of man, and indeed ruling out the possibility of knowledge. It was his rejection of the inductive method, without which there could be no natural science; and without the growing knowledge of nature, man would never be able to harness her forces and utilise her resources for his welfare. With the bliss of ignorance, mankind “would be still living in the state of savagery.”⁵

“In a sense, his scepticism is insincere, since he cannot maintain it in practice. It has, however, this awkward consequence that it paralyses every effort to prove one line of action better than another. It was inevitable that such a self-refutation of rationality should be followed by a great outburst of irrational faith. The growth of unreason throughout the nineteenth century and what has passed of the twentieth, is a natural sequel to Hume’s destruction of empiricism.”⁶ As an antithesis to rationalism, in which reason is conceived as an integral part of man’s biological heritage, empiricism can lead only to unbounded scepticism and sterile positivism.

⁴ Leslie Stephen, *History of English, Thought in the Eighteenth Century*.

⁵ A detailed criticism of Hume’s philosophy is outside the scope of this book. The above outline suffices for the purpose of proving that consistent empiricism is antithetical to the basic principles of philosophical liberalism.

⁶ Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*.

Unfortunately, the principle of utility, which guided the practice of Liberalism in the nineteenth century, was influenced by empiricism as elaborated by Hume.

Locke held that things were good or evil only in relation to pleasure and pain. “What is apt to cause or increase pleasure, we call happiness. Happiness motivates desire, and happiness in its fullest extent is the utmost pleasure we are capable of.” From these rather confused arguments Locke concluded: “The necessity of pursuing true happiness is the foundation of all liberty.” Then he goes over to lay the foundation of his ethics: “The preference of vice to virtue is a manifest wrong judgment.” The basic rule of conduct is laid down on the strength of this bald assertion: “The government of our passions is the right improvement of liberty.”⁷

While control of passion must be given a prominent place in a rationalist system of ethics, it is difficult to imagine what Locke meant by “improvement of liberty”. However, this is yet another of the numerous ambiguities of his philosophy. The fundamental ideas of his ethics were evidently not carefully thought out. Consequently, utilitarianism could only defeat its original praiseworthy purpose—to free human behaviour from the feeling of a super-human compulsion so that morality could be the result of a rational choice between right and wrong.

Since the leader of the Cambridge Platonists, Bishop Cumberland (1632-1718), expounded the doctrine that “universal benevolence” was the foundation of ethics, universal hedonism, as against Hobbesian rationalism, came to be the generally accepted guiding principle of the English moral philosophy. Utilitarianism as an ethical theory is much older than the social and political doctrines deduced from it by Bentham and the Mills in the middle of the nineteenth century. According Cumberland, an ethical theory is that by which “a

⁷ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding.*

certain rule or measure is afforded to the prudent man's-judgment, by the help whereof he may ascertain that just measure in his actions and affections in which virtue consists."⁸ Cumberland laid great stress on the "practical value of a correct ethical theory." He argued to show that individuals acted in an altruistic manner because they found it to be conducive to their own happiness. "No action can be morally good which does not in its own nature contribute somewhat to the happiness of man." The utilitarian normative ethics was developed with theological reference by Gay, Tucker and Paley until, secularised by Hume, it became relativist, to deny the permanence of moral values.

Utilitarianism as it subsequently developed maintained that the end of human behaviour was to enjoy the largest measure of pleasure and suffer as little pain as possible. It was in that form that utilitarianism was presented in France. Until Bentham brought it back in the form given to it by Helvetius, the utilitarianism of Locke had received not only the stamp of Whig orthodoxy, but was patronised also by theologians and Church dignitaries who interpreted the utilitarian ideal as happiness in after-life.

Indeed, without such an ideal, the contradiction between the two basic articles of the utilitarian faith could never be reconciled. They are personal and psychological hedonism and social and moral hedonism. In other words, the propositions that men do and ought to pursue their own happiness, and that they ought to pursue the greatest happiness for the greatest number. There was evidently a moral conflict—between morally justified egoism and morally ordained social duty. The clash of two categorical imperatives (two "oughts") could be composed by the belief in ever-lasting rewards and punishments in a life after death. Enlightened self-interest of gaining eternal (the greatest imaginable)

'Bishop Cumberland, *De Legibus Naturae*.

liappiness would induce men to behave according to the categorical imperative of social morality. The individual ego must be subordinated to the collective ego. Thus, utilitarianism provided a moral sanction for the various totalitarian cults far ahead of time.

A system of ethics based upon the principle of utility was worked out by Helvetius. The psychology of the system was *sensationalist*, deduced from Locke's theory of mind and knowledge. Consistent with the trend of the eighteenth century French philosophy, Helvetius went beyond Locke and adopted Hobbes's clearly materialist description of sensation as the basis of his ethics. He proposed to treat ethics like any other science and the treatment was to be as empirical as of physics. A moral philosophy which would not require any transcendental sanction must start from an understanding of the forces which cause human action. That understanding presupposed a theory of human nature. Hobbes had advanced ai theory (hypothesis) which dispensed with irrational assumptions. But he had not made any ethical -deductions from his theory of human nature. Locke's doctrine that desire for pleasure and dislike for pain were the prime motives of all human behaviour was based upon the philosophy of sensation, which was an elaboration of Hobbes's materialist psychology. So, Helvetius took over the pleasure and pain principle of Locke as the starting point of his ethics.

However, he did not dogmatically assert that to seek pleasure was the basic motive of human action. He preferred the term "self-interest", which had a much larger connotation, and maintained that, if proper education helped men know what was their true self-interest, they would see how it could be in harmony with general welfare. Helvetius provided utilitarian ethics with a sound psychological foundation by merging psychology into physiology. All human behaviour, in the last analysis, is caused by physical sensations; pleasure is a mental state; happiness is much more so. Therefore, it can

be analysed to psychological processes, mind itself being the sum total of sensations. Though he held that the greatest good of the greatest number was the only rational standard of conduct, he insisted that goodness should be referred to individual judgment. So, ultimately, the sanction of his ethics was not the principle of utility, but human nature, which according to his psychology was rational. He made moral behaviour conditional on education, such as would free man's mind from superstition and ignorance, and enable him to act rationally.

Nevertheless, utilitarian ethics, even as developed by Helvetius, was full of fallacies which led to a denial of the absoluteness of any moral value; and a relativist morality was bound to end in ethical nihilism. This process took place after utilitarianism had been reintroduced in England by Bentham. But its evil effects, when applied to economics, made themselves felt already in France. The Physiocrats led by Quesnay introduced the principle of utility in the economic science and declared that general welfare and social harmony would result from everybody acting according to enlightened self-interest. But they did not follow Helvetius in attaching supreme importance to legislation as the means to the protection and promotion of general welfare. On the contrary, they demanded that government should not interfere with the natural operation of economic laws; since to seek pleasure was the common incentive of human behaviour, and general welfare would result from the liberty of individuals to seek pleasure, there should be no restriction on individual initiative and enterprise in the economic field. Theoretically, demanded for all, the freedom from State interference, in the economic field, could be in practice available only to a fortunate few. The economic doctrine of *laissez faire* could be plausibly deduced from the liberal principle of utility; therefore, those who were benefitted by the doctrine declared allegiance to Liberalism.

If capitalist economy and the interests of the class deriving benefit from it could be related to Liberalism, although there is no evidence to prove that it was causal relation, Marxist amorality can be similarly related to the utilitarian (relativist) ethics of the nineteenth century Liberalism. Yet, nobody has called it the ideology of the working class. Ideas develop by themselves, in the right or the wrong direction. If they are utilised to justify the claim or to promote the interest of one or another class, the relation is obviously accidental, not causal.

Although Bentham and his followers were professed rationalists, they were greatly influenced by Hume's empiricism, which had rejected the doctrine of natural law. Bentham's criticism of Blackstone's theory of law was based upon Hume's arguments against the contractual theory of government and the "meaningless" idea of natural rights. With such arguments, contrary to the original principles of Liberalism, partly his own and partly borrowed from Hume, Bentham asserted that what law can and ought to do can be intelligently discussed only with the consideration of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. "The legislator can rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law."⁹

The fundamental fallacy of the logic of utilitarian ethics was the conflict between personal and psychological hedonism and social and moral hedonism. That is to say, between the proposition that men do, and ought to, pursue their own happiness, and the proposition that they ought to pursue the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The conflict could be composed only by introducing the postulate of survival beyond the grave, and with it the belief in ever-lasting rewards and punishments. Thus, the Benthamites did not improve upon Paley's pietist ethics.¹⁰

⁹ Bentham, *Fragments on Government*.

¹⁰ Stephen, for example, believed that the conception of hell was a social necessity.

Characterising Mill's *Essay on Liberty* as "the best expression of the confused sentiments and prejudices of Victorian Radicalism", Stephen showed the unfoundedness of liberal optimism by exposing the authoritarian implications of parliamentary democracy. He argued that the illusion that liberty and equality were complementary was due to the false assumption that the whole tendency of history was towards the diminution of power. In fact, the opposite was true. Political equality, the equal distribution of voting power, merely increased the necessary inequality between government and the governed, since nothing was harder to overthrow than a government grounded on popular sovereignty; and the majority, being necessarily composed of the less fortunate members of society, had a stronger temptation than any other class to use politics for its own aggrandisement.¹¹

Utilitarianism had moved far away from the original position of Liberalism. It was a humanist philosophy which proclaimed man's right to be the architect of his own destiny, and maintained on the evidence of scientific knowledge that man was naturally endowed with that right. It was a fiction to say that man was born free; but it was a truth that man was born to be free, endowed by nature with the potentialities to work out his own freedom. Liberalism proclaimed that every human being was possessed of those liberating potentialities; therefore, freedom was his natural right. Otherwise, individualism would have no meaning. Utilitarianism substituted the humanist principle of Liberalism by a humanitarian approach to the problems of law, political administration and social relations. It advocated political and social reforms, but believed that they could only be imposed from above—by intelligent legislators guided by reason. With this sort of rationalist belief, one could just as well rely upon benevolent despots.¹²

¹¹ James Fitzjames Stephen, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*.

¹² Bentham "cared little for liberty. He admired the bene-

Bentham agreed with Burke that the “Rights of Man” was a set of “anarchical fallacies”. He placed security above equality. “The first condition for happiness is not equality but security. You can only equalise at the expense security. If I am to have my property taken away whenever it is greater than my neighbour’s, I can have no security. Hence, if the two principles conflict, equality should give way. Security is primary, which must override the secondary aim.”¹³

Bentham’s scattered ideas collected and systematised by Austin at last made it clear that representative government was not a democratic government. Analysing the concept of delegated authority, Austin came to the conclusion that government was composed of persons endowed with power to rule others, and that the relation between the rulers and the ruled was determined by the latter’s habit of obedience. In Austinian jurisprudence, inspired by Benthamite Liberalism, God is the supreme lawgiver bound by no rules. His fiat is supported by an irresistible force.¹⁴

The nineteenth century utilitarians passionately proclaimed their faith in individualism, but actually drifted towards collectivism. Under the influence of Hume’s anti-rational empiricism, they theoretically rejected the doctrine of natural law,¹⁵ which had provided the philo-

volent autocrats who preceded the French Revolution. He had a great contempt for the doctrine of the rights of man. The rights of man, he said, are plain nonsense.” (Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*.)

¹³ *Principles of Penal Code*.

¹⁴ John Austin, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*. It is significant that Austin delivered his lectures in the University of London, founded as the centre of the nineteenth century liberal thought.

¹⁵ The rational hypothesis of the natural law providing sanction for values like justice and liberty can never be empirically verified by direct sense perception. But logical concepts are not mere verbal propositions. In the last analysis, they are based on experience. Empiricism destroys rationalism in which reason is a transcendental category. There is no contradiction between a balanced empiricism

sophical sanction for the fundamental democratic principle of individual liberty, but at the same time, in, practice, they appealed to it for the maintenance of social order. They judged social well-being in terms of individual happiness, although economic development, according to their doctrine of *laissez faire*, reduced the majority of individuals to a state of utter helplessness,, and traditional liberal ideas like the sovereignty of the individual, equality before law, freedom of enterprise and initiative, so on and so forth, became legal fictions or empty slogans.¹⁶ During the latter part of the nineteenth century, utilitarian Liberalism was corrupted by the influence of the collectivist criticism of the fundamental liberal principle—the dignity and sovereignty of the individual.

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was written under the impact of Hume's scepticism; Fichte and Hegel developed the idealist tendency of the Kantian metaphysics; and Hegel was the philosopher of collectivism—chauvinistic Nationalism as well as revolutionary Communism both drew their inspiration from him. At the same time, it was as a Hegelian idealist that Green attempted to revise Liberalism; and finally, by adopting Bosanquet's mystic conception of the State, Liberalism killed Democracy and committed suicide.

which does not exclude inference, and naturalistic rationalism which conceives reason as a biological property.

¹⁶ The following picture of Bentham's utilitarian man is drawn, by his critical follower, Leslie Stephen : "The respectable citizen, with a policeman round the corner. Such a man may well hold that honesty is the best policy; he has enough sympathy to be kind to his old mother, and help a friend in distress; but the need of romantic and elevated conduct rarely occurs to him; and the heroic, if he meets it, appears to him as an exception, not far removed from the silly. He does not reflect—specially if he cares nothing for history—how even the society in which he is a contented unit has been built up, and how much loyalty and heroism has been needed for the work; nor even, to do him justice, what unsuspected capacities may lurk in his own common place character." (*The English Utilitarians*).

The decline and degeneration of Liberalism had little to do with the decay of Capitalism. The last decades of the nineteenth century were the hey day of Capitalism. The decline and degeneration of Liberalism resulted from its moving away, under the banner of utilitarianism, from the original philosophical position of naturalist Humanism, scientific Rationalism and metaphysical Materialism.

Previously, romanticism could not be tempered by reason. The result was the post-revolutionary reaction of the early nineteenth century. Utilitarian Liberalism represented a revolt of reason against reactionary neo-romanticism. This time, reason failed to be enlivened by romanticism. The utilitarian plan of imposing social and political reforms from above, of creating happiness by legislation, presupposed lack of the faith that every human being was possessed of unbounded creativeness and therefore could be the maker of his own destiny. The very possibility of Democracy, a government of the people and by the people, presupposes that faith in the potential equality of men. The utilitarian plan, therefore, implied negation of Democracy, and heralded the advent of dictatorship, of one kind or another.

Utilitarian rationalism, which placed emotion and imagination under a heavy discount, was personified particularly by the Mills. With the father, reason meant cold calculation; the trading class on the way to prosperity were finding in calculating utilitarianism a virtue that they could cultivate profitably. The providence of the rational laws of economics had predetermined progress towards the goal of the greatest good for the greatest number. In the secular ideological order of the nineteenth century utilitarian Liberalism, man had no-freedom but to obey the new Providence. The initiative and enterprise of the fortunate few with money were-also according to the providential economic law. To advocate any restriction of their freedom in the name of justice and equality, was romantic extravagance, which

was strongly condemned by James Mill together with other utilitarians. It was a vulgarisation of rationalism.

John Stuart Mill was educated under the strictest supervision of his father, who believed that he was practising the theory of Helvetius. But the product was not a new personality, but a duplication of the father. John Stuart, however, threw off his father's influence soon after the latter's death, and tried to put some living flesh on the dry bones of utilitarian rationalism, now completely at the service of the prosperous middle class. He came nearer to Hume than Bentham, and was influenced by the former's critique of utilitarianism. Consequently, he attached less importance to egoism, and rejected his father's narrow understanding of rationalism. But he was more directly influenced by Comte's positivism, and also by Carlyle and Coleridge, who introduced in England the German collectivist Liberalism as preached by Fichte. While thus coming under the influence of neo-romantic conservatism, John Stuart Mill also moved towards Socialism.

Though full of inconsistencies, Mill's *Essay on Liberty* wielded a more lasting influence than any other political treatise of his time. The inconsistencies resulted from the fallacies of utilitarianism, which contradicted the philosophical principles of Liberalism by providing a moral justification for authoritarian tendencies.¹⁷

¹⁷ Mill's *Essay on Liberty* was characterised as "the best expression of the confused sentiments and prejudices of Victorian Radicalism." (Fitzjames Stephen, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*.)

"Mill's principle can be used, according to taste, to justify the most rigid totalitarianism or the most unqualified anarchy.....The idea of social sanction authorises one of the most dangerous and tempting forms of tyranny.....By admitting that in certain circumstances men might properly be protected against themselves, Mill provided a ready-made justification for paternal despotism, and in his anxiety to avoid contradictions came near to postulating that concept of a *real will*, superior to the conscious and particular will, and expressing itself in the commands of the State which is the

In his essay *On Liberty*, he harked back to the moral ideal, if not the philosophical principles of classical Liberalism. Utilitarian ethics, not only of Bentham but also of Helvetius, was meant to be the guide for reforming legislation. It could have no personal application. The goal of the greatest good to the greatest number could not possibly be attained by any individual; pleasure might be regarded, erroneously, as the prime motive of human behaviour, but it could hardly be raised to the status of a moral value. Utilitarianism offered a powerful critique of the orthodox moral philosophy; but it failed to present a positive alternative. Bentham was primarily concerned with law. Helvetius made an attempt which did not go beyond laying down a sound psychological foundation of a system of humanist ethics. Taken as a whole, *L'Esprit* is rather a treatise on education and social reform than ethics.

In this respect, John Stuart Mill made a significant contribution, but in doing so he took up a position which was not consistent with utilitarianism. At the same time, it was not a resurrection of true Liberalism. Morally outraged by the actual result of the unrestricted operation of the “natural law” of economics, John Stuart Mill advocated a measure of legislative control to guarantee a more equitable distribution of wealth. The suggestion by itself would not be repugnant to Liberalism, unless it logically implied a departure from the humanist principle of the sovereign individual towards the socialist conception of a collective ego. Of course, any such departure was not explicit in John Stuart Mill-

basis of those metaphysical and Germanic philosophies to which Mill's Liberalism is generally regarded as a wholesome correctiveFor all its vaunted belief in free will, secular Liberalism, in fact, solved the problem of liberty by ignoring its existence.....It is for this reason that, while Mill's Liberalism had slowly degenerated into collectivism, the Christian Churches had emerged in the unfamiliar role of the champions of civil liberty.” (*The Times-Literary Supplement*. July 10, 1948.)

Yet, he is believed to have sympathised with the new socialist ideas which outraged his rationalist father.

What was regarded as sympathy for Socialism might be interpreted also as justification for authoritarianism, logically flowing from the fallacies of Liberalism. Mill's *Essay on Liberty* was the product of the reflection in his mind of a conflict which was then going on in the mind of England. It arose from the need for reconciling the abstract principles of Liberalism with the pressing need of the modern society for a centralised authority.

However, the more significant feature of utilitarianism, as elaborated by John Stuart Mill, was the recognition of moral values that could be cherished individually. Never before had liberty as a personal right been accorded such supreme importance in utilitarian political thought. In doing so, he transgressed the limits set by the ideal of the greatest good to the greatest number. Consistent with this ideal, one could not take up the Voltairean attitude to the question of liberty of thought and expression as John Stuart Mill did. The orthodox utilitarian dictum logically justifies suppression of a minority even of forty-nine (because fifty-one is a greater number), and thus keeps the door open to dictatorship. Dictatorial political theories and collectivist social doctrines thus logically resulted from the utilitarian degeneration of Liberalism. Democracy, possible within the limits of utilitarianism and even of orthodox Liberalism, was bound to be so defective that it could not successfully take up the challenge of dictatorship.

Indeed, thanks to Green's restatement, nineteenth century Liberalism could offer a philosophical apology of dictatorship, claiming to represent the whole of a community as against refractory minorities, which "refuse to be free". In a typical Hegelian style, Green made a distinction between positive and negative freedom. Criticising the old liberal doctrine of the freedom of contract, he declared that freedom as the end of citizenship did not consist in the absence of restraint. That, he held,

was a negative idea of freedom. Positive freedom was the capacity of self-realisation, the conditions for the attainment of which ideal are guaranteed by an orderly harmonious social order.¹⁸ The implication of this positive idea of freedom is clear enough: individual freedom is realised in the harmony of the community.¹⁹ An echo of the Hegelian doctrine of the State. Green went farther back to the Aristotelian idea of corporate society, which dominated mediaeval political theories until the rise of Liberalism. Individuals constitute society; but the whole is greater than its parts; therefore, its claim is prior; the welfare of society automatically means good life for its members. Since positive freedom is available only to the members of a harmonious community, individual liberty presupposes collective well-being and collective consent.

Nevertheless, Green did not discard the idea of individual liberty; only, he conceived it as the liberty, that is, choice either to serve the community intelligently and conscientiously, or not. The latter choice, he held, was negation of liberty. He interpreted Liberalism so as to declare that collective well-being was the precondition for individual freedom. The corollary was the idea of a

¹⁸ The veteran philosopher of nineteenth century Liberalism, Benedetto Croce, defines liberty as a “moral ideal” of the Hegelian conception. “In modern times, (liberty) had passed from liberty as a complex of privileges to liberty as a natural right, and from that abstract natural right to the spiritual liberty of the historically concrete personality. And it had become gradually more coherent and more solid, strengthened by the corresponding philosophy according to which that which is the law of being is the law of what must be.” (*The History of the Nineteenth Century Europe.*) The Hegelian conversion of liberal philosophy is thus admitted authoritatively. Arguing against those who hold that the moral ideal of liberty does not allow nor promise the expulsion of evil from the world, Croce writes : “If morality should destroy tho idea of evil, it would itself vanish ; only in the struggle against -evil does morality have reality and life.” So, evil is permanent—as the old Manicheans preached!

¹⁹ T. H. Green, *Lectures on Political Obligation.*

social service State. This idea was taken up by the Fabian Society, which heralded the birth of the British Labour Party.

Green's revision compelled Liberalism to move simultaneously also in the opposite direction—of conservatism. This tendency was represented by Bosanquet, who was a thorough-going Hegelian. He held that the community, functioning through the State, was the custodian of all moral values; that it represented what all its members would desire if they were conscious of their corporate existence, which was real as against the abstraction of individuality.²⁰ This theory of dictatorship, which could easily rise on the background of formal parliamentary democracy, was the apotheosis of utilitarian Liberalism.

²⁰ B. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*.

CHAPTER VII

NEO-CLASSICAL RATIONALISM

THE NATURALISM of the eighteenth century was rationalist as well as romantic. Rejecting the metaphysical implication of classical rationalism, it placed reason in the human being, and inspired by the tradition of the Renaissance, proclaimed the sovereignty of man possessed of an unlimited creativeness. Closely associated with the development of modern science, it was empirical, methodologically. Empiricism destroyed mystic metaphysics. But at the same time, as interpreted in Britain, particularly by Berkeley and Hume, it not only cast doubt on metaphysics (ontology) as such; it actually appeared to be antithetical to rationalism. The eighteenth century naturalism tried to base ethics, social as well as individual, on rationality. By casting doubt on rationalism, empiricists like Hume encouraged, though certainly not deliberately, a revival of the traditional belief that religion alone could provide the sanction for morality. This negative implication of empiricism became express in Berkeley's philosophy. The tendency also culminated in Rousseau's mystic nature-worship and reactionary romanticism. Finally, Hegel's philosophy combined reactionary romanticism with classical rationalism. It was a landmark in the history of thought, occupying an analogous place in the nineteenth century as did Aristotle's system at the close of the pre-Socratic era of the Hellenistic culture.

In the nineteenth century, Germany became the leader of philosophical thought in Europe. Since Hume, Britain had not produced a great philosopher, nor had France since the Encyclopedists. "The Western powers

devoted themselves entirely to the tasks of real life. Meanwhile, metaphysics were left to us in Germany.”¹

Why did Germany become the land of poets and philosophers, while the countries of Western Europe forged ahead on the road of political progress and material prosperity? The Marxists alone offer a categorical reply to the question: Because socially and economically Germany was the most backward country; the German bourgeoisie was not strong enough to capture power; the mystic metaphysics culminating in Hegel was the ideological super-structure of the feudal social order which still persisted in Germany.

Facts, however, do not bear out this simplification of history. The Reformation is said to have heralded the rise of the bourgeoisie and laid the ideological foundation of the capitalist social order. It took place in Germany, and its influence there was naturally more abiding and far-reaching than in other countries. The philosophy of Kant and Hegel clearly bore the stamp of the influence of the Reformation. On the other hand, Rousseau also was a fervent admirer of the Calvinist Order of Geneva, and both the great German philosophers were influenced by him. Finally, Kant as well as Hegel began as scientific naturalists of the eighteenth century school; they were supporters of the Great Revolution, and welcomed Napoleon's victory over the feudal princes of Germany. What is of decisive importance is that a dispassionate appreciation of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel show that they were in the tradition of the “new philosophy” which overthrew the age-long domination of theology at the close of the Middle-Ages. “Kant is the transition to distinctly modern thought.”² Hegel developed the “new science” of Vico, and passed it on to Marx to enable him to predict the coming of the proletarian revolution.

¹ F. A. Lange, *History of Materialism*,

² John Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*.

He was the John the Baptist of the prophet of Communism.

“All the leading ideas of the present day were produced in Germany between 1780 to 1830” (Taine). The period covered the latter part of Kant’s life and the whole of Hegel’s. Two currents of thought originating respectively in the Renaissance and the Reformation fed the intellectual life of modern Europe. The German philosophy of the Kant-Hegel period had its share of the heritage.

Although the exhaustion caused by the Thirty Years’ War retarded the development of Germany in every walk of life, she was not altogether untouched by the intellectual ferment of the seventeenth century. The two basic ideas of the philosophy of Leibniz had a much greater influence on Liberalism than is generally realised. Monadology was essentially a materialist doctrine; and its social significance was a philosophical support for individualism of the Epicurean tradition. On the other hand, the conception of a pre-established harmony indicated the possibility of a synthesis between individual liberty and social organisation.

Soon after Leibniz, a more pronouncedly naturalist version of Locke’s Liberalism was introduced in Germany by John Toland; he was befriended by Sophie Charlotte, Queen of Prussia, who was a Spinozist. While from the time of Klopstock irrational romanticism and subjective idealism dominated German poetry, pre-Kantian philosophy was greatly influenced by Locke and Spinoza. The large volume of polemical literature against scientific naturalism or the materialist philosophy is a measure of the importance the latter had acquired in the intellectual life of Germany. Barring its ethics and aesthetics, Kant’s philosophy was a substantial contribution to scientific naturalism and materialist metaphysics. Yet, the purpose of the entire Kantian system is believed to have been the annihilation of Materialism.

The current of rationalist thought flowing from the

Renaissance and reinforced by the seventeenth century classicism was represented by Leibniz and Lessing. In Herder the rationalist tradition was enriched by romanticism as expressed in the humanist historiography of Vico and the organic conception of social development. Learning from Leibniz, that harmony was the essence of organic evolution, Lessing and after him Herder introduced in the German *Aufklärung* a historical sense which was partially lacking in the French Enlightenment. Hegel took over the idea and cast it in a neo-classical rationalist mould. The result was a comprehensive system of philosophy which directly dominated the intellectual life of Europe for nearly a century and, through Marxism, continues to do so even today. At the same time, through Kant, Hegel inherited also the pietist tradition of the Reformation.

Empiricism was the key note of the eighteenth century philosophy. A strictly empirical attitude leads to subjectivism; and the logical consequence of subjectivism is solipsism. This tendency was inherent even in Descartes' rationalism, which started from self-consciousness (*Cogito, ergo sum*). Cartesian subjectivism reached its culmination in the monadology of Leibniz, who declared that even if the rest of the world was annihilated, nothing would change in the experience of a windowless monad. Locke escaped the solipsist consequence of a thorough-going empiricism through the loophole of his theory of ideas which was a clear departure from the sensationalist psychology and epistemology. Berkeley held that empiricism could not have a metaphysics, and the religious prejudice of a Bishop enabled the empiricist philosopher to escape solipsism. The nihilistic implications of a pure empiricism, not to allow thought and judgment to be influenced by anything beyond the reach of direct experience, was fully thought out by Hume. His rigorously logical scepticism led to conclusions clearly repugnant to commonsense. Hume escaped solipsism,

but destroyed modern rationalist philosophy as it had developed since Bacon and Descartes.

In France, Rousseau's revolt against Reason encouraged emotional exuberance, which pushed the scientific naturalism of the Encyclopedists to the background. In the aftermath of the Revolution, mystic and religious romanticism eclipsed philosophical thought, which had been reduced to absurdity by the greatest philosopher of the eighteenth century. In that atmosphere, the creative power of the human mind, in Britain and France, turned to the enquiry into the diverse phenomena of nature, an endeavour which yielded tangible results.

The task of rehabilitating philosophy was undertaken in Germany by Kant, and completed by Hegel, whose system had the same significance for the classical rationalist idealism as Hume's had had for empiricism in the eighteenth century. The latter had abolished the distinction between reason and faith—rational belief and credulity; Hegel identified being with non-being. He rehabilitated philosophy in the sense of clearing the ground for its further development on the basis laid down by a whole succession of speculative thinkers, from Bacon and Descartes to the French Encyclopedists, and with the rich material of positive knowledge provided by the physical and biological sciences.

Thought and knowledge presuppose non-ego as well as the ego. The failure to grasp this most self-evident truth was the weakness of the Cartesian system. Even self-consciousness is not possible unless the ego, at least partially or temporarily, objectifies itself. Descartes deduced being from thought, but did not analyse the category of thought, which is conditional upon something outside itself. The ego thinks about something; it may be its own self. In that case, the ego is objectified to be the object of thought. The second fallacy of the Cartesian system was the imagination of an unimaginable gulf between the worlds of mind and matter, between thought and being. That was another remarkable slip in the thinking

process of the “restorer of philosophy”. Descartes deduced being from thought, at the same time declaring them to be qualitatively different, separated by an unbridgeable gulf. He escaped subjectivism, implied in the dictum *Cogito, ergo sum*, and its nihilistic consequences, by arbitrarily introducing an absolute dualism in his philosophy. Sensationalist epistemology was an outcome of Cartesian dualism, although Locke might not have been conscious of the connection. Dualism rules out objective knowledge, reduces metaphysics to speculation about empty abstractions, and thus destroys philosophy. Sensationalism had the same significance as Berkeley pointed out. Under the influence of the tradition of Cartesian dualism, Hume turned back upon metaphysics, and his consistent empiricism blasted the foundation of philosophy.

The relation between the subject and the object, therefore, was the crucial problem of philosophy. Kant tried to solve it, but failed. Because, his approach was also empirical. He took the duality of the world for granted, and tried to show that knowledge resulted from the interaction of the two worlds. To make the interaction between two qualitatively different worlds possible, he attributed to mind some *a priori* conceptual patterns. The world of experience is not a creation of the mind; nor is it an adequate picture of actual things. Therefore, knowledge, though not mere self-contemplation of the ego, is never knowledge of a thing-in-itself, but as it enters into experience. So, the unity of the two worlds is only a matter of experience. It is a subjective point of view. Objectively, the duality persists. Therefore, Kant, though he himself began as a disciple of Newton, rejected the eighteenth century philosophy of nature on the ground that, imitating mediaeval metaphysics, it chased the phantom of absolute knowledge. That was a false charge; scientific naturalism only claimed objective validity for knowledge. Objective knowledge is not absolute knowledge. Kant argued that the mind

knows things only as they fit into its a *priori* conceptual patterns; it could never know things-in-themselves; they are not only unknown, but unknowable. The implication is that knowledge is subjective; the corollary is that there is no objective truth. If truth is conceived as a subjective, therefore relative, category, the entire hierarchy of values collapses. Therefore, Kant was compelled to crown his system with a dogmatic ethics.

Kant and the German philosophy founded by him rejected eighteenth century naturalism because they were in the tradition of the Reformation, while the latter drew its inspiration from the Renaissance and the history of humanist culture. Though a supporter of the French Revolution in the earlier stages, Kant broke with the Enlightenment by denying the article of humanist faith that man was good by nature. Following Luther, he believed in the doctrine of the original sin, a philosophical interpretation of which came to be the foundation of his dogmatic ethics. Notwithstanding his religious bias, Kant lived two-hundred years after Luther, and therefore, as an educated man, could not ignore the knowledge science had acquired in the meantime. He did not regard biological functions—passion and sensual desires—as evil by themselves. But they compelled man to go against the motive-force of human existence, namely, duty; therefore, they are evil, and, as they are biological functions, man is by nature evil. A constant struggle against the evils inherent in his biological being, so that he can do the dictates of duty and obey law, is the foundation of morality. Categorical imperatives had to postulated to provide sanction for such a servile ethics.

Philosophically, Kant's doctrine of two worlds led up to his dogmatic ethics. His empirical approach to the problem of the relation between the subject and the object was so very fallacious that it further aggravated the problem by setting up yet another system of dualism. Kant held that there was a world of science and a world, of morals; that reason made this division. Since it

could legislate for both, reason must be superior to either. Reason, therefore, is super-sensual. With no philosophical axe to grind, one could just as well say: "Reason is the voice of God." And Kant's critical philosophy did end in religion. The faith in duty prescribed by categorical imperatives, which are supposed to be dictated by Reason, is the supreme moral value. Therefore, Kant rounded up his system with the declaration: "I have found it necessary to deny knowledge of God, freedom and immortality, in order to find a place for faith."

Kant continued this attempt to reform religion by discovering moral sanctions for its ideas and ideals. His philosophy rationalised the dogmatic doctrines of incarnation, original sin and atonement; so, historically, it completed the Reformation. Kant rejected their literal interpretation, but justified them as symbols of the dual nature of man; literally and chronologically, they belonged to the phenomenal world, morally to the noumenal. He took up a reverential attitude towards religious rituals, ecclesiastical authority and the faith in punishment and reward, regarding them as symbols of moral truth. He was predisposed to regard Church dogmas, "as vehicles of eternal spiritual truths—husks to preserve an inner grain"—although he rejected them as dogmas. He paid reverence to the "outward vesture since that has served to bring to general acceptance a doctrine which really rests upon an authority within the the soul of man." Kant's "all-shattering" philosophy, in its ethics, was inspired by the tradition of the "Revolt of the Angels"; it rehabilitated religion by shifting its basis on dogmatic morality sanctioned by super-sensual Reason. But, at the same time, it was an attempt to shatter the intellectual and cultural values resurrected by the "Revolt of Man" to inspire modern civilisation.

The German cult of *Kultur* logically resulted from Kant's neo-dualism—the doctrine of two worlds. What the Germans mean by *Kultur* is something very different

from culture as generally conceived.³ It is qualitatively different from civilisation. The latter is an experience of *the* phenomenal world, while *Kultur* is the creation of the mystic moral urge which belongs to the super-sensual world of the noumena. According to Kant, *Kultur* is the product of the slow toil of education of the inner life, and an individual shares in it as the member of a community. As such, culture of the Kantian (German) conception is antithetical to civilisation, which concerns only the physical existence of mankind; *Kultur*, on the contrary, is the product of the inner spirit of a community. It is not to be had individually; it is the conquest of a “community devoted to duty”.⁴

In the reactionary mystic conception of culture as antithetical to civilisation, Kant agreed with Rousseau, who idealised savagery. Culturally and temperamentally, Rousseau was a Calvinist; as such he also disowned the humanist tradition of the Renaissance. Therefore, though celebrated as the prophet of democracy, Rousseau too heralded collectivism. Rousseau’s deification of Nature contributed considerably to the German notion that *Kultur* was the creation of the soul of a community. Under the influence of Rousseau, German romanticists also condemned “material” civilisation as morally corrupting and socially disruptive.

The distinction between civilisation and culture and society and the State were the two characteristic features of the nineteenth century German philosophy. The

³ T. S. Eliot’s *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, is an exception.

⁴ Politically, Kant was a democrat, an ardent defender of civil liberties. Nevertheless, true to the tradition of the Reformation, philosophically, he was the prophet of collectivism. To regard the Reformation as the prelude to the bourgeois revolution is evidently a wrong view of history. It provided sanction for individualism as well as collectivism. The dynamics of ideas, though having their roots in the physical being of man, cannot be fitted into a predetermined pattern of teleological historicism.

one followed logically from the other. Society as well as its material progress, called civilisation, belongs to the sensual world; culture and the State, to the moral. Culture being a matter of the mystic experience of the spirit of a community, its highest creation is the State conceived as a metaphysical moral entity. The mystic conception of the State remained rather nebulous with Kant, who could not entirely shake off the influence of the individualism of the eighteenth century. Taking up the threads of his thought, Hegel wove them into a political philosophy which raised the State to the exalted position of the supreme moral entity.

Kant's dualism was mitigated to the extent of allowing "the moral realm of freedom" to influence the "sensuous realm of nature". But the latter, being inferior, cannot affect the sovereignty of the former. Seizing upon this slender bridge between the two worlds of Kant, Fichte expounded his romantic doctrine of Will as the moral justification of aggressive nationalism and political authoritarianism, opposed to the cosmopolitan and democratic spirit of the eighteenth century. Kant defined will as the application of reason to action—an echo of the eighteenth century harmony of rationalism and romanticism. Fichte reversed the relation, and declared that reason was the expression of the Will: The world of experience is the material created by the free, rational and moral ego to serve as the medium for the realisation of its will. A rather naive subjective anticipation of the Hegelian picture of the world as the process of the self-realisation of the Absolute. Nevertheless, Fichte's doctrine of self-realisation through struggle, which was another anticipation of Hegelian dialectics, could be derived from the Kantian belief that morality consists in the duty to struggle against the evils of human nature. So, through Fichte, Kantian morality backed up German nationalism against the cosmopolitan spirit of a humanist culture.

Interpreting Herder's humanist conception of the

Volksgeist in the Kantian sense of culture, Fichte proclaimed that nature had endowed Germany with a mission. “The distinction between Germany and the rest of Europe is founded in nature.”⁵ In order to accomplish the mission, the German people must attain moral unity in the State. The State is the organ of divinity which marks out a particular community from the generic humanity. The State being divine, the symbol of the moral personality of the nation, patriotism is religion. It is “the will that the purpose of the existence of humanity be first realised in the particular nation to which we ourselves belong, and that this achievement thence spread over the entire race.” The logical connection between *Kultur* and the State, implicit in Kant, became pronounced in Fichte’s cultural, nationalism. Fichte himself believed that he was continuing the mission of Luther and Kant by advocating, the practice of their ideas.

One of the numerous curiosities of Marxist historicism is to hail Fichte as a herald of the proletarian philosophy because of his lowly parentage. In fact, he was the philosopher of totalitarianism and prophet of National-Socialism. He preached spiritual imperialism: The German nation and the German State were destined to bring about a moral regeneration of mankind. Therefore, he exhorted the German people to “elevate the German name to that of the most glorious among all the peoples, making this nation the regenerator of the world. Hark to our ancestors speaking to us: We in our time saved Germany from the Roman World Empire; yours is the greater fortune—you may establish once for all the kingdom of spirit and of reason, bringing to naught corporeal might as the ruling thing of the world. There is no middle road; if you sink, so sinks with you entire humanity, without any hope of future restoration.”

Fichte held that, the State being a moral entity, its

⁵ Fichte, Address to the German Nation.

function included moral and material care of the nation as a whole. Property is not merely a physical possession; it signifies subordination of the physical world to Will; therefore, it is a means for the realisation of the moral purpose. With these arguments, Fichte advocated collective ownership through the State. His “Closed Industrial State” was a sort of State-Socialism; it was the advance picture of the National-Socialist State.

As an idealist, more so than Kant before and Hegel after him, Fichte was an ardent believer in absolute unity. The absolute in philosophy led to absoluteness in political theory. Thus, Fichte provided philosophical justification for the authoritarian State, which again was a Lutheran heritage.

* * * *

Hegel continued the movement of ideas started by Kant. “Although he often criticised Kant, his system could never have arisen if Kant had not existed.”⁶ Hegel also philosophised the religious tradition of the Reformation. He inherited the religious bias of Kant. “To Hegel, the substance of the doctrine of Protestant Christianity is identical with the truths of absolute philosophy.”⁷ In political philosophy as well, Kant was the father of Hegel. The distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* is originally Kantian: the one is analytical thought, an empirical category, while the other is the absolute Universal Reason revealed in nature and in the organic process of human history.

Hume’s critique of the concept of causality provoked Kant to a defence of rationalism. But, himself an empiricist in the beginning, he developed an extreme form of subjectivism. As regards this crucial problem in the history of philosophy, Hegel took up the task of combat-

⁶ Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*.

⁷ John Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*.

ting subjectivism in which Kant had failed. He rehabilitated philosophy by rescuing objective reality, and showing the individual the escape out of himself—from solipsism to universalism. A broader conception of Reason than of Kant was necessary to deal with Hume's scepticism convincingly and re-establish the unity of facts and values. The pivot of the Hegelian system, therefore, is a new logic.

Hegel's philosophy proposed to deal with an old problem aggravated by the progress of modern science: the apparent contradiction between the classical concept of the rational order of nature and the traditional religious belief and ethical doctrines. Rousseau had opposed moral-religious sentiments to science and the achievements of "material" civilisation.⁸ Kant was deeply impressed by Rousseau's romantic naturalism. Hegel shared the sympathy. At the same time, he was also impressed by the respect for tradition which Burke opposed to Rousseau's disruptive romanticism. Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to combine romanticism and conservatism in one system. The appropriate method was found in the idea of progress through conflicts.

The dialectic interpretation of history led Hegel to the conclusion that conflict between nations was the motive force of human progress; the history of civilisation is the story of the rise and fall of successive national cultures. Hegelian dialectics also led to the Marxist doctrine that class struggle is the driving force of the history of civilisation. Therefore, Hegel must be recognised as the inspirer of the theory of proletarian revolution and Communism.⁹ At the same time, his glorification of the nation and the mystic conception of the

⁸ Rousseau allowed the heart to decide questions which the head left doubtful. From 1750 to 1794, the heart spoke louder and louder; at last, Thermidor put an end for a time to its ferocious pronouncements." (Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*.)

⁹ The baselessness of the assertion that with Hegel dialectics-

all-power State as the supreme moral entity culminated in Fascism.

The evolution of the Hegelian system was a purely mental process—of abstract ideas. It contained many faults, extravagances and absurdities. But Hegel was not consciously engaged in the fabrication of any particular ideology. An avowed enemy of subjectivism and a stern realist,¹⁰ he did not live in a world of his imagination, but allowed his mind to take the impression of things as they were. Once the objective knowledge of realities crystallised into ideas, these evolved according to their logic.

In his youth, Hegel, like all liberal-minded people of the time, was enthusiastic about the French Revolution.¹¹ Together with Kant, Goethe and other lesser lights, he admired Napoleon as the destroyer of mediaevalism and rejoiced at his victory over Prussia. In 1798 he wrote: “The silent acquiescence in things as they are, the hopelessness, the patient endurance of a vast overmastering fate, has turned to hope, to expectation, to the will for something different. The vision of a better and a juster time has entered alive into the souls of men, and a desire, a longing for a purer, freer condition has moved every heart and has alienated it from the existing state of affairs. Call this, if you like, a fever

was standing on its head, Marx put it back on its feet, will be shown in the next chapter.

¹⁰ So much so that Dewey has called him a “brutalist.”

¹¹ “For the first time since the sun appeared in the heavens, and the planets began to revolve around it, man took up his stand as a thinking animal and began to base his view of the world on reason” (Hegel).

As a student, he shared with Schelling a highly critical attitude towards the political and ecclesiastical lassitude of his country and subscribed to the doctrine of liberty and reason. There is a story that after the battle of Jena the two young enthusiasts, Schelling and Hegel, one morning went out to the neighbouring forest and danced around a “tree of liberty” which they had planted there.

paroxysm, but it will end either in death or in eliminating the cause of the disease.”¹²

Hegel's political ideas began to take shape in an essay called the “Constitution of Germany” published four years later. Already his appeal was addressed to the collective will of the nation, in contrast to the individualism of the eighteenth century political philosophy. But even then he wrote: “How blind are they who can imagine that institutions, constitutions and laws can persist after they have ceased to be in accord with the morals, the needs and the purposes of mankind, and after the meaning has gone out of them; that forms in which understanding and feeling are no longer involved can retain the power to bind a nation.” Having diagnosed the disease, the cure was prescribed; it was the rise of a State to symbolise national unity and national aspiration. Germany was divided: she is “no longer a State”, as Hegel asserted. How, then, could she be a State? Hegel's political philosophy was the answer to the question of the time. It was not an empirical doctrine, but a result of the “synthetic function of reason”.

As a scholar, Hegel was originally concerned with the history of religion. Under Lessing's and Kant's influence, he took up the study of the origin of Christianity. The result was a life of Jesus as the son of Joseph and Mary, and rejection of the miraculous.¹³ Together with Schelling, he opposed the recrudescence of theology on the basis of Kant's postulation of immortality as the sanction for his ethics. Before long, he broke also with Schelling on the issue of the latter's mystic synthesis of the temporal and the eternal, a doctrine supported also by Fichte. Having previously rejected Kant's rational moralising of theology, Hegel blazed a new trail,

¹² Hegel, *Ueber die Neuesten Innern Verhaeltnisse Wuerttemberg's* (On the Latest Internal Conditions of Wuerttemberg).

¹³ Wilhelm Dilthey, *Jugendgeschichte Hegels* (The History of Hegel's Youth).

and found God's presence in the concrete life of humanity. As against the Jewish belief of Christianity that the "Son of God" bore the cross to atone for the sin of man, Hegel regarded Jesus as the archetype of the cosmic man who suffers, with a gentle smile at destiny. That was evidently a Socratic conception. Friendship with Hoelderlin had brought him under the influence of the Renaissance tradition, which all along struggled in him with the legacy of Lutheran dogmatism and orthodoxy. Notwithstanding all the highly objectionable features of his system, the Renaissance tradition persisted as the under-current to inspire the religious criticism of the Young Hegelians.

It is quite possible that the study of the origin and rise of Christianity for the first time gave Hegel the idea of dialectic development. The humanist intellectual culture of Greece—thesis; breakdown of the antique civilisation and the consequent spread" of frustration, pessimism and mystic escapism—antithesis; the rise of Christianity—synthesis. That would be a perfect Hegelian pattern. The conditions of Germany after the disruption of the Holy Roman Empire by the Treaty of Westphalia, so very ably analysed in "Constitution of Germany", must have appeared to Hegel as strikingly similar to the atmosphere of disintegration, dismay and despair out of which Christianity rose. The doctrine of a *Folksgeist* preached by Lessing and Herder suggested the idea that, like the Jews in the past, the Germans were the chosen people. The belief in the mission of Germany to produce a new religion logically followed. It was the cult of the State as the highest moral entity, "God walking on earth".

Referring the collapse of the Empire to the retention of feudal and religious animosities, Hegel visualised a reorganisation of Germany through the rise of a strong central authority. But it was not for the philosopher to play the statesman, »no even the revolutionary. He could only describe life as it was, and foresee future

development. Therefore, having described the given conditions, Hegel drew the outlines of the coming epoch in his “Philosophy of Right (Law)”. It was a rounded up system of moral and political ideas dominated by a mystic-metaphysical conception of the State. But Hegel’s political philosophy was not a worship of the established order, nor idealisation of any peculiar form of State. Its *leitmotif* was appreciation of the value of organisation—the idea that liberty can never be dissociated from order; that a vital inter-connection between the parts of the whole was a reality that could not be ignored in the moral pursuit of the common good.. Hegel’s doctrine of the State was Hobbesian; it was purely theoretical, applicable to any form of government—monarchist or republican, aristocratic or democratic.

In the introduction to his early essay on the “Constitution of Germany”, Hegel had declared that his object was to promote an understanding of things as they were, to show that political history was not arbitrary but necessary. He held that unhappiness resulted from the experience of the discrepancy between the actuality and the desirable, the ideal. When it is realised that what is, must be, men also realise that it is what ought to be. The germ of the famous dictum—“the real (actual) is the rational”—was already in the sprouting stage.

These germinal ideas of Hegel’s youth were elaborated and logically worked out in the “Philosophy of Right (Law)”. The basic thesis is that there is a contradiction between understanding (analytical idea) of abstract right and subjective morality; it is composed by the interaction of reason (as distinct from analytical thought) and objective will, which is freedom. Therefore, Hegel declared that the State was created by the synthetic function of reason.

In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which presents the picture of Hegel’s philosophy in the process of taking shape, the rise of intelligence is treated not as a subjec-

tive experience, but as taking place in historical epochs, national characteristics, forms of culture, and philosophical systems. It is the autobiography of the philosopher's mind. Hegel externalised, objectified, his own intellectual development, and came to the conclusion that it reflected objective reality and revealed objective truth. Hegel's philosophy, therefore, claimed to have been determined by the historical epoch of disintegration and struggle for reorganisation, the resulting national characteristic of the desire for a central authority, the tradition of German culture, and the religion of Christ as interpreted by Luther. It is human mind at last realising its true position in the Universe. It is Hegel's own history—from youthful romanticism to classical rationalism, from religion to philosophy—depicted as the objective process of the unfoldment of the Universal Spirit which the philosopher reproduced in himself.

Dealing with the relation of consciousness to reality, Hegel came to a conclusion which was a severe condemnation of subjectivism: Isolated from the world, self-consciousness is shut out also from the stream of life. Reason is to realise this suicidal significance of an intellectual attitude which had stultified modern philosophy—a prisoner of self-contradictions. But reason, as analytical understanding, cannot bridge the gulf between reality and the ego imprisoned in self-consciousness. Unable to impose on the world of reality, as distinct from the world of subjective imagination, either the selfish (utilitarian) or humanist (naturalist) end, reason feels frustrated, and can only wait patiently for some mysterious power to give victory to righteousness. But the world goes on. Reason abandons the effort to mould it, and allows subjectivism to create a chaos, only reserving the right to step in to lay down precepts for composing the conflicts of individual actions. That was a critique of the romantic rationalism of the eighteenth century, and also of the utilitarian-liberal doctrine about the function of the State. It logically led to collectivism.

When consciousness rises above the level of mere analytical understanding, and attains the spiritual stage of Reason, it is no longer isolated from the world. Dwelling in the community, it identifies itself with its surroundings. But to be identified with the concrete realities of life, still is mere consciousness. Knowledge is yet to come. It is the picture of the primitive communal life. The spirit inspires, but does not reflect; morality is unconscious, spontaneous, the incentive being self-preservation. But culture grows and new ideals arise. Mind gradually emancipates itself from conventions and superstitions. Thus, the ground is prepared for the rule of Reason—of moral conscience. At this point, religion rises to teach that the world is subject to moral laws. The idea of God then passes through various stages—nature-worship, symbolism, etc. Finally, revealed religion establishes the unity of the concrete (man) with the absolute (God): “The spirit knowing itself as the spirit.” That was Hegel’s interpretation of Christ—the archetypal man. It is difficult to follow the tortuous Odyssey of Hegel’s mind; but the journey’s end presents an inspiring picture of the purpose of human existence. It is not to withdraw in the prison-house of subjectivism, but to march on the endless road of knowledge in search of truth—the unity of the Universe.

Phenomenology marked Hegel’s break with the romantic school—Schelling, Hölderlin, Fichte. Having outlined his philosophy, Hegel declared that such an attitude to life, the world and their problems, could have nothing to do with the aspirations of artistic souls. It disowned the idealism which thundered against the deficiencies of the world and craved for something more and better than reality. Philosophy, for Hegel, was the science of the actual world, and the actual was to be recognised as the real. Any other idea of reality was vain speculation.

Continuing his analysis of the dichotomy of reality and appearance, mind and matter, thought and being,

Hegel argued that existence was not an immovable rock limiting the efforts of thought; that thought was implicit in existence, and therefore existence was a process of the unfoldment of ideas. But he was not a believer in “mind-stuff”. He held that the physical nature and mind had a common origin, but were not its co-equal branches. He argued that mind could not be explained unless it was assumed that the potentialities of consciousness were inherent in physical nature. Hegel was a Spinozist and believed that the primeval matter was impregnated with spirit; or he could be credited with having anticipated the modern hypothesis of matter possessing “psychoid” properties. The stuff out of which mind and matter emerge Hegel called “the Idea”. But he would not invest it with the attribute of consciousness. Evidently, it was only a verbal jugglery. Earlier in the argument, Hegel had assumed that the potentiality of consciousness was always there. The potentiality must be potentiality of something. It existed in something, which, therefore, could not be purely mental. However, Hegel related reality with consciousness. There is reality independent of individual consciousness; but reality independent of all minds is impossible. The latter proposition is logically unchallengeable; equally logically it grants priority to the potentiality of being conscious of reality. In other words, the history of the world within the reach of human comprehension must begin with thought; therefore it is natural for human vanity to-assume that existence is limited by thought.

Hegel was concerned with the history of consciousness to which he gave different names on different occasions—thought, idea, spirit. Traditionally speaking that is the scope of philosophy. By transcending the the limits of the world of mind, philosophy becomes identical with science. Professional philosophers are not very likely to be so self-effacing. Therefore, as philosophy in the traditional sense, Hegel’s system is logically consistent; and it would be unfair to expect more

from a philosopher. Hegel stands the test in which many others have failed.

In the traditional philosophic search for reality, Hegel was guided by the principle that ultimate reality must not be self-contradictory; that except the whole nothing could be completely and ultimately real. The result of his search was the organic conception of the Universe; the organic view of society and the State logically followed from his metaphysics.

The Universe is not a collection of self-sufficient units, such as atoms or monads, but an integrated organic whole. Therefore, the reality of finite things is apparent. But Hegel rejected the doctrine which sought to distinguish reality from appearance—the Kantian worlds of noumenon and phenomena. Hegel was scornful about the notion of the “thing-in-itself”. He argued that, when we knew all the properties and aspects of a thing, we knew the thing-in-itself. The component units of the phenomenal world are also real, because they are aspects of the whole. “The antithesis between essence and appearance is in Hegel nothing more than an antithesis of two human modes of conception. The phenomenon is defined as the appearance filled with essence, and reality is there where the phenomenon is the entire and adequate manifestation of essence.”¹⁴

From this metaphysical premiss was deduced the famous Hegelian formula: “The real (actual) is the rational, and the rational is the real.” Interpreted from the empiricist point of view, this cryptic formula may mean that whatever is, is right, and Hegel’s philosophy be damned as an apology for the established order. Although since the passing of the Hegelian era this interpretation was generally accepted, Hegel himself obviated the possible misunderstanding by emphasising that what appears as fact to the empiricist is irrational, and therefore not real. The significance of a fact is different when

¹⁴ Lange, *History of Materialism*.

it is viewed as an aspect of the whole; and so viewed, all facts participate in the essence of reality.

Unlike Kant's, Hegel's entire system is rigorously rational, so much so that it merges metaphysics into logic. The substance is contained in the two books on Logic. All his other works are applied philosophy, so to say. "Reason is the conscious certainty of being all reality." By virtue of being part of the whole, which is the complete and ultimate reality, everything is real. Rationality is to be conscious of this participation. Conversely, in proportion as one is conscious of this participation, he is more rational. That is the transition to his philosophy of history, which is equally rationalistic. "The only thought which philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of history is the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the sovereign of the world; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process."¹⁵

A consistent rationalist of the classical tradition, Hegel held that the world was moving towards perfection. Therefore, the present must be taken as an approximation to the goal—greater than the past. The Universe is a process of the Absolute unfolding itself in the rhythmic movement of thought.¹⁶ In the natural world, the process manifests itself in a series of materialised forces and forms of life; in the spiritual world, (the world of the mind), the Absolute unfolds itself as the human soul, the legal and material order of society, religion, art and philosophy.

Generalising his criticism of Kant, already in his youth Hegel came to the conclusion that problems of the relation between the Church and the State, law and morality, commerce and art, should not be treated in abstraction, but in their systematic inter-connection in the context of the totality of human life. This idea was deve-

¹⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*.

¹⁶ Hegel, *Logic*.

loped in the *Philosophy of History*. Hegel's historical method of treating the problems of religion, philosophy, law and economics has been praised even by his critics. "If we consider only the influence of Hegel on the writing of history, specially with reference to the treatment of the history of civilisation, it must be admitted that, in his own way, he has mightily contributed to the advancement of science."¹⁷

The eighteenth century theory of progress was the empirical generalisation that study and research revealed the fact that ideas and institutions were not static. But Hume's consistent empiricism disputed the validity of inductive generalisation. The vacuum was filled by Hegel's rationalist interpretation of history. He maintained that his theory of history was not a generalisation of a fortuitous sequel of events; therefore it was more profound than the eighteenth century idea of progress. It was based upon the discovery of a law of synthesis inherent in nature as well as in man's mind. That was Hegel's answer to Hume's dichotomy of facts and values; they are united by Reason which pervades nature and human mind. The eighteenth century mind was only analytical; it broke up the organic process of history into its component parts. Hegel believed that his logic showed how Reason could piece the parts together into an underlying pattern with its law of development.

Hume's agnosticism had robbed the course of history of a logically necessary continuity, and consequently reduced the religious and moral values of civilisation to the

¹⁷ Lange, *History of Materialism*.

"If our own historical writing no longer contents itself with the learned discovery and critical sifting of traditions, with the ordering and pragmatic exposition of facts, but above all seeks to understand the deep lying connection of events, and to take a large view of the historical development and the intellectual forces that govern it, this process is not last to be referred to the influence which Hegel's *Philosophy of History* has exercised even upon those who have never belonged to his school." (Zeller, *History of German Philosophy*.)

level of social utility. To combat the sceptic's cult of chaos, Hegel took over Rousseau's conception of the General Will, and interpreted it as a vital spiritual principle of synthesis inherent not in individuals but in communities—a manifestation of a larger spiritual force that makes the core of reality itself. The unfolding of this eternal principle in things supplies a pattern of cosmic evolution and a plan for the development of civilisation in which each nation lives, and acts the part required by its relation with the whole. Hegel substituted the Natural Law by the rational unfolding of the Absolute in history.

Hegel completes Kant's unsuccessful endeavour to abolish the antithetical relation between law and morality by synthetising them in the ethical unity of the family and the State. The central theme of his *Philosophy of Right* is that mind is objectified in the institutions of law, family and State. Family is the instinctive realisation of moral life. That means rejection of the theory of social contract, although Hegel admits it in the Hobbesian sense when he says that by means of wider association of individuals and families, *owing to private interests*, the State rises as the home of the moral spirit where intimacy of interdependence is harmonised with the freedom of independent growth. The State is the consummation of man as a finite reality; it is the necessary point of departure for the spirit to rise to an absolute existence in the sphere of art, religion and philosophy. This simple meaning of this Hegelian jargon is to predicate culture on organisation.

Hegel maintained that no genuine conflict could ever exist between the individual and society to which he belonged. As the State is the highest possible moral value, it cannot mean negation of freedom. Hegel ridiculed the notion of private judgment which could be antagonistic to the State; nevertheless, he preferred the modern State to the ancient because the former had greater respect for individual freedom and the right of

choice. He held that a higher concept of personal liberty was the basic contribution of Christianity to European civilisation. He admired the iconoclasts and admitted that the man who defended society at the dictate of his own conscience was the most valuable social force.

In Hegelian dialectics, negation is not absolute. The conflicting propositions—thesis and antithesis—are partly true, partly false. When the two are rationally judged, a third proposition emerges which is better than both. Hegel discovered this method of approximating truth step by step in the Platonic Dialogues and Socratic interrogations. The Greek word *dialectic* means conversation. It is the function of reason to combine the thesis and the antithesis in a synthesis. By its very nature, reason can never tolerate the finality of any contradiction. Otherwise, nature will not be fully rational. According to Hegel, the Universe as a whole is rational, and there can be no problem which is ultimately insoluble. Dialectics is intimately related with the Hegelian conception of reality. Therefore, his system merges metaphysics in logic. The result is the so-called Panlogism.

The Hegelian theory of State tries to reconcile the idea of individual freedom with the organic conception

of society. As thesis and antithesis, both are right. The conflict, therefore, is apparent, unreal. Reason discovers the reality of harmony and unity. The Hegelian synthesis is not a compromise; it includes both the conflicting propositions completely in the result. Both are transcended and absorbed. The Hegelian State is not organic in the aristotelian sense; it is metaphysical.

“The definition of right, according to which what is fundamental, substantive and primary, is supposed to be the will of a single person in his own private self-will, not the absolute or rational will, involves a view which

is devoid of any speculative thinking and is repudiated by the philosophic concept.”¹⁸

¹⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*.

Hegel regarded human will as an expression of the reason in nature. Consequently, there cannot be a multitude of individual wills without a common denominator. Individualism, which does not presuppose a common human purpose, is bound to defeat itself by creating chaos instead of a harmonious social order. Human cooperation would be impossible unless there was a common element in human nature, common because it emerges out of the background of physical nature. The umbilical chord which binds every human being with mother Nature is the common denominator of individual wills. Therefore, will is rational.

Hegel rejects the doctrine of social contract as an abstraction. The family is the empirical unit. The patriarchal and feudal State grows out of that origin. It is the thesis. The individualist society (the bourgeois-democratic State) is the antithesis. What is the synthesis? It is found in the conception of the State as an organism, in which the component parts consciously identify themselves with the whole.

Though approving the theory of General Will, Hegel questions the practice which led to Rousseau's democratic dictatorship. He rejected the method of ascertaining the General Will by counting votes, on the ground that in consequence of that practice the General Will became an "abstract particularity". The General Will is not an arithmetical deduction; it is a rational category. And the rational is the real. Therefore, all individual resistance to the General Will is unreal. One might turn the table and argue that, since resistance is there, it is also rational. Hegel seems to have anticipated the possible retort. The State is neither a simple organism nor a mechanism composed of individual parts. What is not there cannot be lost. Therefore, the individual does not lose anything when he surrenders his will to the General Will. He only acts rationally. If a defence of autocracy was the purpose of Hegel's somewhat belaboured rationalism, it was much more explicit

in the mystic romanticism of the “prophet of democracy”. Rousseau defended dictatorship for enforcing freedom with the following argument: The General Will is the real will, because by obeying it one realises his own nature.¹⁹

For Hegel, politics was a rational, not empirical enquiry. The *Philosophy of Right* is only an “endeavour to apprehend and portray the State as something rational. As a work of philosophy, it must be poles apart from an attempt to construct a State as it should be. It can only show how the State, the universe of the ethical, is to be understood.”

In contrast to this detached objectivity of the philosopher, Rousseau’s political philosophy was prophetic; it had a message; it prescribed categorical imperatives. “Whoever refuses to obey the General Will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against personal dependence.”²⁰

Again, “If the State is a moral person whose life is in the common union of its members, and if the most important of its cares is the care of its own preservation, it *must* have a universal and compelling force in order to move and dispose each part as may be most advantageous to the whole.”²¹

Hegel did not take his lesson in philosophy from the Prussian King, but from the “prophet of democracy”. The more correct judgment, however, will be that Hegel’s theory of State was not made to order, but resulted logically from his metaphysics, in the realm of pure thought. And the organic conception of nature is as old as Aristotle, who inherited it from Plato. No unbiassed

“Rousseau as well as Hegel had inherited the Aristotelian doctrine of dual nature as the foundation of their political philosophies.

²⁰ *Social Contract.*

²¹ Ibid.

student of history can miss the striking similarity between the Aristotelian and the Hegelian State. Aristotle regarded nature as a process of development from what is to what can be and should be. The end of the process, being a moral ideal, could be realised only in man. The State makes this moral development in man possible. Therefore, it is prior to the individual. “The proof that the State is a creation of nature and prior to the individual, is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole.”²² That is why “man by nature is a political animal”,—the all too familiar Aristotelian dictum. The State enables man to be what he can be and should be; it is the precondition for man’s attaining his moral and rational end. Logically, therefore, it is prior. An empirical absurdity was thus logically rationalised.

“The State is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to parts.”²³ The predicate is obviously false. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian theory of State ruled unchallenged for centuries, until Hobbes.²⁴ But it was rather the organic conception of society which dominated political thought in the Middle-Ages. The supreme authority was the Church, not the State. The political State came into prominence after the Reformation. In theology, Luther revolted against Aristotle, but took over his theory of the State. During the period of the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, Erastianism gained ground, and glorification of the State became a tradition. As a Lutheran Protestant, Hegel inherited that tradition, and combined the organic theory of State with

²² Aristotle, *Politics*.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ “I believe that scarcely anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which is now called Aristotle’s *Metaphysiques*. Nor more repugnant to government than much of what he hath said in his *Politiques*; nor more ignorantly than a great part of his *Ethigves*.” (Hobbes, *Leviathan*.)

the organic conception of nature in a rounded-up system of philosophy.

The ideological implication of the classical, rationalism of the seventeenth century came out prominently in Hegel's philosophy. It bears also the stamp of the eighteenth century thought. Hegel believed in the perfectibility of human nature. He visualised humanity in a continuous movement from the lower to the higher, half a century before this inspiring perspective of history could be deduced from the knowledge of the process of biological evolution revealed by Darwin. Hegel held that all changes were in the direction of perfection. Nothing in Hegel prevents the identification of his World Spirit with the human spirit of creativeness. Hegel actually defines the World Spirit also as a thing dwelling in the mind of man, and gave the thing a variety of names which do mystify it. But the seat of the mysterious thing is the human mind. So, Hegelian Reason can be conceived microcosmically as a biological function, and macrocosmically as the harmony of the Universe. If the World Spirit be seated in man's mind, how could there be any freedom of will? The question is irrelevant for Hegel's system. The supposed limitation of will is not harmful, because the movement is always upwards—towards freedom. But that is the most extreme version of Hegel's Panlogism.

In reality, the position is not fatalistic. The mysterious power is in man's mind. The mind belongs to man. Therefore man can control destiny, provided that he progressively rises to the realisation of his participation in the rational process of nature. This humanist under-current of the Hegelian system found its expression in the philosophy of Feuerbach.

The idealistic view of history places the hero in the centre of the stage; he is a demi-god, not bound by any law. The whole history of mankind is a composite biography of such great men. Hegel completely discarded this view. His philosophy of history makes no room

for heroes, regarded as supermen or demi-gods. The role of heroes in history is only to serve as the vehicle of the spirit of the age; through the unconscious social purpose becomes conscious, and is realised. In other words, great men do not make history; they are products of -history.

This significant idea is quite explicit in Hegel's lecture on the philosophy of history. Analysing the historical role of Julius Caesar, for example, he said: "It was not merely his private gain, but an unconscious impulse that occasioned the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe." Then Hegel went on to generalise: "Such are all great historical men, whose own particular aims involved those larger issues which are the will of the World Spirit . . . Such individuals had no consciousness of the general idea they were unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of theirs; on the contrary, .they were practical political men. But at the same time, they were thinking men who had insight into the requirements of the time, what was ripe for development. This was the very Truth for their age, for their world." This non-teleological view of the dynamics of history was shrouded in a mystic jargon and metaphysical imagery. But abstracted from that context of verbal extravagance, it was not only in the tradition of Vico, but indeed of Renaissance Humanism.

Going back to the original source of the master's inspiration, the Young Hegelian Friedrich Strauss wrote his *Life of Jesus*, which daringly criticised the dogmas of Protestant Christianity which, since the days of Luther, had provided the moral sanction of the established authority. "With this book, Germany took up the path of the leader in that struggle which had begun in England and continued in France, for the application of free criticism to religious tradition. All those transitional standpoints that survived from the age of romanticism and older rationalism were broken on the critical question that henceforth predominated. The application of a cool and

strictly rational criticism to the Bible and to ecclesiastical history belonged to the science of the new age, in which the practical and rational were everywhere asserting themselves.”²⁵

Avowed opponent of reason and science, Lutheran dogmatism had circumscribed the spiritual outlook of Germany. A concerted attack on that bulwark of orthodoxy and conservatism was necessary for the liberation of the intellectual life of the country. That revolutionary role was played by the Young Hegelians, who represented the rationalist aspect of the master’s teachings. Imitating the philosophers of the Enlightenment, they also heralded a revolution of 1848, which opened a new era in the history of Germany.

Feuerbach blazed the new trail. Like Hegel of Kant, he was a critical disciple of Hegel. On the basis of the positive kernel of the Hegelian system, he built up a new philosophy and called it the “Philosophy of the Future”. In his immortal work, *The Essence of Christianity*, he went much further than Strauss and other Young Hegelians in religious criticism, to declare that God and religion were creations of human imagination. Representing the spirit of the Renaissance, Feuerbach called upon men to cease to be “valets of His Heavenly Majesty”, if they wanted freedom.

In the realm of pure philosophy, Feuerbach rejected the Hegelian concept of the Absolute as unnecessary. He held that a series of ideas, as product of philosophical activity, could replace the mystic category. Thus, in Feuerbach’s philosophy, man becomes the creator of the Absolute. The corollary to this revision of Hegel’s philosophy was to regard the material Universe as the starting point of philosophy. It was really not a revision. Because, nature could not be conjured out of logic. A physical-realist view could be deduced directly from the Hegelian formula—the real is the rational. However, in

²⁵ *Lange*, History of Materialism.

Feuerbach's philosophy, thought becomes the result of organic conditions, and the organic conditions of human existence, in their turn, crystallise out of the entire process of physical nature. Therefore, thought cannot be self-contemplation of the ego; it has external reference. Philosophy at last came out of the vicious-circle of subjectivism, and at the same time provided an objective rational basis for Humanism. The Hegelian system, thus, gave birth to a humanist naturalism.

CHAPTER VIII

HEGEL TO MARX

HERALDED BY the Age of Reason, the Great Revolution, however, was a mighty outburst of, romanticism. The short interlude of post-revolutionary political as well as intellectual reaction was followed by a romantic revival culminating in the revolutionary movement which swept Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, during the earlier decades of the century. Hegelian philosophy revived classical rationalism. Karl Marx combined the two currents of thought in his dialectical Materialism, which he proclaimed as a new philosophy—the ideology of the rising proletariat. It was claimed to be an entirely unprecedented type of philosophy, which was not the creation of pure contemplative thought, but a result of real life as lived in society. Disowning the vain pastime of interpreting the world, the new philosophy of action undertook the historic mission of remaking it. But even then it was not altogether new. Its fundamental principle was a plagiarism of Goethe: “Am Anfang war die Tat.” (In the beginning was action). Moreover, if the true philosophy, as against the idle speculation of pure thought, was the sum total of the experience of real life actually lived in a particular period, then it could not precede the class whose experience it claimed to represent ideologically. In fact, Marxism was not a new philosophy at all.

Marx and Engels took over from Hegel much more than “the revolutionary side of his philosophy”. The dialectic process of history can never be independent of the dynamics of thought. Therefore, the founders of dialectical Materialism inherited from Hegel a considerable element of Idealism together with the dialectical method. The feat of having reversed Hegelian dialectics so

as to manufacture Materialism out of Idealism was a figment of imagination. As a matter of fact, there is little of essential difference between Hegel's idealistic conception of the evolutionary process of history and the Marxist doctrine of historical determinism. Hegel's philosophy of history was essentially humanist. The dynamic concept of the Idea in dialectic relation to nature and history showed the escape out of the vicious circle of metaphysical speculations, and provided a basis for action with high ideals, for participation in the affairs of the secular world with the object of remaking it, and with the conviction that the thinking man had the power to do so. It is easy to see how this humanist core of Hegelian Idealism could become the point of departure of the materialist philosophy of action.

In order to break away from the idealist tradition, Engels traced the origin of thought to "matter-in-motion". Logically, he admitted, the two were coexistent in the process of biological evolution, and as such were bound to be mutually influenced and determined. Otherwise, man could not possibly be the maker of the social world. The *ad hoc* concept of matter-in-motion does improve upon the Newtonian natural philosophy which, notwithstanding its mechanistic view of the physical Universe, makes room for a *deus ex machina*. Nevertheless, as "motion" (later on conceived as energy or the vital force), God interferes in the physical processes of the evolution of matter; in that case, man must be deprived of any creative power; and the Marxian philosophy of action would have no leg to stand on. Therefore, Marxist Materialism, to be a self-contained system of philosophical thought, necessarily, though not always explicitly, recognises the sovereignty of ideas, and admits that they are as real as physical and social processes. Rational Idealism, as distinct from theology and teleology, was logically bound to culminate in materialist monism; similarly, materialist philosophy must include recognition of the objective reality of ideas, with their

own dynamics, if it is not to degenerate into vulgarity, or relapse into Newtonian natural philosophy, which makes room even for an anthropomorphic God.

It was Hegel who first expounded the doctrine of the identity of thought and being, which was taken over by Marx and Engels as one of the fundamental principles of their dialectic Materialism. It is an essentially idealistic doctrine. Identity of two things implies the notion of their coexistence. Physical being transcends the beginning of biological evolution. If thought is identical with being, then it must be admitted that consciousness, in which thought originates, is not conditional on life; that there is such a thing as cosmic consciousness coexistent with the physical Universe. That admission, logically compelled by the doctrine of the identity of thought and being, thoughtlessly incorporated in Marxist Materialism, strikes at the root of materialist philosophy. On the other hand, if the doctrine is that thought is identical with being, from a certain level of biological evolution, then it cancels the other Marxist doctrine that ideological systems are mere superstructures of economic relations. In the context of materialist philosophy, which associates consciousness with life, and traces the origin of life in organic matter, the doctrine of the identity of thought and being only means that in the biological process of evolution, including social evolution and history, thought is coexistent with physical (social) being. With this doctrine, shared by both, Idealism flows into Materialism. The latter can replace the former as the philosophy of the contemporary and future world only by taking over the positive outcome of the entire past history of thought.

“We may say that Idealism itself lent assistance to Materialism in awakening the sense for the systematic working out of leading ideas, and in provoking by its very opposition the young and aspiring natural sciences.”¹ That

¹ Lange, *History of Materialism*.

is a correct appraisal of the influence of the Hegelian philosophy on the intellectual life of Germany in the middle of the nineteenth century. It broke the spell of the cultural chauvinism of Fichte and sobered the mystic romanticism of literature. The German mind again turned towards France for scientific and realistic inspiration. The recoil from romantic delirium and airy metaphysical speculations aroused interest in the study of natural sciences. The tendency, however, was not new. It had begun with Kant, "who in his pre-critical period not infrequently came very near to Materialism" (Lange). He began as a follower of Newton, and the Kant-Laplace theory was a landmark in the history of mechanistic cosmology. In metaphysics also, Kant was nearer to Materialism than Idealism. The concept of the thing-in-itself represented a recognition of the objective reality of the physical world. Of the two most significant pupils of Kant, Herder was not only inspired by the humanist tradition of the Renaissance, but also inherited the scientific mode of thought, while Fichte stormed into the emotional wilderness of romantic patriotism.

In the post-Hegelian years, under the impact of the revolutionary aspects of the philosopher's teachings, young Germany turned back on rationalist classicism as well as poetic romanticism. The German *Aufklaerung* was predominantly classicist, that is, conservative. In the post-Hegelian years, it was opposed by a revival of the scientific naturalism of the French Enlightenment. Spinoza survived the attack of Leibniz to influence the philosophical thought of post-Hegelian Germany; and Aristotle was replaced by Epicurus as the source of ancient wisdom. Expounded by Young Hegelians like Gutzkow, Mundt and Laube, Epicurean philosophy penetrated even the German Universities, until then the sanctum of theological orthodoxy and conservatism. A dissertation on Epicurus won for Marx the doctorate from the University of Bonn.

Religious criticism of the Young Hegelians inspired a

struggle against the Church and the Lutheran State. It was reinforced by the pioneering activities of great scientists like Liebig and Alexander von Humboldt. The one introduced the study of chemistry for the first time in a German University (Giessen), while the other, a physicist, of European fame, was the founder of the University of Berlin, where Hegel taught philosophy. Learning from Cabanis and other famous French scientists, Johannes Mueller and Ernst Heinrich Weber spread the knowledge of physiology, particularly of the brain, which undermined the venerable doctrine of the immaterial soul, and thus prepared the ground for Karl Vogt, Moleschott and Buechner, who appeared as the exponents of Materialism.

“The most important effect was produced by the retiring idealistic flood-tide in the sphere of religion. The enthusiasm for pious romanticism and poetical ecclesiasticism disappeared.”² Religious traditions and the annals of the Christian Church were subjected to the scrutiny of exact science on the authority of the Hegelian philosophy of history. To promote an intellectual revolt “against the increasing plague of authority”,³ was the declared purpose of the Hegelian exponents of the eighteenth century Materialism which Marx rejected on the authority of Hegel.⁴

The religious controversy provoked by the literary works⁵ of the post-Hegelian German Materialists was reminiscent of the fierceness of the Reformation; only, this time, orthodoxy was combatted by scientists. Buechner’s book created the greatest sensation and was

² Ibid.

³ Karl Vogt, *Pictures of Animal Life*.

⁴ “Karl Marx did not stop at the Materialism of the eighteenth century he advanced philosophy. He enriched it with the acquisitions of German classical philosophy, specially of the Hegelian system.” (Lenin, *Teachings of Karl Marx*).

⁵ Karl Vogt, *Pictures of Animal Life* and *Koehler-Glaube und Wissenschaft*, Rudolf Wagner, *Letters on Physiology*; Moleschott, *Kreislauf des Lebens*; Buechner, *Kraft und Stoff*.

vehemently condemned alike by idealist philosophers, conservative academicians, orthodox ecclesiasts and theologians. Marx's belaboured exposition of the inadequacies of "mechanical Materialism" did not make his dialectic Materialism more acceptable to the opponents of the former. It was pointless. As a matter of fact, it weakened the efforts to pull down the ideological superstructure of the established order, as Marx would characterise theology and clerical learning, and placed Marx outside the current of progressive thought flowing from the realist metaphysics and rational-humanist historiology of the Hegelian system. Representing the democratic spirit of post-Hegelian scientific Materialism, Buechner, for example, wrote in the preface of his famous book: "It lies in the nature of philosophy that it should be a common property. Expositions which are not intelligible to an educated man are scarcely worth the ink they are printed with. Whatever is clearly conceived can be clearly expounded"⁶ The "mechanical Materialists" also wanted, as did Marx, to bring philosophy down from the clouds of speculative thought on this earth to reflect the experience of the realities of life. The last sentence of the passage quoted above meant a round rejection of philosophical systems dealing with abstractions such as the Universals of the Realists, extra-sensual categories of metaphysics and vague concepts about their nature.

Buechner "applied his rich and many-sided abilities partly to scientific enquiries, but partly to the popular exposition and appreciation from a social and political point of view of the results of our recent researches in physical science. Amid all his activity, he never lost sight of the mighty task of advancing humanity."⁷ Buechner as well as Moleschott rejected the concept of the Absolute and took up a relativist position in epistemology. The problem of the ultimate reality will never be solved; human

⁶Buechner, *Kraft und Stoff*.

⁷Lange, *History of Materialism*.

mind should be satisfied with the truth revealed by empirical investigation, which does not allow the assumption of any super-sensuous categories. Whenever speculation tries to reach beyond the limits of experience, it involves philosophy in an inextricable maze of errors. Reason can not follow faith. Philosophy must be guided by the natural sciences.⁸

Moleschott proposed to deal *de novo* with the relation between the subject and the object in knowledge. He doubted the Hegelian doctrine of the unity of thought and being, which logically led to the pantheistic conception of the identity of the human spirit with the Spirit of the Universe. On the other hand, he rejected the Kantian concept of the unknown and unknowable thing-in-itself. “We know everything in relation to ourselves. This has been called a limited knowledge, human knowledge conditioned by the senses, a knowledge that merely observes the tree as it is to us: that is very little; we must know how the tree is in itself, so that we may no longer delude ourselves that it is as it appears to us. But where is the tree in itself? Does not all knowledge presuppose someone that knows? And consequently a relation between the object and the observer? If the two things exist, it is just as necessary for the tree as for the man that it stands to him in a relation that manifests itself by the impression upon his eye. It is simply by this relation that the tree is in itself. Because, the knowledge of the object resolves into the knowledge of the relation between itself and the observer, all knowledge is objective knowledge.”⁹

The indispensable subjective element of knowledge does not destroy its objective validity. On the other hand, objective knowledge is not absolute knowledge. Knowledge derived empirically is objective, but necessarily relative. That was a “higher synthesis” which

⁸Buechner, *Natur und Geist*.

⁹Moleschott, *Kreislauf des Lebens*.

solved the problem of the relation between the subject and the object of knowledge. It resulted from the rigorously rational Hegelian system, which laid the twin phantoms of subjectivism and dualism which had haunted philosophy through the ages. But it was not the negation of a negation; it resulted from a rational discrimination between the true and the false, the criterion of judgment being empirical as well as logical. The possibility of combining speculative Idealism and dogmatic Materialism into a philosophy more realistic than either was inherent in Hegel's all-embracing system.

The Materialism of the eighteenth century was defective because of the inadequacies of the then available scientific knowledge. In proportion as the latter expanded, materialist metaphysics and sensationalist epistemology and psychology could be freed from fallacies and inadequacies. That development of philosophy took place in consequence of the intellectual activities of the post-Hegelian period. The "mechanical" or "naive" Materialism of Vogt, Moleschott and Buechner was followed up Lotze, a professor of philosophy at Goettingen, whose treatment of pathology and therapeutics as mechanical sciences dealt a staggering blow to the doctrine of the vital force. The authority of an objective academician encouraged young Heinrich Czolbe to publish his *Neue Darstellung des Sensationalismus*, in which empirical epistemology was reinforced by a materialist metaphysics. The sensible presentation was resolved into matter and its motion; it was shown only as a regulative principle, matter being the metaphysical element. Czolbe's new exposition freed sensationalism from the solipsist fallacy, which persisted even after its improvement by Condillac and Helvetius. Locke as well as his French followers were inclined to refer spirit to matter. But a consistent sensationalist could just as well hold that, since only sensations are perceived, the notion of matter is superfluous. Consequently, subjective Idealism as well as agnosticism can logically follow from sensationalism,

unless it transcends the limits of epistemology and arms itself with a metaphysics. Czolbe, with the help of biological knowledge acquired since the time of Locke, Condillac and Helvetius, improved sensationalism in that sense and merged it into Materialism, which consequently was also enriched.

“What in recent times Feuerbach, Vogt, Moleschott and others have accomplished, forms but suggestive and fragmentary assertions which, upon a deeper examination of the matter, leave us unsatisfied. As they have only generally maintained the possibility of explaining everything in a purely natural way, but have never attempted a more particular proof of this, they are still at bottom entirely on the ground of religion and a speculative philosophy which they attack.”¹⁰

Czolbe’s approach to the task of building a materialist metaphysics was entirely free from dogmatism or unfounded assumptions. It was truly scientific. For the fundamental principle of his new exposition of sensationalism, namely, the exclusion, on the authority of physiological knowledge, of anything super-sensuous from the cognitive process, he did not claim any greater validity than that of a working hypothesis. “Without such an hypothesis (call it prejudice, if you please), the ‘forming of a view as to the connection of phenomena is altogether impossible. Besides internal and external experience, hypotheses are necessary in the forming of philosophy of things.”¹¹ Czolbe further argued: Bacon had advanced philosophy by discarding the super-sensuous—the notion of the Final Cause. Since his time, evidence has been accumulated to support the method. Locke’s exposition of the fiction of the vital force is the latest addition to the evidence. Why should we not finally discard the notion of transcendental forces?

Czolbe’s new exposition improved sensationalism not

¹⁰Czolbe, *Neue Darstellung des Sensationalismus*.

¹¹Ibid.

only as regard metaphysics and epistemology; the most significant contribution was ethical. Czolbe's purpose was to formulate a humanist ethics by merging Materialism into natural philosophy. He believed that morality necessarily resulted from the good will which naturally developed in the intercourse of man with man.

Ethics had been the Achilles, heel of all non-religious,, non-transcendental systems of philosophy. The "happiness principle" of Locke did not improve matters. Utilitarian ethics, even as elaborated by Helvetius, logically led to the relativist morality of Bentham and his followers. Subsequently, it was taken over by Karl Marx, substantiating the contention that materialist philosophy cannot have an ethics. The problem of a secular, rationalist morality with an objective criterion for its value is still to be solved. The Epicurean tradition enabled the men of the Renaissance to ignore the problem. The scientific, humanist naturalism of the French Enlightenment gave some illuminating pointers. Czolbe found a more promising approach in the Hegelian system, which abolished the dichotomy of nature and spirit. Hegel's "view of the world's history makes the dualism of spirit and nature a great transitional stage between a lower stage and a higher purer stage of unity—an idea which, on the one hand, retains the point of connection with the innermost motives of ecclesiastical doctrine, and on the -other, has given rise to those exertions which have for their object the entire setting aside of all religion."¹²

Under the impact of this grand sweep of the Hegelian Idea, which went to the incredible extent of declaring that at a certain stage of the spiritual evolution of man, religion (belief in the supersensuous) ceases to be rational and therefore real, progressive and liberty-loving German minds looked beyond the narrow horizon of race and national consciousness, to find a vision of their future in "the free harmonious humanity of

¹²Lange, *History of Materialism*.

Hellenism and the self-supporting manliness of Roman antiquity” (David Strauss). Czolbe believed that sensationalism as expounded by himself, a synthesis of naturalism and Materialism, would be the philosophy of the future visualised by the Hegelian Strauss. Accordingly, he came to the following conclusion: “The so-called moral needs arising from dissatisfaction with our earthly life might just as properly be called immoral. It is, indeed, no proof of humility, but rather of arrogance and vanity, to improve upon the world we know by imagining a super-sensuous world, and to wish to exalt man into *a.* creature above nature by the addition of a super-sensuous part. Dissatisfaction with the world of phenomena is not a moral reason at all, but rather a moral weakness. The systematic development of true principles often demands much less acumen than the development of false ones; thus, sensationalism does not require a greater acuteness, but it does require a deeper and truer morality.” Later on, Czolbe declared that, just as the idea of a moral order immanent and inseparable from himself had compelled Rudolf Wagner to assume the immaterial soul, “in my case too, it is neither physiology nor the rational principle of the exclusion of the supernatural, but primarily the moral feeling of duty towards the natural world order and contentment with it, that compels me to the denial of a super-natural soul.”¹³ There is a Kantian flavour in Czolbe’s ethics; nevertheless, it makes the stimulating suggestion that the road towards a rationalist ethics, which can avoid the pitfalls of moral relativity or amorality, lies over a bridge to be built across the apparent gulf between physics and psychology.

Those intellectual efforts marking a highly significant stage in man’s endless struggle for spiritual freedom were not appreciated by Marx, whose philosophy inherited rather the objectionable features of the Hegelian

¹³Czolbe, *Die, Grenzen und Ursprung der Menschlichen Erkenntnis*.

system than its progressive and revolutionary tendencies. The philosophical foundation of Marxism (dialectical Materialism) was laid in the years preceding the publication of the *Communist Manifesto*. During that period Marx, ably seconded by Engels, carried on a bitter controversy with the Young Hegelians and the philosophical Radicals who called themselves “German Socialists”—all disciples of Feuerbach. In that controversy, which has become an integral part of the Marxist system, its founders defended Hegel against all his pupils who represented the materialistic and naturalist tendencies in his system .against his mystic Idealism.

The implication of Hegel’s memorable reference to the French Revolution as the first effort of man to be guided by reason¹⁴ was put in plain language by Heine. All the Hegelian Radicals—Young Hegelians and German Socialists—enthusiastically hailed the poet’s discovery of the revolutionary implications of their master’s teachings. Heine declared: “If we can weaken people’s faith in religions and traditions, we will make Germany a political force.” The spirit of the Renaissance at last challenged the deep-rooted influence of the Reformation in Germany. David Strauss, Feuerbach, the Bauer brothers, Moses Hess, Gutzkow, Mundt, Karl Gruen, Czolbe and a whole host of Radical thinkers followed Hegel’s lead.

In the earlier years of his career, until he chose to assume the role of the prophet of an inevitable revolution, Marx also belonged to that distinguished company. In those early days, he believed that an industrially and politically backward country like Germany in the middle of the nineteenth century could contribute nothing to the advance of European civilisation except a philosophical understanding of human aspirations and historical processes. Yet, later on he bitterly attacked the German Socialists exactly for holding this view.

¹⁴ See page 142, footnote 11 to Chapter VII.

Marx started his political career as the editor of the *Rheinische Gazette*—an organ of the Hegelian liberal bourgeoisie. As a Liberal, he was critical of socialist ideas coming from France. In 1840, the Young Hegelian Moses Hess returned from a visit to Paris full of enthusiasm for the sacred cause of the liberation of the “dehumanised humanity”. Marx gave a sympathetic hearing to the glowing account of the socialist movement in France which had by that time reached the highwater mark. But he pointed out that the socialist idea that society should be built from the bottom did not fit in the Hegelian dialectics of history; that the creation of a society free from the curses of money, profit and poverty presupposed self-negation of the established order. Only-then a higher synthesis could result from the negation of the negation. In other words, the society based on money,-profit and poverty must be exhausted by itself to give birth to its antithesis (negation) as the indispensable precondition for its disappearance into the limbo of time. Until then, the true Hegelian must be guided by the dictum that the actual is rational. Where were the indispensable conditions for a great change? Changes do not happen simply because they are desirable, but of necessity. A revolutionary reconstruction of society is not a matter of human desire, human will, human aspiration and human endeavour; it takes place of necessity.

With these Hegelian arguments, which have subsequently been used by the conservative defenders of the *status quo*, Marx came to the conclusion that the Socialists had postulated the end of the system of money, profit and poverty without proving that it was inevitable. Therefore, he characterised the socialist movement, which was inspired by the tradition of the French Revolution and the doctrines of earlier moralists, as Utopian. However, compelled by other considerations also, he agreed to go to Paris to study the socialist movement and its ideas. There he reached the second source of his system. Under the influence of the romantic tradition.

of the French socialist movement, young Marx's political ideas began to outgrow the conservative implications of Hegel's philosophy and orientated towards revolutionary activism. But even then his criticism of Hegel's political philosophy was not directed against the Hegelian State. Marx's conception of the State remained Hegelian; only, it was to be established not by the German nation, but by the proletariat.¹⁵

As the would-be prophet of an inevitable revolution, albeit to be brought about by the activities of the "real" man, Marx went back on his early association with the Radical Hegelians and began a crusade against them with the weapon of Hegelian dialectics, which he claimed to have placed on its feet as the foundation of his new philosophy. Here is a recognition of the historical significance of the Hegelian Radicals, whom Marx fought with unfair means: "Towards the end of the 'thirties the cleavage in the (Hegelian) school became more and more apparent. The left wing, the so-called Young Hegelians, in their fight with the pietist orthodox and feudal reactionaries, abandoned bit by bit that philosophical aristocratic reserve in regard to the burning questions of the day which up to that time had secured State toleration and even protection for their teachings. The fight was still carried on with philosophical weapons, but no longer for abstract philosophical aims. It turned

¹⁵ As a matter of fact, Marx never quite outgrew the Hegelian faith in the mission of the Germans, if not of Germany. When the Prussian army was marching on Paris in 1870, in a letter to Engels he wrote : "If the Prussians win, the centralisation of State power will subserve the centralisation of the German working class. German domination would furthermore shift the focus of the Western-European workers' movement from France to Germany, and you have merely to compare the movements in the two countries from 1866 up to now to see that the German working class is superior, both in theory and in organisation, to the French. Its supremacy over that of the French on the world stage would at once mean the supremacy of our idea over Proudhon's."

directly on the destruction of traditional religion and of the existing State. At that time, however, politics was a very thorny field, and hence the main fight came to be directed against religion; this fight, particularly since 1840, was directly also political. Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, published in 1835, had provided the first impulse."¹⁶

It was Feuerbach who first revolted against Hegelian Idealism and blazed a new trail. He is generally recognised in the history of philosophy as the pioneer of the nineteenth century materialist revival. David Strauss shares the honour with him. Feuerbach was the first to reject the Hegelian conception of the dialectical process of history as the self-realisation of the Absolute Idea. Searching for the origin of idea, which undoubtedly was the motive power of history, Feuerbach located it in social anthropology. He came to the conclusion that physical nature preceded spirit; that thought was determined by being. "I do not generate the object from the thought, but the thought from the object; and I hold that alone to be an object which has an existence beyond one's own brain."¹⁷ Feuerbach's *Philosophy of the Future*, therefore, came to be known as dialectical Materialism as against the dialectical Idealism of Hegel.

Though recognised as the founder of dialectical Materialism, Feuerbach would be more correctly described as an expounder of sensationalism of the eighteenth century tradition. He broadened the basis of sensibility by placing man in the context of nature as its integral part. In other words, he revived Humanism, and found the incentive in the Hegelian system. "The new philosophy makes man, including nature as the basis of man, the one universal and highest object of philosophy."¹⁸

Thus, in Feuerbach's system, anthropology and

¹⁶Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*.

¹⁷Feuerbach, *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft*.

¹⁸Ibid.

physiology are raised to the status of universal science. Until, then, Materialism was based on physics; consequently, it could not be reconciled with Humanism, which concedes the highest importance to ethics. But unless the source of the sense of moral obligation could be located in the biological being of man, logic leads to supernaturalism, super-sensualism and irrationalism. Hence the baffling problem of harmonising a mechanistic cosmology, materialist (or realist) metaphysics and humanist ethics in an integral system of natural philosophy. Feuerbach made a considerable contribution to the solution of the problem, and in that sense his humanist Materialism was really the “outcome of the classical philosophy”, as Engels characterised it. Breaking away from its admitted source of inspiration, the Marxian dialectical Materialism dehumanised humanity by subordinating its entire history, political, social, cultural and intellectual, to a secular teleos, and rested an ill-conceived romantic view of life on a soulless mechanistic Materialism which it claimed to have rejected.

Feuerbach, of course, did not hold that philosophical thought should be limited by the being and becoming of man. Because, in that case, it would be identical with anthropology, history and sociology. “In this respect, Feuerbach was a Hegelian, and at bottom favoured with Hegel the principle of Protagoras that man is the measure of things. Truth with him means what is true for man; that is, what is apprehended with human senses. Hence he declares that sensations have not merely anthropological but metaphysical meaning; that is, that they are to be regarded not merely as facts in the individual man, but as proofs of the truth and reality of things.”¹⁹

“The old philosophy started with the principle that the ego is an abstract, merely thinking being; the body is no part of it. The new philosophy, on the other hand, begins with the principle: I am a real, a sensible

¹⁹Lange, *History of Materialism*.

being; the body is part of my being; nay, the body is its totality, is my ego, is itself my essence. . . .

“All our ideas spring from the senses. Idealism is, therefore, right in seeking in man the origin of ideas, but wrong in trying to derive them from isolated man, as a being existing for himself and fixed as a soul. Ideas arise only through communication, only out of converse of man to man. Not alone, but only by virtue of a duality we attain to ideas and to reason. Two human beings appertain to the production of man, of the spiritual as well as of the physical man; the community of man with man is the first principle and criterion of the true and the universal.”²⁰

Those rather aphoristic sentences summarise the entire philosophy of Feuerbach, which stimulated the historically significant intellectual efforts of all the Radical Hegelians. In the beginning, Marx was amongst them; but he began formulating his dialectic Materialism with a criticism of Feuerbach’s materialist Humanism. That wrong start put an indelible stamp on the entire Marxist system.

The salient points of the Marxist criticism of Feuerbach are summarised in the Eleven Theses written by Marx himself in 1845, and subsequently (in 1886). elaborated by Engels in the pamphlet *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*. The gravamen of that attack was Feuerbach’s Humanism and humanisation of Materialism, so to say. A hitherto unpublished essay on Feuerbach by Marx himself is included in the book *The German Ideology*, published in 1940 as a part of *The Marxist-Leninist Library*. The caption “Feuerbacn” seems to be an interpolation, because in the manuscript the essay was entitled “Opposition of the Materialistic and Idealistic Outlook”, and it was a general dissertation on ideology. In the foreword

²⁰Feuerbach, *Philosophic der Zukunft*.

to his book on Feuerbach, Engels refers to the unpublished essay (rather notes) of Marx, and writes: "Since then, more than forty years have elapsed and Marx died without either of us having had an opportunity of returning to the subject. We have expressed ourselves in various places regarding our relation to Hegel, but now-where in a comprehensive connected account. To Feuerbach, who after all in many respects forms an intermediate link between Hegelian philosophy and our conception, we never returned." Engels adds that his book, written in 1884, was "the first connected account

of our relation to the Hegelian philosophy and a full acknowledgment of the influence of Feuerbach."

Having candidly admitted that Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* "placed Materialism on the throne again", and that Marx himself "enthusiastically greeted the new

conception", Engels proceeds to catalogue Feuerbach's faults. They are "deification of love" and contribution to the "spread of true Socialism like a plague in educated

Germany since 1844". And why was "true Socialism" of the faithful followers of Feuerbach condemned as a plague? Because it maintained that a conception of free society superior to that of the British and French Socialists could be deduced from the "nature of man".

The spirit of the criticism can be sensed in the

original scripture, which begins with the following: "As we hear from German ideologists, Germany has in the last few years gone through an unparalleled revolution. The decomposition of the Hegelian philosophy which began with Strauss has developed into a universal ferment, which swept all the powers of the past. Principles

outstep one another, heroes of the mind overthrow each other with unheard of rapidity, and in the three years, 1842-45, more of the past was swept away than normally in three centuries. All this is supposed to have taken place in the realm of pure thought."²¹

²¹Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*.

Marx was very proud of the historical sense of his philosophy. But the criticism with which he began formulating it reveals a woeful lack of appreciation of the historical significance of a whole period of intellectual development, simply because he wanted to assert the superiority of his philosophy—of an immaculate conception of a whole system of ideology sucked out of his thumb, so to say, without any past, but claiming the monopoly of the future. If he applied historical sense to the appraisal of his philosophy, he would be compelled to admit that he did not conceive one single idea, philosophical, political or economic, which had not been known previously; that, in short, his philosophy was only a continuation of past philosophies.²² Otherwise, his materialist interpretation of history, of society as well as philosophy would be untenable.

Marx's criticism of Feuerbach and his followers, as recorded in the unpublished manuscript now issued with the title "German Ideology", is very fragmentary and incoherent. His only bias, at that time, (between 1844 and 1848), was to prove that Hegel was great and Karl Marx his only prophet; to deny that Socialism required any philosophical justification; and to disprove that there was any historical connection between the French Enlightenment and the post-Hegelian philosophical Radicalism.

That is how Marx began his ideological war. His

²² "Having given invaluable services to the human spirit, 'German Idealism declined, as though to give a new proof of its own theory, and to show by its own example that everything finite consists in the fact that it cancels itself and passes into its opposite. Ten years after Hegel's death, Materialism again appeared in the arena of philosophical development.

"The Marxist conception of history is really the legitimate product of the whole past development of historical ideas. It contains them all in so far as they have real value and gives them a firmer foundation than they ever had in any of their flourishing periods. It is, therefore, the fullest, most comprehensive, most adequate of all." (George Plekhanov, *History of Materialism*).

completely negative attitude to the positive outcome of the Hegelian era is remarkable, because it betrays a woeful lack of historical sense. His failure to grasp the historical significance of the religious mode of thought is also surprising. Because of that defect in his historical sense, Marx was unable to appreciate the importance of religious criticism. Religion provided the moral sanction for the continuation of the political and social *status quo*. To undermine its authority, therefore, was a revolutionary act of fundamental significance. The Young Hegelians did that. But Marx failed to appreciate the revolutionary significance of their bold attack on religious tradition and ecclesiastical orthodoxy. He scornfully dismissed their endeavour, which was a precondition for the revolt against the established order, incited by Marx in the *Communist Manifesto*. “The entire body of German philosophical criticism from Strauss to Stirner is confined to criticism of religious conceptions.”²³ Undoubtedly, it was so, and therein lies the importance of the intellectual efforts of the Hegelian Radicals. In the tradition of the Renaissance, they raised the standard of a philosophical revolution, which was to create the ideological preconditions for political and social revolutions. But Marx did not really believe that man was the maker of his destiny; his view of history and social evolution was essentially ideological, fatalistic. Therefore he combatted Feuerbach’s Humanism, propagated by his followers who called themselves “true Socialists”, and developed by a succession of brilliant scientists.

The following statements, selected by Marx as the targets of his attack, contain the substance of the views of the followers of Feuerbach, which he combatted as opposed to his dialectical Materialism:

“The French arrived at Communism by way of politics; the Germans arrived at Socialism by Way of

²³Karl Marx, *German Ideology*.

metaphysics, which eventually changed into anthropology; ultimately both are resolved in Humanism.”

“If nature recognises herself in me, then I recognise myself in nature. I see in her life my own life. . . Let *us*, then, give living expression to that with which nature has imbued us.”

“To speak of Feuerbach is to speak of all philosophic labours from Bacon of Verulam up to the present; one defines at the same time the ultimate purpose and meaning of philosophy, one sees man as the final result of world history . . . We have gained man for ourselves, man who has divested himself of religion, of moribund thoughts, of all that is foreign to him, with all their counterparts in the practical world; we have gained pure, -essential Man.”

“In Communism, man is not conscious of his essence; his dependence is reduced by Communism to the lowest, the most brutal relationship, to dependence on crude matter—the separation of labour and enjoyment. Man does not attain to free moral activity.”

“The only difference between Communism and the commercial world is that in Communism the complete alienation of real human property is to be in no way fortuitous, that is, is to be idealised.”

“The Communists are particularly given to drawing up systems or ready-made social orders. All systems are, however, dogmatic and dictatorial.”²⁴

The significance of Marx’s dialectical Materialism can be deduced from the view denounced as its antithesis. To fight philosophical Radicalism, which approached the problems of political revolutions and social reconstruction from the humanist point of view, Marx was compelled to defend the French and English forerunners of Socialism, whom he later on ridiculed as Utopians.²⁵

²⁴ All the above passages were quoted by Marx in his unpublished manuscript now issued with the title *German Ideology*.

²⁵ These ‘Socialists’ or ‘true Socialists’, as they call themselves, consider foreign communist literature not as the expression

Marx rejected Feuerbach's humanist Materialism on, the ground that it regarded man as an isolated individual. The criticism was entirely uncalled for. "The individual man by himself does not contain the nature of man in himself, either in himself as a moral or as a thinking, being. The nature of man is contained only in the community, in the unity of man with man. Isolation its finiteness and limitation; community is freedom and finality."²⁶ That is clear enough to prove that Feuerbach's Humanism did not deny the necessity of organisation; but being the logical outcome of man's age-long, struggle for freedom, it would not subordinate the sovereign individual, the creator of the civilised society, to his creation, to an imaginary collective ego of the community. While Feuerbach really went further than Hegel, Marx took over his organic conception of society, which denies the possibility of individual freedom.

The humanist conception of the individual as a, sovereign moral entity is critically analysed by Marx in the "Theses on Feuerbach". "Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in separate individuals. In its reality, it is the ensemble of social relations. ..." (Sixth Thesis). The essence of religion is primitive rationalism; man creates gods as hypotheses for an explanation of natural phenomena. Because man is rational by nature, rationalism is the essence of man. To have discovered this real essence of man was a great advance in the struggle for freedom. The aggregate of social relations presupposes existence of individuals, who are the product of a real movement, but merely as a set of theoretical writings; it has been evolved, they imagine, by a process of pure thought, after the fashion of the German philosophical systems. It never occurs to them that even when these writings did preach a system, they spring from the practical needs, the whole conditions, of life, of a particular class in particular countries." (Marx, *German Ideology*.)

²⁶Feuerbach, *Philosophie der Zukunft*.

entered into relations. They did that because of their essence of rationality. Obsessed with the Hegelian organic conception of society, Marx ignored the self-evident truth that society is an association of individuals. That obsession led him to take society as simply given, as if by Providence, and regard social relations as the ultimate reality. Social relations result from the activities of individuals constituting the society. Being human creations, they can be altered by man. Human will and human action are the primary factors of social existence.

The last point of the *Theses on Feuerbach*²⁷ contains the quintessence of Marxism. It is a declaration of faith in human creativeness. Thus, rejecting Feuerbach's Humanism in favour of dialectic Materialism, Marx contradicted the essence of his activist philosophy: man is the maker of his destiny; in remaking the world, he remakes himself. The dialectic process does not leave any room for the greatest of revolutionaries, armed with the philosophy of Marxism, to change the world. The irreconcilable contradiction between dialectic Materialism and the programme of a revolutionary reconstruction of society is the basic fallacy of Marxism. Neither of the conflicting ideas originated with Marx. One was inherited from Hegel, and the other from the tradition of the French Revolution.

The historical significance of Marxism is that it was an attempt to harmonise the rationalist and romantic views of life, which clashed at the time of the French Revolution and had pulled the subsequent intellectual and cultural history of Europe in two contrary directions. The harmony was latent in the Hegelian system, which incorporated the traditions of the Reformation, classical rationalism, eighteenth century Enlightenment, and also Rousseau's romanticism. Feuerbach's materialist Humanism and the philosophical Radicalism of his followers

²⁷ "The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; the point is to change it."

also tended to harmonise the rationalist and romantic views of life. Nevertheless, Marx combatted these latter schools because they rejected dialectics as an idealistic, teleological conception, not compatible with the ideal of freedom. In its formative stage, Marxism was a defence of Hegelian Idealism as against the materialist naturalism which the Young Hegelians and the philosophical Radicals deduced from the system of the Master. The fascination for dialectics drove youthful Marx to reject the scientific naturalism of the eighteenth century as mechanical and unhistorical. The implication of his criticism was that the Enlightenment did not take a fatalistic view of history, but recognised the creative role of man.

In his controversy with the Young Hegelians and the followers of Feuerbach, Marx allowed no place to mental activity in the process of social evolution; indeed, not even in the process of development of man himself. "Man can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion, or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence— a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation."²⁸ The brain, indeed, is a part of the physical organisation; and sensation and perception can be explained as physiological functions. But conceptual thought is a purely mental phenomenon, and it distinguishes the most primitive man from the highest animal. The discovery of fire might have been an accidental physical act without any thought. But subsequent application of fire for the purposes of the most primitive human existence presupposes mental activity. Therefore, even a nodding acquaintance with anthropology should not permit the assertion quoted above.

Yet, mental activity is completely absent in the entire history of social evolution described in the subsequent pages, as if society was a lifeless machine. Indeed,

²⁸Karl Marx, *German Ideology*.

it appears only at the tail-end of the process. "The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with material activity, and the material intercourse of men, the language of life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of material behaviour." The first sentence is partially correct; the next one is altogether wrong. What is material activity? If the adjective "material" is used for physical, then it has some sense. But the physical activity of the most primitive man is conditional upon some mental activity. It may be very little differentiated from the physiological reaction to environments. Yet, it is something qualitatively different from the fall of a stone or the growth

of a plant or the flight of a bird. Ideas and thoughts do not result from physical behaviour; they are influenced by physical and social environments. The rather confused argument with wrong words and inaccurate descriptions led up to the conclusion that "life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life." Later on, Marx reformulated the statement, meaningless in the original form, by using the word "being", that is to say, physical existence, instead of life. There is no causal connection between life and consciousness, one being an expression or property of the other. However, correctly formulated, the statement is the cardinal principle of scientific Materialism, which fully recognises the role of mental (including emotional) activities, and therefore can be harmonised with Humanism. Consciousness is the foundation of these activities, and biology traces

-consciousness to a physico-chemical organisation of matter. The eighteenth century Materialism, within the limits of the scientific knowledge of the time, attained this level, which could be the point of departure for further development in our time. Yet, Marx discovered in the essentially idealistic Hegelian dialectics a surer and sounder foundation of his Historical Materialism. He rejected the eighteenth century Materialism because it

believed in something constant in human nature, from which the rights and duties of citizenship could be logically deduced. On the authority of Hegelian Idealism,²⁹ Marx denied that there was anything stable in human nature, and asserted that human nature “is the ensemble of social relations.” The eighteenth century idea of human nature was defective; traditionally, it was deduced from the doctrine of the Natural Law; scientifically, it was based upon pre-Darwinian biology, which still believed in unchanging species, and the classical dictum *natura non-facet saltus*. Marx rejected it, but also corn-batted Darwinian gradualism, which contradicted his theory of revolution. The rejection of the eighteenth century belief in human nature thus was not brought about by a greater biological knowledge, but on the authority of Hegelian Idealism.

Marx found in Hegelian dialectics a philosophical support for his theory of revolution. Therefore, dialectics became his sole criterion for judging all other philosophies; and dialectics is admittedly an idealistic conception. Revolutions are not brought about by men; they take place of necessity, that is to say, are predetermined. The dialectical Materialism of Marx, therefore, is materialist only in name; dialectics being its cornerstone, it is essentially an idealistic system. No wonder that it disowned the heritage of the eighteenth century scientific naturalism and fought against the humanist Materialism of Feuerbach and his followers.

Although in the last analysis Marx rejected the eighteenth century Materialism on the authority of Hegel, he did make an effort to criticise the philosophy of sensation. He held that mind was not a *tabula rasa*, passively receiving impressions; that sensations and perceptions were interactions of the subject and the object. In holding this view, Marx anticipated subsequent clarifica-

²⁹ “There is nothing which is not an intermediate position between being and non-being.” (Hegel).

tion of the problem of cognition in the light of biology, particularly physiology and psychology. The object is transformed in the process of being known; knowledge results from the subject acting upon the object. The emphasis is on action, which practically rules out pure thought as an instrument for acquiring knowledge and discovering truths. Consequently, the foundation of Marxist Materialism is not matter, as conceived by science and philosophy ever since the time Democritus; it is man's relation with matter. Again, an essentially idealistic position. Man, according to Marx, being a physical organisation, his relation to matter is the relation of one material entity to other material entities. Where does consciousness and intelligence appear in the interaction of dead matter? In other words, what makes man different from a lump of dead matter? Begging all these crucial questions, which Materialism must answer to be convincing, Marx simply takes man for granted, as an elementary undefinable, as the "personification" of the Hegelian Absolute Idea.

The "economic man", whose appearance coincides with the production of his means of subsistence, may be nothing more than the ensemble of social relations. But the human species has a much older history, which vanishes in the background of the process of subhuman biological evolution. Marx entirely ignored that entire process of the becoming of man before he entered into social relations. Consequently, Marx knows nothing of the human nature which underlies the ensemble of social relations, which induces men to enter into those relations.

That substratum of human nature is stable; otherwise, the world of men could not be differentiated from the world of animals ruled by the laws of the jungle. That rockbottom of human nature antedates the economic and political organisation of society. The origin of mind is there. In that sense, mental activities are determined in the earlier stages by physical existence and

thereafter by social conditions. But the becoming of man involves the parallel process of mental and physical activities. The relation between the two is not of causality, but of priority. From primitive consciousness, mind evolves in the context of a biological organism; the latter .being an organisation of matter, the priority of being must be conceded to matter.

Marx did not carry the analysis of mental phenomena far enough, beyond the dawn of social history. Therefore, his Materialism is dogmatic, unscientific; on the other hand, the negation of a constant element in human nature leads to the negation of morality. Without the recognition of some permanent values, no ethics is possible. If they are not to be found in human nature, morality must have a transcendental sanction. The choice for Marxian Materialism, therefore, was between the negation of abiding moral values and relapse into religion. Theoretically, it chose the first, although in practice dogmatism eventually also put on it a stamp of religious fanaticism.

CHAPTER IX

MARXISM

IT WAS not as a philosophy, but as a theory of revolution,, that Marxism gained adherence, finally to become the ideology of a world movement. Marx proposed to make a science of Socialism. Hegelian dialectics was useful for the purpose. If, in so far as it is a philosophy, Marxism was an offshoot of the Hegelian system, as a theory of revolution it drew upon the doctrines and experiences of the “bourgeois” French Revolution. The most important part of Marxism is its economic analysis; in that respect, its fundamental principles were taken over from the British political economists, who were characterised by Marx as ideologists of Capitalism. So, Marxism itself contradicts the doctrine that ideologies are created by the economic necessities of particular classes with the object of promoting and defending their respective interests.

Philosophical principles, revolutionary political doctrines and economic theories, which constituted the foundation of Marxism, had all been developed as integral parts of what Marxists would call the bourgeois ideology¹ to serve the interest of the capitalist class. They were created by men who did not belong to the working class, nor did any of them claim to be the champion of its,-

¹ “Marx was a genius who continued and completed the three main ideological currents of the nineteenth century, belonging to the three most advanced countries of mankind; classical German philosophy, classical English political economy and French Socialism, together with French revolutionary doctrines in general.” (Lenin, *Teachings of Karl Marx*).

“His teachings arose as a direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and Socialism.” (Lenin, *Three Sources and the Three’ Component Parts of Marxism*).

interest, as did Marx who himself belonged to the middle class by birth, and was brought up as a bourgeois Liberal intellectual. Yet, ideas conceived and developed by them went to feed what was called the ideology of the proletariat.

To attach class labels to ideas is evidently a false practice. They are created by men, and as such belong to the entire race, and not to any particular class. They are, of course, not static; from the dawn of civilisation, they have been in a continuous process of evolution, having been influenced by the natural and social conditions under which various human communities and classes lived in different parts of the world, in different epochs of history. But ideas have their autonomy and a logic which is not dialectical, but dynamic. Therefore, political doctrines of the bourgeois revolution, theories of the classical capitalist economics and the principles of the Hegelian philosophy could all go into the making of Marxism, which called itself the ideology of the proletariat, but the positive elements of which will survive the proletarian revolution. Marxism was not a negation, nor a negation of a negation, of the older ideas that it took over. Without those ideas, there could be no Marxism. Therefore, the laws of the dynamics of ideas cannot be called dialectical.

The materialist interpretation of history or the doctrine that social, political and cultural history is economically determined, did not begin with Marx. "The Marxist conception of history is really the legitimate product of the whole past development of historical ideas."²

The New Science of history was founded by the Catholic conservative Vico. The method of studying and writing history was revolutionised in the eighteenth century by Gibbon and other historians, although they did not theories. Herder's anthropological and philological approach to the problems of historiology was an improve-

² *Plekhanov*, History of Materialism.

mem on Vico. Finally, there was Hegel's philosophy of history, and the great French historians of the post-revolutionary period. Guizot, for example, wrote: "To understand political institutions, it is necessary to know the nature and relationships of property." Again, "Society, its composition, the manner and life of individuals, in accordance with their social situation, the relations of the different classes of individuals, in short, the condition of the people, surely this is the first question to demand the attention of the historian who wishes to know how the peoples lived, and the publicist who wishes to know how they were governed."³ Guizot applied this method in writing his history of France in the early Middle-Ages. In his history of the English Revolution, he introduced the idea of class struggle.

Augustin Thierry traced the "hidden cause" of political revolutions in the evolution of society. He regarded public opinion as the expression of the dominant social interest. It is interesting to recollect that in his youth Thierry was a secretary of St. Simon, and must have taken from that "utopian" his lessons in the science of history. Mignet and other French liberal historians, not to mention Michelet, went farther than Guizot and Thierry, to discover the spring of social evolution in economic relations.

The tradition of outspoken socialist ideas can be traced to the great moralists of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. They all condemned the institution of private property and the resulting economic exploitation of the labouring classes, and held that the attainment of the ideals of liberty, equality and justice was conditional on common ownership. "Competition and rivalry, on the one hand, and on the other, conflict of interests, and always the concealed desire to make a profit at the expense of others, all these evils are the first effect of property and the inseparable accompaniment of rising

³ *Guizot, L'Histoire de France.*

inequality.” This is not a quotation from the *Communist Manifesto*, but from Rousseau’s *Discourse on Inequality*. Similarly revolutionary sentiments had been preached by others who preceded the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Thomas More, Campanella, and Fenelon are famous names. Together with lesser lights, such as Morris, Bellamy, Cabet and others, they were Utopians in the true sense of the much abused term. The moral worth of the Marxian “scientific Socialism” consists in its essentially Utopian character. Coming to the early eighteenth century moralists, like Mably and Morelly, the unbiased historian meets the heralds of Marxism.

Both were clergymen; Mably was a Platonist, like all classical scholars of the Renaissance tradition. Flint has described him as the “forerunner of scientific Socialism”.⁴ Mably perhaps was the first to declare that equality reigned in the first stage of society, and in its final stage equality would be restored. In a book written to combat the economic doctrine of the Physiocrats, he declared that private property was the root-cause of all human misfortune. The views expressed therein can be summarised as follows: The moment property is established, inequality becomes inevitable; the resulting conflict of interests brings in its train all the vices of wealth and all the vices of poverty, brutalisation of men’s mind, corruption of civil manners, and much more, which is war. Anticipating Baboeuf’s and Marx’s theory of surplus value, Mably held that whatever the upper classes had in excess was obtained at the cost of others.⁵

Mably’s communistic doctrines were very popular decades before the French Revolution. He was followed by Morelly, whose famous book *Les Codes de la Nature, Ou le Veritable Esprit de ses Lois Tout Temps Neglige ou Meconnu*, appeared anonymously in the same year as Rousseau’s *Discourse on Inequality*. The most novel part

⁴Robert Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*.

⁵Mably, *Doutes Proposees Aux Philosophes Economistes*.

of the book is the chapter on a “Model of Legislation Conforming to the Intentions of Nature”. Rejecting the Christian doctrine of the fall of man, as also the Hobbesian notion of man in the state of nature, Morelly held the belief that man was fundamentally good, and from that belief deduced a code of morality quite novel for the time. He maintained that the wickedness of men was due to the social conditions which resulted from the institution of private property. Therefore, he demanded the abolition of private property as the condition for the establishment of a social order in which liberty, justice and morality would prevail. Under such social circumstances, morality would be as simple and as evident as the axioms of mathematics.

The historical significance of Mably and Morelly is that Babeuf was directly in their tradition and represented their communist doctrines in the field of practice. No serious Marxist with historical sense would disown Babeuf as a forerunner of the revolutionary proletarian movement, and Babeuf frankly admitted that he had drawn his inspiration from Mably and Morelly, particularly, *Le Code de Nature*. Babeuf's disciple and biographer, Buonarroti, was influenced by the ideas not only of Rousseau, but Mably also. On the other hand, Buonarroti's dictum—“Equality is the essence of justice”—became the leitmotif of Proudhon's philosophy. Years before Marx wrote in the *Communist Manifesto* that “the history of society in the past is the history of war between classes”, Buonarroti described the French Revolution as a conflict between the supporters of wealth and distinction and the supporters of equality—the mass of workers. In another respect, he preached Marxism before the prophet of the proletarian revolution. He declared that social reform advocated by the eighteenth century moralists and philosophers could be achieved only through revolutionary conquest of power, in other words, through armed uprising of the masses.

Louis Blanc preached other doctrines of Marxism

also before Marx. His book, *L'Organisation du Travail*, published in 1840, calls for the establishment of an authoritarian State, which is described as the “realisation of the collective being”, as the instrument of revolution. The idea of proletarian dictatorship in the transition period between the conquest of power and establishment of Socialism is clearly inherent in Blanc’s theory of the revolutionary State. He also visualised the Marxist Utopia of the classless society. “One day, there will no longer be a lower class and an upper class, and on that day there will be no need for a protective authority; until that day, Socialism will not be made fruitful except by the sway of politics.”

With Blanqui, Marxism before Marx advanced yet another step. He discarded the moral attitude of Babeuf and his followers,⁶ and prescribed a strategy for the establishment of the revolutionary dictatorship. The programme of the Blanquist dictatorship included (1) rupture with the bourgeoisie, (2) arming of the proletariat, (3) abolition of parliamentary election and dissolution of the National Assembly, (4) suppression of the bourgeois press and (5) drastic reorganisation of the State machinery.

Socialist theories thus grew out of the intellectual and political efforts to broaden the basis of democracy. Socialism rose not as the antithesis to democracy. The movement of thought from democracy to Socialism was not dialectic, but continuous. The incentive was the age-long human quest for freedom. Socialist ideas broadened the frontiers of freedom. The Great Revolution was completed in 1830 when the French bourgeoisie finally established themselves in power. Before long, all lovers of freedom and progress, who still cherished the

⁶While calling for revolutionary capture of power, Buonarotti made a reservation : “Before conferring the exercise of sovereignty on the people, the love of virtue must be taught.” (*Conspiration Pour L'Egalite*).

noble ideals of the eighteenth century, felt that for the people at large things had not changed much. Socialist ideas crystallised out of that intellectual and emotional ferment.⁷

Romanticists like Lamartine, Michelet and Victor Hugo contributed to that process of socialist ideas flowing logically from the democratic ideal. Catholic Liberalism developed into Christian Socialism. Lamennais, for example, argued: "Whence comes the evil in the material world? Is it from the ease of some? No; but from the deprivation of others, from the fact that through the laws made by the rich in the exclusive interest of the rich, almost they alone profit from the work of the poor, which becomes less and less fruitful." The argument led up to the declaration: "We must ensure that he who works shall share equitably in the product of his work."⁸

Socialist and communist ideas preached by a long succession of moralists and reformers since the seventeenth century⁹ were formulated in a system for the first time by Henri de Saint-Simon, who died in 1825. After the July revolution of 1830, the progressive bourgeoisie were attracted by the revolutionary social philosophy of Saint-Simon, because it provided them with a powerful weapon to combat the reactionary political theories of Bonald, de Maistre and others. Saint-Simon was the first to attempt

⁷ "It is fair to say that the tremendous historical significance of Communism was understood more quickly by the middle class than by the working class, who were primarily concerned. The middle class saw that Communism was the logical outcome of democracy... The political battles of the French Revolution showed that the middle classes, in fighting for their own conception of freedom, found in the end that they were fighting the very principles on which they had made their stand." (François Fejtó, "Europe on the Eve of the Revolution", in *The Opening of an Era—1848*, edited by A. J. P. Taylor).

⁸ Felicité Lamennais, *Livre du Peuple*.

⁹ The tradition can be traced backward through the history of civilisation almost indefinitely.

an interpretation of social and political history in the light of the physical theories of Laplace and Cuvier. He took over Condorcet's philosophy of history, according to which "the progress of society is subject to the same laws observable in individual development considered at once in a great number of individuals." Vice's cyclical interpretation of history also influenced the social and political philosophy of Saint-Simon. At the same time, the Platonic *penchant* was unmistakable. All those influences and traditions of the past enabled Saint-Simon to come to the following conclusion: "The imagination of poets has placed the Golden Age in the cradle of the human race. It was the age of iron, they should have banished there. The Golden Age is not behind us, but in front of us. It is the perfection of the social order. Our fathers have not seen it; our children will arrive there one day; and it is for us to clear the way for them."¹⁰

Saint-Simon did not fail to specify what should be done to prepare the way: "The most direct means of bettering the moral and physical lot of the majority of the population would be to classify as essential expenditure by the State those which are necessary in order to obtain work for all able-bodied men, in order to ensure their physical existence; those which have as an object to disseminate among the proletariat as quickly as possible newly acquired positive knowledge; and lastly those which can guarantee to individuals of this class the pleasures and joys necessary to develop their intelligence."

Before Marx, it was Saint-Simon who realised that only in the light of the analysis of its economic foundation could the historical importance and the possibilities of the modern industrial age be properly appraised. His pupil and biographer, Bazard, went deeper into the details of the economic organisation of contemporary society. As far back as 1829, he wrote about "the third emancipatory phase of history—the abolition of the proletariat."

¹⁰Enfantin, *Doctrine, de Saint-Simon*.

the transformation of wage-earners into companions", the first having made serfs out of slaves and the second wage-earners out of serfs."¹¹

The historical significance of Saint-Simon is made evident by the fact that men so very different as Augustin Thierry and Auguste Comte were equally influenced by him. It has been held by competent historians that Saint-Simon's philosophy laid the foundation of Comte's Positivism. To have ridiculed such a philosophy as Utopian was one of Marx's most blatant extravagances.

On the deathbed, Saint-Simon declared: "My whole life can be expressed in one thought: All men must be assured the freest development of their natural capacities."

In the case of Charles Fourier, it was the bitter experience of life that determined his moral approach to social problems. Therefore, the Utopian Fourier could be called a personification of the Marxist doctrine of economic determinism. His chaotic life and erratic thinking have not left a deep mark on the history of the transition from Democracy to Socialism. Nevertheless, his moral approach to social problems has a lesson for our time. He was, however, a true Utopian. "He is an *echo*, perhaps a caricaturing echo, of that greater voice from the eighteenth century, of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who also found that somehow the human race has taken the wrong turning."¹²

But the ideas of Fourier's leading disciple, Considerant, were much clearer and systematic, to the extent of anticipating the *Communist Manifesto* in certain respects. In 1843, Considerant wrote that the anarchic principle of free competition, which has resulted from the decay of mediaeval corporations and guilds, would in its turn lead to the rise of "the universal organisation of great monopolies in all branches of industry."¹³

"Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia*. "Alexander Gray, *The Socialist Tradition*. "Quoted by Martin Buber in *Paths in Utopia*.

As against the “utopia” of the forerunners of Socialism. Marx offered his “scientific” Socialism. He criticised his predecessors because they had no knowledge of the proletariat; that they built out of their imagination fantastic pictures of a new social order; that they appealed to morality; that, in short, they did not have a philosophy of history. An unbiased study of the pre-Marxian history of socialist thought shows that some of the charges against the Utopians were simply unfounded. As regards the charge of appealing to morality they were guilty, but only from the Marxist point of view. For rejecting that appeal, Marxism was doomed to betray its professed ideas and ideals. The contention that “from the scientific point of view, this appeal to morality and justice does not help us an inch farther”, was based upon a false notion of science.

As regards the other points of criticism, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the proletariat was a child of Marx’s imagination; those who did not share his fantasy, naturally, did not know anything about it.¹⁴ If they

¹⁴In his polemics against Proudhon, previous to the publication of the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx himself had realised that the forerunners of socialist thought could not have any knowledge of the proletariat, simply because it was not there. .”These theoreticians are Utopians; they are driven to seek science in their own head, because things are not yet so far advanced that they need* only give an account of what is happening under their eyes and make themselves its instruments.” (*Poverty of Philosophy*)

Engels expressed the identical view thirty years later. “The-founders of Socialism were Utopians because they could not be anything else at the time when capitalist production was so little developed. They were compelled to construct the elements-of a new society out of their heads, because they had not yet become generally visible in the old society.” (*Anti-Duehring*).

Engels went farther to admit that scientific Socialism “stood on-the shoulder of man who, despite all their fantastic ideas and rttopianism, must be counted among the most significant brains of all time, who anticipated with genius countless truths whose-validity we can now prove scientifically.” (*Peasant War in Germany*).

“constructed a new society out of their heads”, so did Marx also. “Scientific Socialism” as well as dialectical Materialism was a theory, and as such an ideal creation. Marx distinguished himself from his predecessors by declaring that he wanted to proceed scientifically; nothing was to be taken for granted or deduced from preconceived notions. He would make inferences only from the empirical laws of social evolution and forces of modern society. He proposed to prove that Socialism was bound to come, as “necessary product of historical development”. The “evolutionary laws of history”, which enabled him to found scientific Socialism and predict the inevitable advent of Communism, was the Hegelian notion of progress through conflict. It was certainly not an empirical law; it was a preconceived notion and scientific Socialism was derived from it. And as a notion, it belonged to idealist philosophy, even when Marx’s imagination put it on its feet. The result was that “the picture given at the end of *Capital*, Vol. I, answers to a conception arrived at by speculative Socialism in the forties.”¹⁵ The picture conjured up in the *Communist Manifesto* is much more so. Marx had not yet hit upon master-key of economic determinism. Later on, to elaborate the philosophical presuppositions of Marxism, Engels wrote that a particular economic phenomenon had already ceased to exist “when the moral consciousness of the masses declares it to be wrong.”¹⁶ The Idealism of the dialectic method cannot be suppressed. Moral consciousness is not an economic force. And Marxism, in so far as it was true to the tradition of man’s age-long struggle for freedom, could not get away from the appeal to morality. Its historical significance is in that fact. But the much vaunted historical sense failed Marx when he ridiculed his predecessors, and believed himself to be

¹⁵*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 13th Edition.

¹⁶Quoted by Eyazanov in his Introduction to the new edition of the *Communist Manifesto*.

a prophet of immaculate conception, possessed of the light of revelation.

Utopia is an eschatological conception, and eschatology, the doctrine of the final goal, is as old as the human spirit; therefore, utopianism is equally old. Throughout the ages, it has two main forms alternately: prophetic and apocalyptic, both associated with religion, except in pagan Greece and in the age of the Renaissance. The decay of the religious mode of thought gradually secularised eschatology; the prophetic view of human destiny prevailed over the apocalyptic, placing will above faith. That was the origin of modern utopianism, which was a declaration of faith in man's power to mould his destiny. It was atavistic to oppose that declaration of the sovereignty and creativeness of man. The scientific Socialism of Marx also places before mankind the picture of a future society; therefore, it is also a Utopia; only, the goal will be reached not by human will and conscious human effort, but thanks to the development of the impersonal productive forces. Marxist Utopia, thus, is apocalyptic; it is a relapse into fatalism: "The leap of humanity out of the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom". It may just as well be a leap into darkness, with the blind faith of finding light there.¹⁷

The error, if not insincerity, of Marx's rejection of the earlier socialist thought is proved by the fact that his whole fight against the German philosophical Radicals, who called themselves "true Socialists", was a defence of the utopianism of the French Socialists. The German Socialists, whom the founder of scientific Socialism vehemently combatted, characterised pre-Marxian

¹⁷ "The polemics of Marx and Engels have resulted in the term Utopian becoming used for a Socialism which appeals to reason, to justice, to the will of man, to remedy the maladjustments of society, instead of his merely acquiring an active awareness of what is dialectically brewing in the womb of industrialism." (Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia*).

Communism as Utopian and maintained (hat, as against the empiricism of the French and English social reformers or revolutionaries, they reached Socialism scientifically.¹⁸ Marx poured scorn on the accursed “true Socialists” because they opposed “the present society based upon external compulsion” with the idea of a free society based upon “the consciousness of man’s inward nature, that is, upon reason.” What was the source of this idea, which invited Marx’s blistering sarcasm? Hegel had taught: “In furthering my own end, I further the generality of ends, which in turn furthers my end. Therefore, as a final consequence, we have the conscious unity of the individual with the general existence—harmony.”¹⁹ As consistent Hegelian Radicals, the followers of Feuer-bach (German Socialists) inferred from the Master’s teaching: “Organic society has as its basis universal equality and develops, through the opposition of individuals to totality, towards unrestricted concord, towards the unity of individual with universal happiness, towards social harmony which is the reflection of universal harmony.” These conclusions, right or wrong, are logically

deduced from the organic conception of society, which Marx inherited from Hegel. But the fanatical zeal of a would-be prophet of revolution induced him to blast the foundation of his own rationalist view of history.

The scientific Socialism of Marx resulted from his Hegelian prejudice—the faith in dialectics. Socialism could never come except as the negation of a negation. Therefore, a scientific theory of Socialism must begin with the assumption (pending verification) that the capitalist

¹⁸ “Communism is French; Socialism is German. The French arrived at Communism by way of politics, the Germans arrived at Socialism by way of metaphysics, which eventually changed into anthropology. Ultimately, both are resolved in Humanism.” (Quoted by Marx in *German Ideology* from *The Rhenish Annals*, or *Philosophy of True Socialism*).

¹⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Law*.

social order contained its own antithesis. Scientific-Socialism, from the very beginning, therefore, was a fatalistic doctrine, even though the fatalism was secular. Marx mooted the idea of the inevitability of the breakdown of the capitalist society for the first time in 1844. "The system of trade and moneymaking, of property and exploitation of human beings, leads to a breach in existing society which the old system is powerless to heal."²⁰ It was a dogmatic assertion, a bit of wishful thinking, in the tradition of earlier Socialists whom Marx called Utopians. Not even an attempt was made to prove the statement. Because, until then Marx had no acquaintance with the "trivial" science of economics, his academic education having been philosophical and juristic. But the necessity of fitting the heralded advent of Socialism in the scheme of Hegelian dialectics persuaded the would-be prophet to take up economic studies with the firm conviction that evidence for the inevitability of the breakdown of the capitalist system would be found. Pending the discovery of the truth, he reaffirmed his faith in it for the sake of his controversy with Young; Hegelians. "Private property in its economic movement advances towards its own dissolution through a development which is caused by the very nature of things, and which progresses independently of, unperceived by and against the will of private property."²¹

The discovery at last was made not in economic records, but in the Hegelian philosophy. Modern psychology since the time of Marx has discovered the force-of predisposition in making the desired ideal, and even visual, discoveries. All on a sudden, Marx was struck by an idea—why not conceive Hegel's "World Spirit" as the economic force? Then you have not only discovered, but also materialised, put it on its feet, the Great Force which drives humanity forward from negation to negation.

²⁰*Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher*, edited by Arnold Ruege

²¹*Holy Family*.

The breakdown of the capitalist society is one of those negations, therefore inevitable. The foundation of Marxism was laid; but it was Hegelianism applied to human history.²² “Imperceptibly, the dialectical movement of ideas is substituted for the dialectical movement of facts, and the real movement of facts is only considered so far as is compatible with the movement of ideas.”²³

“Without the philosophy of Hegel, scientific Socialism would never have come into existence.”²⁴

Hegel’s view about the role of great men in history²⁵ could be passed on as a quotation from Marx, provided that “historical necessity” was written in the place of the “World Spirit”. If the term used by Hegel lent itself to an anthropomorphic interpretation, “historical necessity” can also be called a metaphysical conception, having a Ideological connotation. Only the acumen of modern scholasticism could maintain that there is a difference between historical necessity and providential will. Referred, ultimately, to the revolutionary function of the new means of production, historical necessity has the connotation of predestination. The necessity of earning a livelihood with the greatest economy of energy may explain why and how new means of production are evolved. But that necessity is not a metaphysical force.. It is felt by man; and it is man’s effort which satisfies the necessity. The realisation of the necessity expresses itself in the will of man; will motivates action; and new means of production are created. Man proposes and also disposes. The Hegelian doctrine that freedom is the realisation of necessity provides the human dynamics to the Marxist theory of social evolution. Alternatively, evolution of the means of production will have-

²² “Instead of making discoveries in the bowels of economics,-he had discovered economics in the bowels of destiny.” (Leopold Schwarzschild, *The Red Prussian*).

²³ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 13th Edition.

²⁴ Engels, *Peasant War in Germany*.

²⁵ See quotation on p. 158.

to be regarded as a predetermined economic process, the final cause of which must be somewhere beyond the reach of human intelligence. In order to keep determinism within the reach of human history, it is necessary to recognise the creative genius of man. Otherwise, the dictum that man makes history will be an euphemism. In other words, the dynamics of ideas, the unconscious purpose of society finding expression through thinking man, is the very essence of the organic view of history as expounded by Vico, Michelet and Marx.

In the same article, in which for the first time Marx advanced the theory of the inevitability of the collapse of the capitalist order and the advent of Socialism, he also for the first time advocated armed revolution for the overthrow of the established State and the social system. So, at its very conception, Marxism was self-contradictory. If the decay and disappearance of any social system was inevitable, a violent revolution for its overthrow was palpably unwarranted. Conversely, if the change had to be brought about by force, it was not inevitable. Because it could be prevented by the use of superior force. Trying to combine rationalism, the view that history is a determined process, with the romantic view of life which declares the freedom of will, Marxist historiology contradicts itself. Not that the two cannot be combined; they are combined in Hegel's dialectics. The notion of progress is a product of reason and romanticism. Nature is a rational system; so is society, because it is a part of nature, social evolution being a prolongation of the bio-logical evolution. If the mechanistic view is not to be tampered with, then neither a *deus ex machina* should be allowed to wind up the clock of the evolution of the physical Universe, nor any conscious effort of man is to influence the unfolding of social forces. And the mechanistic view of the physical, biological and social evolutions is the very essence of Materialism.

The doctrine, whether of Vico or of Michelet or of Marx, that man is the maker of the social world, contra-

diets materialist philosophy, unless the mechanistic view of evolution is clearly differentiated from teleology; unless romanticism is reconciled with reason, and will (freedom) is fitted into the scheme of a determined evolutionary process. That can be done only by recognising the creative role of man, not as a mere cog in the wheel of a mechanistic process, determined by the development of the means of production, but as a sovereign force, a thinking, being who creates the means of production. Otherwise, the rationalist concept of determinism cannot be distinguished from the ideological doctrine of predestination. The idea of freedom, the possibility of choice, distinguishes the one from the other. If the rationalist view of history precluded the romantic attitude to life, then there would be no room for revolutions in history, the concept of freedom should be written off as an empty ideal. Yet, according to Marxism, revolutions take place of necessity; they are historically necessary. The point of departure of the Marxist philosophy of action, the point where it is supposed to break off from the Idealism of Hegelian dialectics, is that man makes history. That is also the fundamental principle of romanticism. Unless this idealistic core of Marxism is clearly grasped, the romantic idea of revolution, to be brought about by human endeavour, cannot be harmonised with the rationalist view of progress, which is the essence of materialist philosophy.

The recognition of the decisive role played by thinking man, that is to say, by ideas, in historical processes, runs counter neither to the rationalist notion of progress nor to the mechanistic view of evolution. The harmony between the rationalist conception of progress and the romantic idea of revolution also takes place in the materialist philosophy, which is not a negation of Idealism, but absorbs and goes beyond by tracing the roots of ideas in the rational scheme of nature. The thinking man acts upon the process of social evolution not as a *deus ex machina*; he is an integral part of the process. The

human brain is also a means of production—of ideas, which motivates action to create history.

These philosophical implications of Marxism were not clearly thought out by its founders. Therefore, the Marxist view of history is vitiated by the contradiction between rationalism and the romantic notion of revolution. With his rationalism, which is the essence of materialist philosophy, Marx was a Humanist, and as such a romanticist. He combined, as Heinemann wrote, “the righteous fury of the great seers of his race, with the cold analytical power of Spinoza.”“ A different personality could not be the prophet of revolution; because, any

-successful revolution is conditional on a combination of thought and action inspired by a harmony of rationalism and the romantic view of life.

The harmony is in the thesis that “philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” This basic doctrine of the Marxist philosophy of revolution is a legacy of Renaissance Humanism, which saw the relation between history and philosophy. Inspired by the humanist tradition, Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning* emphasised on the necessity of shifting importance from precept to application, from theory to practice, from philosophy to history. Bacon, at the same time, was a rationalist, the exponent of inductive logic, which made Newtonian mechanistic natural philosophy possible. Inspired by Bacon’s humanist approach to history, Vico’s *Scienza Nuova* unfolded the romantic vista of humanity creating itself. The relation between Marx and Bacon can be traced far backward through the history “Of philosophy.

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Marxism, however, was not the first to believe in the inevitable advent of Socialism. The French “Utopians” and the British Communists held the belief and passionately preached it before Marx. But consistent in their

belief, they anticipated a gradual, peaceful transformation. They also invoked science in support of their belief. Saint-Simon called his Socialism “the science of universal gravitation.” Fourier named his “the certain science.” Proudhon was the most exasperating; he anticipated Marx and named his doctrine “scientific Socialism”.²⁶ Therefore, Marx felt it necessary to write a whole book (*The Poverty of Philosophy*) to refute Proudhon’s doctrine “La Propriete c’est Vol.” (property is theft).²⁷ Consistent with their belief in the inevitability of Socialism, the Utopians condemned revolution preached before Marx by many others since the time of Baboeuf.²⁸

On the other hand, Marx was also not the first to

²⁶ The term Utopia was also used by Proudhon before the publication of the *Communist Manifesto*. It does not appear in the first draft of the Manifesto, prepared by Engels. It was later introduced by Marx. In a letter to him, Proudhon wrote in 1884 : “When the contradictions of commonality and democracy, once revealed, have shared the fate of the utopias of Saint-Simon and Fourier, then Socialism, rising to the level of science—this Socialism which is neither more nor less than political economy—will seize hold of society and drive it with irresistible force towards the next destination.”

²⁷ But previously, with reference to Proudhon’s book on property, Marx had written : it “revolutionises political economy and makes a science of political economy possible for the first time.” (*Holy Family*).

Marx turned against Proudhon because the latter was opposed to collectivism and criticised Communism on that account. He also warned against the dogmatic tendency of Marx. He refused to be a party to a new system-building. “After we have cleared away all these *a priori* dogmatisms, let us not, for God’s sake, think of tangling people up in doctrines in our turn. Let us not fall into the contradiction of our countryman Martin Luther, who, after having overthrown the Catholic theology, immediately set about founding a Protestant theology of his own.....We stand in the van of a new movement ; let us not make ourselves protagonists of a new intolerance, let us not act like apostles of a new religion, even if it is a religion of logic, a religion of reason.” (Letter to Karl Marx).

²⁸ “Revolutions, instead of being truly beneficial to mankind, answer no other purpose than that of marring the salutary and

advocate violent overthrow of the established order. The example of the Great French Revolution had fired the imagination not only of impatient political idealists. Liberal French historians of the nineteenth century also took class struggle for granted with the concomitant idea of bloodshed. Even Thiers wrote: "I repeat, war, that is, revolution, was essential. God gave justice to man only at the price of struggle."²⁹ Baboeuf's passionate appeal to violence on the authority of the classical moralists survived the Napoleonic era and found considerable response in the period from 1830 to 1848. The Blanquists actually organised an armed insurrection. In Britain, the Chartist Movement had a powerful "Physical Force" wing led by Bronterre O'Brien, who preached the following doctrine: "We challenge the historians to quote one single instance in which the rich in any country or at any time have relinquished their power from love of justice or in consequence of appeal to their heart or to their conscience. Force, and only force, have ever converted them into humanitarians."³⁰

Marx called his forerunners "utopian romanticists", while he himself advocated the most extravagant form of romanticism, which had brought the Great Revolution to grief. Romanticism, as represented by its emphasis on human action, makes of Marxism a revolutionary doctrine. But at the same time, romanticism contradicts its basic philosophical principle inherited from Hegel, namely, rationalism. Dialectics is a rationalist notion; dialectical Materialism, therefore, is a rationalist philosophy. On the other hand, the appeal to violence, being an echo of the last phase of the Great Revolution, is a romantic extravagance. The two aspects of Marxism thus stand in the relation of

synthesis is the statement that “by changing the world, man changes himself”. In other words, man’s ability to change the world, to expedite evolution through revolution, and the moral right to do so, result from the fact that man is a part of nature, which is a ceaseless process of change, a dialectic process, in the Hegelian language. But the world is greater than the greatest of men; and will always be so. Therefore, man’s ability to change it is limited by the axiom that the whole is greater than its part. By disregarding this self-evident truth, revolutionary activism becomes irrational and runs up against the law of nature and the nature of man. Then, revolution only mars the salutary and uninterrupted progress instead of being truly beneficial for mankind, as Godwin warned.

The revolutionary, therefore, must be modest; he should not aspire to make miracles. His philosophy of life should be a judicious synthesis of rationalism and romanticism. By laying too much emphasis on revolutionary action, Marxism tipped the scale on the side of irrationalism, to degenerate eventually into a faith. At the same time, the Marxian theory of revolution is cynical. Its basic dogma is that human beings are never actuated by moral impulses. By rejecting the belief that human nature by itself is sufficient cause for the endless progress of mankind, it declared that revolutionary action by determined minorities was the decisive factor of history. The Marxian interpretation of history and theory of revolution, thus, create the cult of supermen (the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat organised in the party), and opens up the perspective of dictatorship as the alternative to democracy.

In its economic aspect also, Marxism built upon ideas

economists. It is well known that the British theoretical Communists of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century anticipated, though in outline, practically every aspect of Marxian economics. But it is little known that in the middle of the seventeenth century, during the English Revolution, the Republican Harrington preached economic determinism. He held that the structure and function of a government were determined by social and economic forces. He explained not only the “religious revolution” under Henry VIII, but also the Wars of the Roses in economic terms. Referring to Hobbes’s doctrine that law must be upheld by the sword, Harrington wrote: “The hand that holdeth the sword, is the militia of the nation ; but an army is a beast that hath a great belly and must be fed; wherefore this will come unto what pastures you have, and what pastures you have, will come into the balance of property without which the public sword is but a name or a mere spit-frog.”³¹

In his famous work, Condorcet speaks of the productive forces as, incentive for the development of human the spirit. “The art of making weapons, preparing food, of making the instruments necessary for this preparation, of preserving for a short time the means of nourishment, of creating their food reserves for them, was the first characteristic feature which began to distinguish the human society from societies of other animal breeds.”³² Soon after the French Revolution, Sismondi began the critique of capitalism in his famous book, *Nouveaux Principes d’Economie Politique ou de la Richesse dans ses Rapports avec la Population*, which has come down in history as a valuable contribution to the classical political economy.

from the fact that “man hath mixed his labour with the gifts of nature”. Later on, “Adam Smith and David Ricardo laid the foundation of the labour theory of value. Marx continued their work. He rigidly proved and consistently developed their theory.”³³ The idea of collective class interests and conflict of those interests was also inherent in classical political economy. A theory of distribution of rent, profit and wages presupposed that society was composed of classes instead of individuals. The labour theory of value logically led to the theory of surplus value, which was expounded with great precision by the British theoretical Communists—all followers of the classical political economist Ricardo. Philosophically, they all professed radical Liberalism—“the ideology of the bourgeoisie”. The fundamental principles of Marxist economics were worked out before Marx, in the social and philosophical atmosphere of “bourgeois Liberalism”. That is a fact of great significance for an objective philosophy of history. The entire heritage of Marxism contradicts Marxist historiology.

Charles Hall was a physician. His profession made him acquainted with the life of the poor. He approached the problem of their life not from the class economic point of view, but from the ethical humanist. Yet, he came to a conclusion which supported the theory of surplus value. “Eight-tenth of the people consume only one-eighth of the produce of their labour; hence one day in eight, or one hour in a day, is all the time the poor man is allowed to work for himself, his wife and his children. All the other days, all the other hours of the day, he works for other people.”³⁴

William Thompson has been described as “the most

he nevertheless declared: “Without labour there is no wealth; labour is the sole parent of wealth.”³⁶

The list of those who anticipated the Marxist economic theories is long. In addition to the above, Thomas-Hodgskin, John Gray and J. F. Bray deserve special mention. Gray held that “labour is the sole foundation of property, and that in fact all property is nothing, more than accumulated labour.”³⁷ Hodgskin’s views are summarised in the following eloquent passage: “I am certain, however, that till the triumph of labour be complete; till productive industry alone be opulent; and till idleness alone be poor; till the admirable maxim, that he who sows shall reap be solidly established; till the right of property shall be founded on principles of justice and not those of slavery; till man shall be held more in honour than the clod he treads on, or the machine he guides—there cannot and there ought not to be either peace on earth or goodwill amongst men.”³⁸

And Bray has been described as “probably the most effective of English pre-Marxians—perhaps in places the most Marxian.”³⁹

The positive value of Marxism can thus be fully appraised only in the context of its liberal tradition. Liberalism proclaimed the principle of individual freedom; but liberal practice nullified the principle by formalising it. Socialism promised the practice of the-principle. Bernstein’s contention that Socialism in practice would be organised Liberalism was not revisionist, but a true appreciation of the historical significance of Marxism.

The Marxist attitude towards ethical questions was also of

was of aristocratic origin, and therefore not valid in a different social and cultural atmosphere. The philosophical Radicals, however, approached moral problems from the individualist point of view. They disputed the morality of asking individuals to sacrifice for the interest of society. Deprecating the virtues of obedience and humility, they held that general prosperity and well-being were promoted only by the defence of individual rights and interests; moral order resulted necessarily from an equilibrium of interests. Marx rejected the liberating doctrine of individualism as a bourgeois abstraction, and consequently also the individualist approach to moral problems. While the ethical relativism of the utilitarians was rational, Marxian relativism, notwithstanding its appearance, is dogmatic, being a projection in the future of Hegelian moral positivism.

Marxism was not the product of the mind of one Individual. It drew upon the totality of human thought and human activity of the three to four hundred years which preceded the time of Karl Marx. Since then, human knowledge has advanced considerably. The startling discoveries of modern physics appear to have knocked

off the foundation of materialist philosophy. Some hypotheses of the nineteenth century physics have, indeed, proved to be false, and new facts have been discovered. The Marxian Materialism must be accordingly revised. There is nothing in the teachings of Karl Marx that prohibits such a revision necessitated by the advance of knowledge.

The philosophical significance of Marxism is that it offered a solution of the problem of dualism which had vitiated

corollary to the conclusion was doubt about the objective validity of knowledge acquired through the senses and denial of the reality of the physical world. Philosophy being the love of knowledge, by coming to the conclusion that knowledge is impossible, it committed suicide.

However, the tradition of physical realism of the ancient naturalist thinkers, who were the fathers of philosophy, and forerunners of science, was not altogether dead. Revived by philosophers like Gassendi and Hobbes, it inspired the “naive” Materialism of the eighteenth century, which accepted the mechanistic cosmology of Descartes while rejecting his psycho-physical parallelism. Misguided by his Hegelian schooling, Marx disowned the heritage of mechanistic naturalism and was carried away by the essentially idealistic concept of dialectics.

Nevertheless, his approach to the baffling problem of psycho-physical parallelism was more fruitful than the sensationalist epistemology of the eighteenth century Materialism. It was more scientific than Kant’s *a priorism*. Marx regarded the problem as of relation—of priority, and declared that consciousness was determined by being. The imaginary gulf between the worlds of mind and matter was bridged. He formulated the fundamental principle of materialist monism just when biology was not only blasting the venerable doctrine of the special creation of man, but discovering the physical origin of life itself. The theoretically ascertained fact that physico-chemical conditions under which life is known to exist did not obtain anywhere in the Universe until a comparatively recent time suggested that life was an emergent phenomenon. Consciousness being a property of life, the proposition that

the world of matter. They are but two aspects of the self-same world, one being antecedent to the other. Matter as a conceptual metaphysical category is the ultimate reality, capable of producing life. Consciousness, cognition, mind, ideas follow in course of biological evolution. The world of experience as a whole is real; transcendental reality is a figment of imagination. Mind as well as matter, the physical world as well as the world of thought and ideas, are equally real. But philosophy must have a realistic scientific understanding of their relation. Marx's contribution to this understanding won for him an outstanding place in the history of philosophy.

The alternative view about the origin of mind is to refer it to the immaterial soul; and it is mind so conceived that can be imagined to have a world of its own, qualitatively different from the world of matter. Postulating such an absolute dualism, philosophy leaves the ground of science and rationalism. The immaterial soul or disembodied spirit is an article of faith; it is not a logically conceived ontological category, much less a fact of experience.

The age long struggle of philosophy (love of knowledge) to free itself from the domination of religion and theology, to which Descartes himself made a decisive contribution, culminated in the materialist naturalism (as distinct from the natural religion) of the eighteenth century. Already then, biology, though still in its infancy, showed that the Cartesian distinction between man and animal was arbitrary, and thus emboldened philosophy to reject dualism by generalising the mechanistic concept. Locke's sensationalism as improved by Condillac reinforced the

Marx himself was not sufficiently aware of his spiritual ancestry. Under the influence of the Hegelian dialectics, he rejected the eighteenth century Materialism as mechanical. At the same time, he disowned the humanist tradition of the earlier advocates of social justice, ridiculing them as Utopians. Though he thus believed to begin from scratch, as the founder of a new philosophy and the prophet of revolution, Marx belonged to the intellectual lineage of Democritos, Epicures, Lucretius, Bruno, Gassendi, Hobbes, Holbach, Diderot and Feuer-bach, to mention only the most illustrious of them. His place in the history of philosophy, therefore, is no less significant and honourable than any one of his forerunners. Indeed, his contribution to the cause of human freedom was greater, because he had the advantage of living in an age when scientific knowledge could throw light on the old problems of philosophy.

To be able to offer a rational explanation of the world of experience, and to avoid the pitfalls of mysticism, philosophy must be monistic; monistic metaphysics does not preclude pluralism in the process of becoming; and only a materialist metaphysics (irrespective of the change in the concept of matter in physics) can be strictly monistic. Marx's proposition that consciousness is determined by being placed materialist metaphysics on a sound scientific foundation. His subsequent thought, particularly sociological, however, did not move in the direction indicated by the significant point of departure. Marxism, on the whole, is not true to its philosophical tradition. In sociology, it vulgarises Materialism to the extent of denying that basic moral values transcend space and time. With the impersonal concept of the forces of production, it introduces teleology in history, crassly contradicting its

Influenced by the fallacious and erroneous doctrines of Marxism which do not logically follow from its philosophy.

In addition to the accumulated achievements of the agelong struggle of metaphysics against dualism, philosophically, Marxism inherited also the liberating tradition of Humanism. The two apparently conflicting trends of thought—mechanistic naturalism and romantic Humanism—harmonised in Feuerbach, who therefore could throw off the Hegelian influence more completely than Marx. Nevertheless, in Feuerbach's materialist Humanism, man remains an abstraction, veiled in mystery, an elementary, indefinable category, as simply given, to be taken for granted. The fiery prophet of social justice in Marx was more a Humanist than a Hegelian. But his critical mind did not miss the weakness of Feuerbach's Humanism and realised the necessity of explaining the being and becoming of man, if his sovereignty as the maker of his destiny was to be empirically established. It was in search of a rational foundation of the humanist view of life that Marx undertook his analytical study of history. At the same time, anthropology had discovered that the struggle for physical existence was the basic human urge—a biological heritage. Marx identified the primitive man's intelligent effort to earn a livelihood with the biological struggle for existence, and came to the conclusion that the origin of society and subsequent human development were economically motivated. The point of departure of the Marxist historiography was the mistake of confounding physical urge with economic motive. For a considerable time after the origin of the species, *homo sapiens* was not moved by any economic motive, but by the biological urge

the struggle for physical existence provides stimuli for mental development. Consciousness and other rudiments of mind are a biological heritage antecedent to the appearance of *homo sapiens*. Thus, further evolution is determined by the physical conditions of the being, and becoming of man. But the economic determinism of history from the origin of society cannot be logically deduced from that fact. In other words, economic determinism is not a corollary to Materialism. Moreover, it is antagonistic to Humanism, because it subordinates man to the inexorable operation of the impersonal forces of production. In an economically determined society, man is not a producer, but a means of production.

Marx's effort to place Feuerbach's materialist Humanism on a rational foundation led to the exactly contrary consequence. Feuerbach's mystic abstraction was replaced by an economic automaton; and the abstract conception was transferred from the debased man to society, which was endowed with a collective ego.

Marx's failure to work out a sociology consistent with materialist philosophy was due to his passion for social justice, inherited from his humanist predecessors, though he disdained them as Utopians. Marx, however, was not the dry-hearted mathematical prophet of history, as he has been celebrated by his followers, and as he might have believed himself to be. With a burning faith in revolution, he was a romanticist and as such a Humanist. The idea of revolution is a romantic idea, because it presupposes man's power to remake the world in which he lives. If purposeful human effort is left out of account, social development becomes a mechanistic evolutionary process, making no

depart from objectivity, honour Marx for a passionate search for truth and intellectual honesty. Without a moral fervour of the highest degree, without an intense dislike for injustice, he could not undertake the lone fight to-improve the lot of the oppressed and exploited.

One of the most impassioned fighters against cant and hypocrisy, Marx was a great moralist in the tradition of the ancient prophets of his race. His merciless exposition of the .essence of capitalism was a severe moral condemnation. In the last analysis, *Capital* is a treatise on social ethics—a powerful protest against the servitude of the toiling majority. It may be presumed that Marx abstained deliberately from making the moral appeal of his economic theories explicit, because he hated the cant of the sanctimonious defenders of the established order of inequity. Nevertheless, it was as a moralist that he influenced history. Only his orthodox followers seem to be immune to that influence.

Marx talked of Socialism as “the kingdom of freedom”, where man will be the master of his social environments. One who preached such a humanist doctrine could not be a worshipper at the shrine of an exacting collective ego, even of the proletariat. According to Marx, under Socialism human reason will overcome irrational forces which now tyrannise the life of man; as a rational being, man will control his destiny. Freed from the fallacy of economic determinism, the humanist, libertarian, moralist spirit of Marxism will go into the making of the new faith of our time. It is a part of the accumulated store of human heritage, which must be claimed by the builders of the future, who will not belong, to any particular class.

triumph of rationalist Humanism. The fact that life is found to be associated with dead matter in a particular state of organisation connects man, through the long process of biological evolution, with the background of the physical Universe. The supreme importance of man results from the fact that in him the physical process of becoming has reached the highest pitch so far. Humanism thus ceases to be a mystic and poetic view of life. Based on scientific knowledge, it can be integrated in the materialist general philosophy, and the latter, then, can be the foundation of a sociology which makes room for human creativeness and individual liberty without denying determinism; which reconciles reason with will; which shows that cooperation and organisation need not stifle the urge for freedom. Harmonised with Humanism, materialist philosophy can have an ethics whose values require no other sanction than man's innate rationality.

The positive elements of Marxism, freed from its fallacies and clarified in the light of greater scientific knowledge, are consistent with a more comprehensive philosophy, which can be called Integral or Radical Humanism: a philosophy which combines mechanistic cosmology, materialist metaphysics, secular rationalism and rationalist ethics to satisfy man's urge for freedom and quest for truth, and also to guide his future action in pursuit of the ideals.

CHAPTER X

THE TWINS OF IRRATIONALISM

THE MAGNIFICENT achievements of the natural sciences-silenced the outburst of irrationalism as represented by the post-revolutionary romantic movement in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century. Consequently, the secular rationalism of the eighteenth century tradition reasserted itself as the guiding principle of the intellectual life of Europe—of philosophical as well as of social thought. As a philosopher and a social scientist, Marx was a rationalist of the Hegelian and also of the English liberal school. At the same time, his noble passion for an early attainment of the humanist ideal of social justice generated impatience which discovered the short-cut of violent revolution.

In the beginning, Marxism tended towards a harmony of reason and romanticism. Had it developed, consistently with its original philosophical premisses, which implied that the laws of social evolution did not preclude the freedom of human will and endeavour, Marxism might have rescued the idea of revolution from its traditional association with the romantic extravagance of zealots and the orgy of violence let loose by wilful minorities; it might have promoted a scientific humanist movement as heralded by Feuerbach and his followers, known as the German Philosophical Radicals. But the lure of a short-cut on the model of the Great Revolution induced Marx to go at a tangent, to become the fiery prophet of the coming revolution which would place the proletariat in power. He left the high-road of the rational and humanist thought built by generations of fighters for the spiritual and social

to run into a blind-alley. The Marxist neo-romanticism merged man in the masses and ascribed mystic powers to the latter.

Nevertheless, until the years preceding the first world war, the socialist movement, which professed Marxism as its creed by and large, attached greater importance to its rationalist aspect and liberal tradition than to the pseudo-romanticism of the gospel of revolution. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the latter tendency gained ground, ultimately to triumph in the Russian Revolution, which appeared to be an empirical corroboration of the Marxist theory. In reality, however, it did not; because it took place in a country where the conditions for a revolution as anticipated by the prophet were very largely absent. Yet, the Marxist theory was interpreted so as to justify facts which were not historically determined, but brought about violently by a wilful minority in power. The contradictions of Marxism permitted such an interpretation, which placed a premium on irrationalism. With the Communists, Marxism became a dogma which demanded blind faith, and the new faith naturally had to be reinforced by its casuistry. Communism became an irrational cult which attracted pseudo-romantics who did not by birth belong to the chosen people, namely, the proletariat.

A year after its unhistorical victory in Russia, the revolution failed in Germany, where it ought to have triumphed if Marx was not a false prophet. After the defeat, the Communists found consolation in their faith that the decayed capitalist system was heading towards yet another imperialist war which guaranteed the ultimate success of

a violent revolution was pseudo-romanticism; it rejected the classical romantic passion for individual liberty in favour of a mystic belief in the power of the masses. Collectivist romanticism is a contradiction in terms; because, with true romanticism, the individual man is everything; the unlimited power to conquer and create is in him. As the prophet of revolution, Marx deviated from his original rationalist position; but the belief in economic determinism emasculated his romantic passion. The result was that reason and romanticism cancelled each other, and Marxism became a cult of collective irrationalism. The fallacies of Marxism, with all its original high ideals and good intentions, logically resulted in the evils of Communism in practice.

The more unreservedly irrational cult of Fascism or National-Socialism is said to have arisen as a reaction ,to Communism. That is not true, because the roots of the one as well as those of the other can be traced in the earlier movement of ideas.

Right up to the close of the Middle-Ages, man's struggle for freedom had centered around the problem of his relation with God. In the sixteenth century, the age of the Renaissance, it entered a new phase, where the old problem was gradually replaced by the problem of man's relation with society—the relation between the individual and the State. It was an old problem, which had taxed the genius of a Plato. But in the States of the modern world, with large populations and complicated socio-economic structures, the problem proved to be much more baffling than in the City Republics of ancient Greece. Ultimately, the idea of social contract promised :a solution of the age-old problem.

a mockery of the constitutional right of equality before-the-law and an empty formality of political democracy.. Unable to reconcile these contradictions in practice with its social and political theories, Liberalism gradually abandoned the contractual conception of the State; the organic view gained ground, providing moral and theoretical sanction to the subordination of the individual to the State. Regarded no longer as an artificial creation, but as a natural organism, the State was something much more than the mere sum total of its constituent parts, which could not exist by themselves,, and therefore were subservient to it. Collectivism thus resulted logically from the failure of Liberalism to solve the problem of harmonising freedom with organisation.¹

* * *

It may be mentioned that in the liberal welfare State the workman is conceived as a “unit of earning, capacity” (Beveridge). This idea of Marxist origin had found favour also with Bismark.

The organic conception of the State and the consequent eclipse of the tradition of individualism by the new cult of collectivism appeared to find a scientific corroboration towards the end of the nineteenth century in anthropology and social psychology. Previously, the Darwinian doctrine of the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest had been interpreted to justify the *laissez faire* economy, which had reduced sovereign individuals to helpless social atoms. The liberating doctrine of individualism was vulgarised to justify the law

¹ A Social-Democratic theoretician condemns the Bolshevik State for “intrinsically curtailing human freedom in the spiritual sphere.” Yet, as a

of the jungle—everybody for oneself, the devil takes the hindmost. And under the prevailing social conditions, the majority composed of atomised individuals could not possibly help themselves, and consequently were delivered to the devil as the hindmost. The fortunate few claimed that their power and privilege were due to the law of nature, which favoured the fittest. The corollary to that vulgarisation of science was the undemocratic doctrine of the elite and the superman cult of the coming dictatorship.

In that psychological atmosphere of frustration, the mystic appeal of collectivism found a ready response from the masses. It was an appeal to emotion and therefore had to be reinforced by irrationalism. The other basic liberal principle of rationalism was discredited by the triumph of empiricism in philosophy and ethics, which glorified emotion as against intelligence, intuition against knowledge, instinct against reason.

After Cudworth (1617-1688), who based ethics on a system of metaphysics, English ethics was divorced from philosophy. In his *Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, Cudworth expounded an ethical system as an integral part of a general philosophy.² Thereafter, English ethical theories tended to be “practical”, free from the speculation about any metaphysical source of values, which were therefore arbitrarily postulated. Thus isolated from a rational system of metaphysics, moral philosophy regarded values as simply given, to be judged by the principle of utility. The alternative sanction for moral values was religious or intuitive.³

² *The Intellectual System of the Universe.*

Social and political theories must have a philosophical foundation, and no philosophy is possible without a metaphysics. The early liberal thought was preeminently philosophical, and its development coincided with the process of philosophy transferring its alliance from the traditional mystic-transcendental to a materialist-realist metaphysics. The possibility of discovering that Reason was a biological property, and thus an expression of the Natural Law in man, and consequently of a rationalist secular ethics, was inherent in that process of philosophical revolution. Hartley indicated the way which was further explored by Priestley and Erasmus Darwin. Hartley held that Hume's scepticism did not necessarily follow from Locke's empiricist epistemology. But Hartley's claim to be a legitimate successor of Locke was disputed, and his elaboration of

most nearly into contact with the theory of knowledge, the question whether moral perceptions originate in sense or in reason, was commonly treated with reference to little beyond its strictly ethical issues. The horizon of Cudworth and Price is indeed wider; but Cudworth belonged to the seventeenth century. Hume's moral theory is very psychological and very little metaphysical ... In Locke's *Essays*, moral theory comes in at intervals in order to round off the discussion, and though it certainly contains a great deal which is of great importance for the metaphysics of morals, it is distinctly episodic in character. Bishop Berkeley was a most metaphysical person . . . But the ethical portions of his writings might, to all appearances, have been written by Paley . . . And Butler, the most typical of British moralists, will have nothing whatever to do with the metaphysics of his subject—whether the moral faculty be regarded as a 'sentiment' of the understanding or 'a perception of the heart or both', is for him a matter of small importance . . . That morals have a peculiar interest for the lawyer, politician and the divine, needs no saying. For the rest, ethics

sensationalism rejected by the empiricists, because it tended towards Materialism. Owing to the reluctance to accept the logical development of the philosophy of its founder, Liberalism came under the influence of the philosophical reaction. The prejudice against Materialism drove empirical philosophy into the blind-alley of scepticism.

Developing on the background of a conflict of the traditions of the Renaissance and the Reformation, Liberalism, from the time of Locke, became philosophically confused. Through Hooker, who could be called the earliest forerunner of Neo-Thomism, the tradition of the Reformation predominated in Liberalism as formulated by Locke. Transplanted in the scientific rationalist atmosphere of the eighteenth century France, it outgrew the pietist prepossessions of Locke, and the naturalist tradition of the Renaissance reasserted itself in its philosophy. Locke's sensationalist theory of knowledge, on the other hand, led to the subjective idealism of Berkeley and agnosticism of Hume. Though apparently so very different, both exposed the fatal inadequacy of empiricist philosophy—fatal, because it was pregnant with the danger of a philosophical reaction. Locke proposed to ascertain the limits of human knowledge, and came to the conclusion that nothing beyond the reach of the senses could be known. The implication is palpable: Why bother about the objective reality? At its very birth, empirical philosophy denied metaphysics.

Berkeley, in a straightforward manner, went directly to the point: The reality of the external world cannot be proved by experience; therefore, in order to avoid the absurdity of

of the possibility of a realist (materialist) metaphysics. But his agnostic attitude towards the supersensuous did not-necessarily imply negation of God. As a matter of fact, he explicitly differentiated his attitude from atheism. The famous story of his first meeting with the French Encyclopaedists is to the point. In course of conversation, he remarked that he was yet to meet a confirmed atheist. Thereupon, Diderot retorted: "Sir, here you are with nine of them." If philosophy cannot discover the ultimate reality, in search of it man must revert to religion. Agnosticism sets an absolute limit to human knowledge, and declares implicitly that knowledge of truth and reality is impossible.⁴ It is a sophisticated cult of ignorance,⁵ and ignorance is the foundation of faith. Therefore, it has been held by critical historians of philosophy that Hume's agnosticism created an intellectual atmosphere congenial to religious revivalism. That is the logical consequence of empiricism in philosophy. When insufficiency of the explanation of mental phenomena and causality is pointed out as the demonstration of the impossibility of all explanation, it amounts to the suggestion that further enquiry should stop because it is fruitless. It is easy to see how at that dead end intuition can replace experience, and empiricism opens the way to mysticism. Wedded to the empirical philosophy, even after Berkeley had taken it to the temple of God, and. Hume had exposed its absurdity, Liberalism could not but embrace the so-called natural religion and move towards irrationalism.⁶

The *Natural History of Religion* exposed the fiction

⁴ Hume's empiricism, as Eid points out, constructs our whole knowledge out of representative ideas. The empirical

of the venerable conception of soul; but the material world also went with it. What remained was atomised “ideas” with no cohesion or rational connection. The world of experience, of our sensations, is the only world; but it is an ideal and irrational world. There being no necessary connection between phenomena, anything may happen anywhere any time. That is to say, the world of the empiricist is a world of miracles, which cannot be without a miracle-making God—an almighty who can create out of nothing—Dugald Stewart brought out this implication of Hume’s agnosticism. He was a follower

-of Reid, who opposed Hume’s scepticism with his “commonsense” realism. Stewart proved that Hume’s doctrine really led to theology, implying that God gives us the conviction of the necessity of a cause. But Hume argues that it can never be a logical necessity. Stewart retorts that it must then be either a prejudice or an intuitive judgment; and in either case, it is an *a priori* belief, which is the essence of religion.

Noting that “enlightened zeal for liberty was associated with the reckless boldness of the uncompromising free-thinker, Stewart tried to show that a man could be a Liberal without being an atheist”.⁷ Paley held that psychology proved existence of a design in the moral world (See *Natural Theology*). He agreed with Bentham that that action was good which made for the greatest good for the greatest number. But following the religious utilitarians of the previous century, he laid emphasis on the doctrine of reward and punishment after death. Under Hume’s influence, although politically he was a Tory, Liberalism in Britain broke away from its philosophical moorings.⁸

sheer selfishness. The doctrine that each man should, first attend to his own interest was justified by a venerable cant: “It was a proof of a Providential Order that each man, by helping himself, unintentionally helps his neighbours” (Adam Smith). The notion of a Providential Order rules out man’s claim to be the maker of his destiny. It is not consistent with the humanist philosophical principle of individualism, which proclaims the sovereignty of man. Once it is admitted that the world is a Providential Order, the idea of man’s liberty becomes meaningless. The established social and political order being a part of the world is also providentially ordained.. How could man ever alter it? Philosophical reaction thus reduced the social and political doctrines of modern Liberalism to mere conventional declarations.

“Practical men, asking whether this or that policy shall be adopted in view of actual events, no more want to go back to right reason and law of nature. The order, only established by experience and tradition, was accepted, subject to criticism of detail, and men turned impatiently from abstract arguments, and left the enquiry into social contracts to philosophers, that is, to silly people in libraries. Politics was properly a matter of business, to be discussed in a businesslike spirit. In this sense, individualism is congenial to empiricism, because it starts from facts and particular interests, and resents the intrusion of first principles.”⁹

To accept the order established by tradition as sacrosanct, was to vindicate the Toryism of Burke. The addition of the term “experience” made no essential difference. Having deviated from its philosophical tradition, Liberalism thus

in philosophy. The attempt to apply scientific methods to the study of social phenomena encouraged a renewed revolt against reason in the closing years of the nineteenth century.¹⁰ Applied to social evolution, the doctrines of Darwin were interpreted differently, either in favour of individualism or of collectivism. Scientists sought the truth in an empirical study of the anatomy and physiology of the human mind. It led to researches-into primitive human institutions of the present as well as of the past. The result was the development of two new sciences—anthropology and social psychology. The mass of data about the social organisation and behaviour of primitive peoples gathered by the investigations of Frazer, Westermarck, Hobhouse, Rivers and many others, appeared to cast doubt on the validity of the rationalist social and political theories of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While the scientists, as scientists, were reluctant to abandon the rationalist belief that the world was a complex of law-governed processes, their empirical knowledge seemed to prove that man's social behaviour was very largely instinctive rather than intelligent, and suggested that the irrational—intuition and passion—should be given a much larger place in any realistic understanding of the past history and making of the future. On the basis of a defective knowledge of the biological sciences, particularly neo-vitalism, Bergson constructed a philosophy of irrationalism. "It exemplifies admirably the revolt against reason which, beginning with Rousseau, has gradually dominated larger and larger areas in the life and thought of the world."¹¹

While formalised and vulgarised Liberalism was declining in Britain, it reasserted itself in France after

the short period of the post-revolutionary romantic reaction. Indeed, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the whole continent was swept by a wave of vigorous liberalism.

In France, the banner of Liberalism was held high, after Michelet and Victor Hugo, by Quinet and Faguet, Renouvier, Fouillee and others, though more or less cautiously than their vibrant predecessors. While others took a wavering attitude towards the crucial question of the dichotomy of the authority of the State and the freedom of the individual, Renouvier declared that there was no collective being called the State that had its existence apart from the individual citizens or to which they could delegate their will.¹² But Fouillee expounded the eclectic theory that the State was a “contractual organism”.¹³

The last of the Mohicans of classical Liberalism was Anatole France. Faithful to the tradition of the Revolt of Man and the Enlightenment, all his life he vehemently attacked the Church and its dogmas as antagonistic to science and freedom. He maintained that until the spiritual domination of the Church was broken, modern civilisation could not free man's mind. A bold fighter against dogma and prejudices, he was a firm believer in rationalism and in the liberating role of science, even when the authority of Bergson and the eloquence of Sorel made irrationalism fashionable. The full-blooded liberalism of Anatole France and other early French Radicals led directly to the rationalist Marxism of Guesde and the socialist Humanism of Jaures.

The reaction to the contradictions and inadequacies of formalised nineteenth century Liberalism was most

Jarmonise individual freedom with the necessity of political administration and economic organisation of the modern society drove Sorel to anarchism, which logically follows from the consistently utilitarian and pragmatic Liberalism. In that mood, Sorel came under the influence of Bergson's philosophy, to be a fiery prophet of romantic irrationalism. He was a fanatic preacher of violence as the only means to reform society. Though an ardent advocate of the proletarian revolution, he rejected Marx's historical determinism and declared that nature and society were not governed by any law, but by a blind will. For this view and his glorification of violence, the proletarian revolutionary Sorel was held as the philosopher of Fascism. Mussolini declared himself to be a disciple of Sorel, while on his death-bed Sorel himself hailed the Russian Revolution as the realisation of his dream and Lenin as the ideal man. It is highly significant that a common parentage of Fascism and Communism can be traced in one man, who represented more forcefully than others the revolt against reason encouraged by the philosophical reaction at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century.

Early in the nineteenth century, the heritage of the philosophical tradition of Liberalism passed on to Germany. The German *Aufklaerung* was the last great flash of the light of human freedom kindled by the Renaissance and kept burning ever since by the devotion of an increasing number of worshippers at the temple of knowledge, liberty and truth. An appreciable advance was made towards the much needed harmony of reason and romanticism, intelligence and emotion, science and philosophy. The tradition of that Golden Age of German history was inherited by those followers of Hegel and

“Three generations of eminent scholars brought about a flowing of intellectual Liberalism, the main principles of which were independence from authority, objectivity and tolerance. In various ways and fields, the emancipation from blind submission to traditional authority was achieved. A materialistic philosophy based on the findings of science did away with metaphysical speculations. Religion was considered as an anthropological phenomenon instead of a supernatural revelation. The Bible critically analysed like any other historical document, in the eyes of some did not even prove the existence of Christ. Next to science, history indeed was the: signature of the liberal age (in Germany). It taught dispassionate objectivity. But the human element behind it should not be overlooked.”¹⁴

A divergent current of thought flowed from Kant. Though he started under the influence of Newtonian natural philosophy and the Enlightenment, the inspiration for his thought came rather from the tradition of the Reformation than of the Renaissance. Therefore, his Liberalism was more akin to the conservative English school than the Radical French. The first to introduce empiricism in German philosophy, Kant proposed to rescue it from the blind-alley of Hume’s agnosticism. He thought that empirical philosophy could have a metaphysics if the gap between the subjective and the objective could be bridged. The postulation of the gap having first been made by Descartes, Kant’s critique implied a revision of the Cartesian system. The Kantian revolution thus amounted to striking at the roots of modern philosophy and to the inauguration of a neo-mediaevalism.¹⁵

The subjectivism of Kant's critical philosophy, on the one hand, fed the romanticism of Fichte and, on the other hand, inspired Schopenhauer's revolt against reason. Both of them, together with Nietzsche, Bergson and Sorel, not to mention lesser lights, have been hailed as the philosophers of Fascism. Fichte was the prophet of German Nationalism, and in the nineteenth century, nationalism was the strange bed-fellow of Liberalism. Fascism was the bastard of that misalliance, particularly in Italy and Germany. A formalist conception of democracy, which had imperceptibly but quite decisively replaced individualism by collectivism, misled liberal politicians to champion nationalism. Presently, experience proved that, notwithstanding its democratic professions while still struggling for power, victorious nationalism invariably favoured a reactionary social and cultural outlook, and allied itself with conservative forces.

In Italy, triumphant nationalism was not only influenced by the irrational romanticism of Sorel, but accepted the blatantly chauvinistic and frankly conservative doctrines of the French Royalist. Forgetting the support Liberalism had given to nationalism in its days of struggle, a leading nationalist theoretician criticised Liberalism for its lack of philosophical outlook, and himself made up for the deficiency. "The highest form of human solidarity is the Nation. The Nation is not merely the sum of individual citizens, but it is a living organism, a mystical body, embracing all past, present and future generations, of which the individual is an ephemeral part, and to which he owes his highest duty."¹⁶

These views were "scientifically" elaborated not only by

of the elite provided a sociological justification of chauvinism and dictatorship; they were endorsed also by the liberal philosopher Gentile, who gave the fascist political theory a cultural form. As Mussolini's Minister of Education, he prescribed that curricula should place emphasis on the life of heroes as the symbols of the national spirit. He held that human spirit found expression only in national cultures, and therefore individuals should find their expression through the nation. A pupil and friend of Croce could not be an apologist of Fascism if Liberalism had not moved far away from its original philosophical position. The testimony to that philosophical reaction was borne by Gentile himself. "Human being is naturally religious. To think means to contemplate God. As against man, God is everything. Man is nothing." Again: "The fascist State embraces and includes all spiritual values, including religion. The State which tolerates any other sovereign power commits suicide. Whatever is spiritual, is free, but within the great limit of the powers of the State, which itself is 'spiritual' "¹⁷

Man had to free himself from the divine tutelage before he could take up the struggle for temporal freedom. Philosophically, Liberalism was born of the revolt of man against spiritual slavery, and as such it inspired the rise and growth of modern civilisation until the nineteenth

-century, when causes mentioned above brought about a philosophical reaction which culminated in liberals like Gentile becoming apologists of Fascism.

On the other hand, nationalism was the child of the Reformation, which reinforced religion against the revolt of man by harking back to the democratic and individualist

sophical reaction which ultimately created the atmosphere of irrationalism conducive to the growth both of Fascism, and Communism. It was also under the influence of the Reformation that Liberalism found an ally in nationalism; and the crassest form of the mystic collectivist cult is Fascism or National-Socialism.

Germany is the cradle of the idea of the National State; consequently, idealisation of the concept of the nation came to be a distinctive feature of the German culture; a political concept was raised to the status of a metaphysical abstraction. The prejudice of nation-consciousness, nation being identified with an ethnic group, is not nearly so very deep-rooted in any other regional culture of Europe. Yet, nationalism, born there in the sixteenth century, did not succeed in Germany until late in the nineteenth. That was a misfortune which generated a widespread feeling of frustration. The result was the psychological complex of inferiority characteristically expressed in national cultural chauvinism. The inspiration for the German culture was found in the mythology of the Teutonic tribes who inhabited the primeval forests of Central and Eastern Europe before they were civilised by Christianity in the Sagas of prehistoric heroes. The legendary Siegfried came to be the ideal of German manhood. He represented the “*furor teutonicus*” described by Tacitus who found the old Germanic tribes to be “wild, irritable, cunning, hypocritical and adventurous”. Siegfried was miraculously endowed with an immense vigour and unmatched power which made him invincible. The miracle of a bath in dragon blood clad him in a cloak of invisibility. In short, he was the archetype of the superman. Nationalist literature cast all the historical heroes of Germany— from Attila to Bismark—on the

liberalism identified itself with nationalism, Fichte was a Liberal. He has been hailed also as the “child of the people”, who heralded Socialism. Yet, he was the prophet of the Nordic myth of German Fascism. He described the Germans as the race of the purest blood, and therefore destined to possess “the mystic powers of nature”. Thanks to the unique racial purity, the Germans are “the (chosen) people, metaphysically destined, possessed of the moral right, to fulfil the destiny by every means of

-cunning and force”.¹⁸ The theoreticians of German Fascism found the justification for the cult of brutality, cynicism and amorality in Fichte, who preached a

.double standard of morality.¹⁹ What is wicked for the individual to do, is a sacred duty of the State. “Between States, there is neither law nor right save the law of the strongest.”²⁰ For its purpose, the State is entitled to adopt all possible means—fraud, violation of law, physical violence. The purpose is to enforce the will of the collective ego of the nation, which is bound by no laws. That was the quintessence of Fascism, formulated by a liberal philosopher, when Capitalism was still in its adolescence and the spectre of Communism had not yet appeared even in the imagination of Marx.

The cultural chauvinism and spirit of aggression inherent in Fichte’s romantic nationalism were elaborated by a number of writers, historians and University professors, who wielded a powerful influence on the intellectual and emotional outfit of the German youth nearly for two generations before the first world war. During that period of the prosperity of German Capitalism and

national predisposition to accept the doctrine of Fascism as the expression of the traditional German spirit and the fascist practice as the means for the accomplishment of Germany's world mission.

Paul de Lagarde and Julius Langbehn, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, developed the mystic element of Fichte's philosophy of nationalism. They initiated the cult of *Innerlichkeit* (inwardness), which was supposed to be the foundation of the moral superiority of the German race. The mystic cult was fanatically preached by Gustav Freytag, Wilhelm Schaefer, Hans Grimm and others.

De Lagarde was the theoretician of Pan-Germanism. Concretising the famous Bismarckian doctrine, *Drang nach Osten*, he wrote: "The Germanisation of our neighbours in the East would be a worthwhile deed. May Russia be so kind and move some three-hundred miles further East to Central Asia. If she refuses to do so, she will force us to expropriate her, that is, to make war on her."²¹ The legend of *Innerlichkeit* as the token of the moral superiority of the Germans, as the mystic sanction for cultural chauvinism, was elaborated pseudo-scientifically in the race cult by Houston Chamberlain, an Englishman who became a naturalised German. He was a disciple of the French anthropologist Gobineau and the preceptor of Alfred Rosenberg, the theoretician of Hitler's National-Socialism. Thus, Fascism was neither a class ideology nor economically determined.

The historian Treitzschke, himself a Slav racially, drew upon the stories of the war-likeness of the ancient Teutonic tribes, and also on his own imagination, to provide a

imagination of the German youth, all of whom aspired to be something like Siegfried, the superman. The foundation of Fascism thus was not economic, but emotional—irrationalism cultivated in the atmosphere of a philosophical reaction.

“In the Reichstag of 1930, there were thirteen political parties. From an ideological viewpoint, they can be divided into two opposite groups. It is not the old conflict of conservatism and progress, but one that reaches beyond the political sphere into the depths of *Weltanschauung*, the conflict between rationalism and irrationalism. It is reflected by the type of leaders that appear on the public stage, the intellectual who pleads with the arguments of reason, and the demagogue who appeals to emotional sentiments. The conflict between the rational and irrational forces is the story of political, thought in pre-Nazi Germany.”²³

Schopenhauer began the revolt against reason, which, manifesting itself through art, literature and philosophy during the closing decades of the nineteenth century heralded the advent of Fascism. Fichte was a romanticist, but not altogether irrational. He did not swim in the current of philosophical reaction which came to Germany through Schopenhauer. A pupil of Kant, Schopenhauer nevertheless came under the romantic influence of the Tieck-Novalis circle. But he soon turned his back on the Renaissance romanticism, and found himself at home in the reactionary pessimist school. Eventually, Friedrich Schlegel introduced him to Indian mysticism. He began to hear inner voices, and truth was revealed to him. Accordingly, he declared that parts of his main work—*The*

climax of Kant's critical philosophy. It implied a relapse into mystic metaphysics. Hegel, and Fichte also in a sense, rejected the concept. Schopenhauer did the opposite, it has been said, perhaps maliciously, out of spite for Hegel.²⁴ He interpreted the thing-in-itself as the Will. But It was not as big a break with Kant's rationalism as it might appear. The supremacy of will is inherent in Kant's ethics. He maintained that the difference between a good and a bad man was a difference of volitions. He also maintained that the metaphysical moral law was concerned with will. Making explicit what was thus implicit in Kant's metaphysics,. Schopenhauer came to the conclusion that will was the ultimate and only reality, and identified the will of the individual, who could will, with the Universal Will.²⁵

But substitution of one mystic concept by another notion would hardly be an illuminating interpretation. Therefore, Schopenhauer defined Will: It is the ultimate, irreducible, primeval principle of the whole being, the impelling force producing the world of phenomena including life and all its manifestations. That far the definition tends towards a sort of mystic pantheism. But it turns abruptly to the opposite direction: The Will is a blind urge, without any cause, a fundamental, utterly unmotivated impulse. So, the romanticism of Schopenhauer's youth was drowned in the fatalism of his mature philosophy. That is why he transferred his

²⁴ It is a fact that Schopenhauer was very jealous of Hegel for the latter's great popularity. Trying to outshine his more brilliant rival, Schopenhauer used to time his classes in the Berlin University simultaneously with Hegel's. The result

loyalty from the Greek rationalist Humanism to Hindu mystic pantheism.

Schopenhauer, however, was not a pantheist in the true sense of the term; his cosmic will is not like Spinoza's; it is not identical with God. Schopenhauer's cosmic will is not the divine will—to goodness and virtue in man. On the contrary, it is the evil, wickedness, cause of all suffering. Therefore, life is destined to be full of sorrows which increase with the increase of knowledge. The world is a vast prison-house, out of which there is no escape. Man is condemned to eternal servitude by his own will, which he cannot control because it is the manifestation of the cosmic will. So the urge for freedom is an illusion, misleading man ever since the birth of the species; it is a typical case of the proverbial carrot dangling before the donkey. Man has no way out of the vicious circle of the cosmic will, because knowledge which is said to give power, only galvanises his bondage; and in any case, knowledge cannot help, because intellect, the capacity to know, is also created by will. “This relation between will and mind, this premise of Schopenhauer that the second is only the tool of the first, has about it as much that is humiliating and deplorable, much that is even comic. It puts in a nutshell the whole tendency and capacity of mankind to delude itself, and imagine that it will receive its direction and content from its mind, whereas our philosopher asserts the direct opposite, and relegates the intellect to a position as mere mouthpiece of the will: to justify it, to provide it with ‘moral’ motivations, and in short to rationalise our instincts.”²⁶

The philosophical reaction heralded by the Reformation,

Dewey. And in proportion as will has gone up in the scale, knowledge has gone down. This is the most notable change that has come over the temper of philosophy in our age. It was prepared by Rousseau and Kant but was first proclaimed in its purity by Schopenhauer.”²⁷

Nietzsche called himself a follower of Schopenhauer and consistently developed the doctrine of the omnipotent will to the cult of brutality and cynicism of the hero. But he was really of a class by himself, and broke away from the tradition of classical German philosophy as well as the general philosophical reaction by denouncing Kant as a “moral fanatic *a la Rousseau*”. Nietzsche felt that the destruction by science of the faith in the dogmas of Christianity was leading to a negation of all values—to what he characterised as “nay saying to life.” He held that the nineteenth century Naturalism was a mere makeshift—that it could not give a new meaning to life. “Philosophical systems are wholly true only for their founders; for all later philosophers, they are usually one vast error; for weaker minds, they are a blend of truth and error; but in any case, as the highest end, they are an error and are therefore to be rejected.” Nietzsche marked the close of an epoch, the intellectual, cultural and moral ideals of which turned out to be self-contradictory and impractical, because the philosophy of nature as well as of life underlying them had not been consistently carried to its logical conclusion.

The new philosophy founded by Descartes was a revolt against mediaevalism. Backed up by the humanist spirit of the Renaissance and the advance of scientific knowledge, it was objectively meant to liberate man’s mind from the lingering tradition of the religious mode of thought, of the

The light of the growing knowledge of science blazed the trail for philosophy to follow, but just as in the dawn of civilisation inadequacy of positive knowledge had compelled early naturalist speculations to postulate supernatural agencies, and lay the foundation of religion, similarly, in modern times also, the inability of science to explain fully all the phenomena of nature, particularly the so-called vital and mental ones, kept religious atavism alive to confuse philosophical thought and thus impede man's march towards spiritual liberation. Ultimately, in the nineteenth century, philosophy came to be the field of battle between the belief in reason and irrationalism, scientific naturalism and various forms of camouflaged super-naturalism, secularism and transcendentalism, materialism and spiritualism—in short, between knowledge and faith. The currents of thought which ran counter to the logical evolution of the new philosophy themselves were equally logical, because they represented a slow process of the disappearance of mental habits and emotional predispositions cultivated during the centuries of an earlier epoch.

The crisis of philosophical thought expressed itself in a growing contradiction between political and social doctrines deduced from it and their practice. The net result of the experience of the nineteenth century was man's loss of faith in himself. Individualism was eclipsed by collectivism; political liberty, cultural autonomy, intellectual freedom, were to be sacrificed for the cult of totalitarianism; democracy was threatened by dictatorship. But at the same time, science had advanced to acquire knowledge which threw a flood of light not only on the vast expanse of the physical Universe, and in the obscure

was no longer a delusion; morality a mystic state; nor truth a metaphysical abstraction. Conceived by human mind, all those traditional ideals or values were within the reach of human endeavour, progressively reinforced by the creative power derived from increasing knowledge.

But the new Renaissance called for a revolt against the “conventional lies” of the nineteenth century civilisation. Nietzsche personified that revolt. He also personified the conflict which confused the intellectual life and disintegrated the morale of the passing epoch. Not an adept in the art of self-deception, so successfully practised by lesser men, he consciously experienced the nerve-wrecking conflict of emotions, and went mad.²⁸

Fascism and Communism both claimed the historical mission of building a new civilisation, one on the ruins, and other on the basis, of the positive achievements of the nineteenth century. Either of them could, therefore, find in Nietzsche support for its doctrine and practice. But the Dionysian role of Nietzsche was predominating; his condemnation of modern civilisation appeared to be so very sweeping that the Fascists monopolised him as their philosopher. But if Nietzsche was against Socialism, he was even more hostile to Nationalism.²⁹ Nietzsche’s superman was the “good European”, embodiment of all the intellectual, cultural and moral values of modern civilisation, which the Fascists proposed to destroy as decadent, foreign to the German spirit. The Nazis vulgarised the Nietzschean idea of “Beyond Good and Evil”, to justify

²⁸ The opinion expressed in a new study of Nietzsche’s life is “Nietzsche was a weak man, delicate, sensitive, and

their negation of morality. But Nietzsche distinguished bad from evil. The idea was a declaration of revolt, against the conventional meaning of the terms, and the “slave morality” which it sanctioned. While ridiculing, the idea of evil, he evidently had Schopenhauer’s philosophy in mind. Moreover, it would also be a plausible interpretation of the famous Nietzschean doctrine that good and evil stood for God and the Devil, between which two equally powerful imaginary rulers of his destiny, man was reduced to a position of utter helplessness. The archetype of Nietzsche’s superman was presumably Goethe’s Mephistopheles, the cynical philosopher laughing at the hypocrisy of the man who has neither the courage to be bad nor the strength to be good. The doctrine of the eternity of the dual principles of good and evil must have attracted Nietzsche to the religion of the Magis. Since God was the embodiment of both the principles, it logically follows that spiritual freedom lay beyond good and evil.

Nietzsche’s philosophy was first formulated, still under Wagner’s influence, in *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*. The old theme of the conflict between the Dionysian and the Apollonian tendency in Greek culture is developed with great artistic skill and a wealth of poetic imagery often reaching wanton extravagance. The Dionysian tendency is older; it represents “primal strength, unending turbulent lust and longing, which drive man to conquest, mystic ecstasy and love-death.” Shorn of the extravagance of poetic phrases, it is man’s urge for freedom, capacity to be conscious of that basic impulse of life, faith in his power to conquer nature, the emotional predisposition to revel in the realisation of his creative power and to enjoy the beauties of life even if that meant

ted by the philosophers and artists from Democritos to Epicuros, and that it was overwhelmed when leadership passed on to Socrates, Euripides and Plato, who represented the Apollonian tendency. Nietzsche described the latter as peace-loving, harmonious, wanting to restrain the elemental impulses of life. By drawing the contrast in high colours and sharp relief, Nietzsche only means to suggest that he prefers naturalism to mystic-metaphysical preoccupations, which led to the spiritual slavery of man and "slave-mentality". The Dyonisian culture gives full rein to man's urge for freedom and creative power; it is humanist in the truest sense of the term. The Apollonian, on the other hand, sets a limit to man's potentialities, subordinates him to mystic-metaphysical restrictions, which eventually incarnate as Gods to rule over man.

The implication of Nietzsche's poetic philosophy, therefore, was that the nineteenth century expressed the conflict between the two old tendencies, and he was all in favour of the Dyonisian, destructive as well as creative humanist—destructive of the obstacles to the unfoldment of man's capacity to be free, to create and enjoy. Logically, he was a rebel against the philosophical reaction which doubted, then denied, man's ability to stand on his own legs, without spiritual, mystic or godly crutches.

Confronted with the fact of the breakdown of the nineteenth century culture, Nietzsche felt that his personal life symbolised a world full of pains. The purpose of his whole philosophy, therefore, was to solve the problem of pain. He found the solution in the famous dictum "Wille zur Macht". Kant's moral order was deduced from the metaphysical concept of Good Will, arbitrarily super-

if it did not depend on us alone how everything is to be. To demand that anything should be different from what it is, is to demand that everything should be different from what it is; such a desire expresses a hostile criticism of the whole.”³⁰

On the whole, Nietzsche's life was a Dionysian dance, mitigated by pardonable slips, and it concluded the tragedy of the nineteenth century, denouncing rationalism and ridiculing irrationalism, criticising classicism and castigating romanticism, offering an ethics and cynically rejecting all moral values, condemning Nationalism and mock-ing at Socialism—all at once.

Nietzsche closed an epoch, and stood at the gates of a new one, which was destined to be dominated by two apparently antagonistic movements. Both drew inspiration from him; the Fascists hailed him as their philosopher for his glorification of irrationalism and the cult of the hero; the Communists took from him lessons in cynicism and brutality and also moral nihilism. And Nietzsche's philosophy was not economically determined.

The aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy which could serve the purpose of Fascism were given a fantastic form by Stefan George and his followers. They declared that the entire European history since the age of Socrates was “the tragedy of the triumph of the intellect”. The Apollonian era must now be followed by a new Dionysian, which will dream of a cosmic cataclysm. In human relations, complete subordination and passionate devotion to . the superman should replace the farce of democracy and corrupting and devitalising intellectual pretensions. Stefan George sang the ode to the coming leader: “Plough over our bodies, and

outcome of the philosophical reaction which, reinforced by the “crisis of the physical theories”, led to the orgy of irrationalism in the beginning of the twentieth century. With their faith in the Marxian determinist view of nature and history, Communists might appear to be rationalists. But the dogmatic assertion of determinism itself was a negation of reason. It amounted to a blind faith. Moreover, irrespective of the nature of that theory, in practice their appeal was exclusively emotional, the object being to promote a blind faith in the mystic power of the masses, and in the infallibility of the revolutionary vanguard of the working class, that is, themselves and their party. The Communists were no less contemptuous of the liberal tradition and democratic practice of the nineteenth century than the Fascists. Both stood for collectivism, totalitarian regimentation and dictatorship. Both were equally cynical about morality; and both preached the cult of leadership. The ideological difference was superficial. The struggle between the two which all but destroyed the civilised world, was exclusively for power to dominate the world.

Nationalism and Socialism, both being collectivist and totalitarian doctrines, were bound to combine in a mortal struggle against the ideals of modern culture and civilisation, namely, philosophical individualism and cosmopolitan Humanism. The fact that Fichte preached both Nationalism and Socialism anticipated their future alliance. Not only did German Nationalism talk Socialism; subsequently, Communism also allied itself with, and actually degenerated into, Nationalism. National-Socialism and Communist Nationalism are the two sides of the same medal.

CHAPTER XI

THE CRISIS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

THE CONDITIONS of the contemporary world present at dismal picture of decay, degradation and demoralisation. The threatening perspective appears to be either of a ruinous war or a slow breakdown of modern civilisation. While peace is obviously the crying need of a distracted, and tormented world, on all sides, there is talk of war and frantic preparation for it. No sensible person wants, another war; yet, it seems to be inevitable, like fate. Man seems to have lost all faith in himself; consequently, the hopelessness about the future of the race has reached the limit. It is indeed a paradoxical situation. Man's creative faculties have unfolded themselves in our time to a higher degree than ever before; he knows much more; his ability to do things is, therefore, correspondingly greater.. Nevertheless, something seems to be lacking. Human creativeness is inhibited; the eternal urge to go forward, to break down intellectual and spiritual barriers, seems to have lost its force.

Plausible political theories and doctrines of social justice are still preached. They all talk of democracy, freedom and equality. But the realities of the contemporary world contradict the promising theoretical pictures presented in the nineteenth century. It is not because the theories were false or deliberately deceptive, but because man has failed to take the fullest advantage of the knowledge acquired in modern times, so as to apply it to the solution of the problems of actual life. During the last half a century, the failure became more and more remarkable, until the world reached its present state of helplessness and despair.

Marxist—have all been practised, and all equally found wanting. If they were capable of solving the problems of modern life, the world should not be plunged in the present impasse. Nor is it true that they were not practised honestly by their respective protagonists. To hold on to discredited faiths by doubting the sincerity of the profession of others is woeful self-deception.

The experience of contemporary history has exposed the fallacies of the cherished social, political and economic ideas and ideals, classical as well as revolutionary. The world is full of possibilities, material and also mental. To build a better and freer society is a practical possibility. Yet, things go from bad to worse; helplessness and hopelessness grow to corrode the springs of human action and corrupt the ideals of civilised life. Failure and disappointment are bound to follow from attempts to solve the problems of our time with the ideas of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The mental make-up and moral tone of the civilised man have not been brought up to the level of material progress. That is the root cause of the crisis of our time.

The civilised world has been confronted with new problems for a whole period of history, during which time they seem to have baffled human intelligence; they have defied solution on the basis of old ideas and theories. History reached one of the recurring periods when man is compelled to take stock of things, look back on his past in the light of experience, and examine traditional ideas and time-honoured ideals critically, in order to find out what is lacking in them so as to have brought him to a state of helplessness, frustration and despair. Appreciation of the

The decay and possible breakdown of old social institutions and political systems, and the consequent pragmatic discredit of their theoretical sanctions have precipitated a crisis. The errors, inadequacies and outright failure (in the case of some) of ideologies, either of reform or of revolution, have created the atmosphere of frustration, despair, disgust and disillusionment. Civilised, mankind is confronted with the choice between a modern barbarism promising material well-being and security in a socially regimented and spiritually enslaved life, or a relapse into mediaeval obscurantism in search of an illusory safety in the backwaters of faith. This conflict of ideologies underlies the process of political polarisation which may any day plunge the world headlong into a titanic clash of arms. A growing number of tormented souls throughout the civilised world are eagerly looking out for a possible escape from the dreadful dilemma. Never in history has man's ingenuity been put to a greater test. He will have the courage to decline the security of slavery, in one form or another, only by regaining faith in himself.

A searching analysis of the problems confronting the modern world leads to the conclusion that the crisis of our time calls for a complete reorientation of social philosophy and political theories, so as to recognise the supreme importance of moral values in public life. Therefore, one hears appeals to morality even from the most unexpected quarters. Politicians engaged in the unscrupulous scramble for power sanctimoniously talk of moral obligations. Yet, the situation deteriorates. The law of the jungle, scramble for political power, lust for economic loot, reign supreme. Any country which

may plead not guilty to the charge only lays itself open to the graver charge of telling the untruth.

Nevertheless, the mere fact that the absence of moral scruples in public life is generally deplored, that lip loyalty is pledged to moral values, is significant. If in practice politicians cannot be true to their profession, that is not necessarily a proof of dishonesty. They are caught in a vicious circle. Engaged in a game, one must play it according to the rules. The fault of moralising politicians is the failure to realise that, so long as power remains the object of political practice, it cannot be handicapped by irrelevant scruples, it must be guided by the dictum that the end justifies the means. Caught in the whirl-pool, even the best of men are bound to be pulled down to the lowest depth, which may appear as the pinnacle of power.

The disconcerting experience of the contemporary world compels thoughtful people to re-examine the fundamental principles of social philosophies from which different political theories of the Right and of the Left, conservative and liberal, reactionary and revolutionary— are alike deduced. The experience is that in practice there is little difference, because capture of power, irrespective of the diversity of means advocated for the purpose, is the common postulate of all political theories. Morality in public life, therefore, presupposes a political theory which does not make capture of power the precondition for any necessary social change; and a new political theory must be deduced from a social philosophy which restores man in the place of primacy and sovereignty.

Morality being the dictate of conscience, it can be practised only by individuals. Without moral men there can be no

by good laws. As against their “reformism”, Socialists and later on Communists maintained that economic reconstruction on the basis of common ownership was the condition for human development. The result has been eclipse of the individual by collectivities; totalitarianism and dictatorship in political practice have been the corollary to collectivist social philosophies.

It is easy enough to place the individual in the centre of a social philosophy. As a matter of fact, individualism was the cardinal principle of the liberal social philosophy and political theory; and Liberalism was the source of inspiration for the magnificent achievements of modern civilisation. But in practice, the principle of individualism was reduced to an abstract doctrine, the sovereign individual to a legal fiction. The decay of Liberalism encouraged the rise of various collectivist doctrines which denied the possibility of individual freedom, ridiculed the idea as an empty abstraction, and proclaimed that, in order to be free, the individual must merge himself in the mass; in other words, find freedom in self-annihilation. If Liberalism had made a legal fiction of the sovereign individual, the Socialist as well as the Communist conception of freedom is a fraud.

The cause of the decline of the liberal social philosophy was the ambiguity about the sanction of morality. It started with the excellent principle that the individual was a moral entity and as such sovereign. That is an ancient belief; in Europe, Christianity popularised it: Man is a moral entity because he possesses the soul which is a spark of the divine light of the universal moral order. In the beginning, that was an elevating idea; inspired by it, European humanity

a super-human power. With this paralysing sense of spiritual subservience, man can never be really free. Man's struggle against the doctrine of the necessity of his eternal spiritual subordination was the outstanding feature of the earlier stages of modern civilisation. Liberalism was born out of that struggle, which reached the high-water mark in the eighteenth century. The Enlightenment was its afflorescence.

The shock of the French Revolution, however, frightened Liberalism out of its wits. Natural religion was opposed to naturalism, and the sanction for social and individual morality was traced in a transcendental moral order.² As against the transcendentalism of the early nineteenth century moral philosophy, liberal social reformers and political theorists advanced the utility principle of morality. If in the former, moral values were metaphysical concepts beyond the test of human experience, the latter deprived them of any objective standard, and that amounted to a negation of morality. Between the two, the civilised world was thrown in a moral confusion.

At the same time, the practice of parliamentary democracy and *laissez faire* economics reduced the individual to a helpless position. The cumulative effect of moral confusion and social atomisation destroyed man's faith in himself. The collectivist ridicule of the idea of individual freedom corresponded with the experience of the bulk of the community. Having lost faith in himself, the individual welcomed the hope offered by collectivist social philosophy, of finding security in the imagi-

nary power of the masses. The reality of the human factor disappeared from politics. To sway the masses by appealing to base instincts and evil passions, came to-be the essence of political practice.

It is clear that moral philosophy itself must be placed on a sound basis before it can have a wholesome influence on social doctrines and political practice. The crucial question, therefore, is: What is the foundation of ethics? Can man be moral by himself? Until now, the prevailing opinion has been that man can behave morally only under compulsion, either super-natural or social. This view about the source of morality nullified the time-honoured belief that man is a moral entity. That belief must be resurrected, and freed from its original limitation, if a really revolutionary social philosophy is-to prescribe a rational political theory and a moral political practice.

A great advance in this direction was made during the earlier centuries of the history of modern civilisation, when its pioneers made certain secular postulates about the nature of man and his place in nature. Their bold speculative thought, progressively reinforced by the expanding knowledge of nature, culminated in the scientific naturalism of the eighteenth century. The approach was-humanist, which discarded the dogma of special creation and traced the origin of man in physical nature. Growing out of the background of a law-governed Universe, man must be a rational being; as such he established the original society to serve the purpose of his continued struggle for existence. The revolutionary discoveries of biology in the nineteenth century bore out the speculative postulates and rational hypotheses of the

of substance and causality, which were the corner-stones of scientific naturalism. A neo-mysticism, claiming the authority of science, challenged the pretentious philosophy of humanist naturalism. Not only the objective validity, but even the reality of human knowledge, was disputed. An exaggerated emphasis on epistemology confused cosmological and ontological thought. An intellectual crisis aggravated the moral crisis.

Before long, psychology preached irrationalism on the authority of the natural sciences; in the garb of the vague concept of intuition, mysticism and transcendentalism returned to ethics. Man is irrational; he is instinctively moved by the blind urge of dark forces; therefore, the sanction of morality, either in private or public life, is the penal code and the police, or the priest. Except under the surveillance of these temporal and spiritual custodians of law and order, the law of the jungle would reign. The irony of our time is that the dreaded law of the jungle came to reign supreme, nonetheless.

The only way out of this vicious circle is indicated by a moral philosophy which finds the sanction of its values in the rationality of the human being. But what is the sanction of the rationality of man? What is Reason? Is it again a metaphysical category or a biological property? In the former case, the problem of the sanction of morality is not solved by tracing it to rationality. That is only referring one problem to another. As an expression of the reason in nature, rationality can be regarded as a biological function, and physical determinism is reason in nature. Otherwise, the classical concepts of natural law and moral order are Reason? Is it again a metaphysical category or a biological,

It has been a time-honoured belief which could not be sustained in practice; now the belief must be replaced by the knowledge of the fact that man is moral because he is rational. The Universe is a moral order governed by laws inherent in itself. Man grows out of that background.

A secular rationalist system of ethics can be logically deduced from the mechanistic cosmology of the materialist philosophy, and a moral philosophy which can do without a metaphysical and super-sensual sanction is the crying need of our time. If the materialist philosophy is expected to yield an ethics such as will restore man's confidence in himself, it must be able to meet the challenge to its cosmology. It cannot stand if its very foundation is blasted. And mechanistic cosmology is the foundation of Materialism.

The challenge to Materialism as a cosmology is half a century old. It was delivered by the physicists who, at the turn of the century, discovered that the atom was not the ultimate unit of matter, and on that evidence hastily proclaimed the "dematerialisation" of matter. People began to doubt the relevancy or correctness of the nineteenth century natural philosophy. Physics having revealed that the sub-stratum of the world was not composed of the "hard lumps of reality", philosophers imagined that the imposing structure of scientific naturalism was crumbling. That was the beginning of the crisis of our time. It was a new flare-up in the age-long struggle between religion and science, between the religious mode of thought and the scientific mode of thought, between faith and reason, between mystic agnosticism and the empirically established belief in man's capacity to know. Being most probably the

the sophisticated philosophies waging war against Materialism with "scientific" weapons are all in the last analysis rationalised religion. Denying the possibility of man ever knowing anything, they preach a neo-mysticism and revive the ideological view of life, which is the expression of man's loss of faith in himself. That is the central feature of the crisis of our time. To come out of it, mankind must have a philosophy which places man in the centre of the Universe, as the maker of his destiny, and celebrate the final triumph of science over religion. They speak of a cultural crisis; if there is such a crisis, it is experienced only by sophisticated intellectuals. In reality, it is an intellectual crisis,—a crisis of their intelligence. Otherwise, how can we explain the strange phenomenon of modern man, possessed of an ever-growing scientific knowledge, godless men in search of soul, eager to enthrone a mathematical god in the place vacated by the old-fashioned deity? The scholastics of our time may succeed in promoting a religious revival under the banner of the pseudo-scientific cults of empiricism, positivism, realism, so on and so forth. A self-contained philosophy, beginning with a mechanistic cosmology and ending with a secular evolutionary ethics, is the only guarantee against the danger:—a philosophy which will give an integrated picture of human existence and explain human existence, including desire, emotion, instincts, intuition, will, reason, without going outside the physical world, which is at least theoretically accessible to human comprehension.

In order to avoid the quicksand of transcendentalism, and the pitfalls of relativity, ethics must be integrated in a general philosophy. No useful purpose will be served by building yet another castle in the air, which will not stand

living nature. In the light of the discovery that life originates in course of the mechanistic process of nature, human rationality can be deduced from the background of the law-governed Universe. The imaginary gulf between physics and psychology is thus bridged and the most baffling problem of philosophy, the epistemological problem, is solved. Truth ceases to be a metaphysical concept; it stands out as the content of positive knowledge. In the light of the basic nature of truth, the nature of other values is more clearly visible, and they can be rationally arranged in a proper hierarchy. Having thus obtained moral values in the world in which man has his being and becoming, we shall be able to harmonise them with a social philosophy which indicates the humanist approach to the economic and political problems confronting the contemporary world.

Everything new grows out of the old. We must take advantage of the entire store of human knowledge and draw upon the entire history of thought. The new philosophy, the need for which we are feeling, can be deduced from the entire current of human thought, which has flown ever since the dawn of civilisation. The crisis of our time is the result of an inability to appreciate that great human heritage. There are abiding as well as temporary values. We have to find out the permanent values created in the course of human evolution. The elements of stability, of unity, of uniformity-ideas pursued ever since the appearance of *homo sapiens*, should be the foundation of a new social philosophy. A philosophy thus founded will have no difficulty in solving the complicated problems which have been baffling conventional philosophers. The solution, however, will not be theoretical: it will come from

rationalist rebels against theology—Descartes, Leibniz, Kant—also could not get out of the vicious circle of dualism. In the context of a dualist philosophy, the only logically consistent ideology, which can offer security to man, is religion, and the religious man must always bow before the will of God or the “Moral Law” of the Ideological order. Morality is equated with absence of freedom.

The ultra-empiricists of our time also are essentially religious men. They declare that everything beyond the reach of direct experience is metaphysical. From that apparently scientific premises, they deduce a neo-mysticism which goes to the extent of denying man's capacity to know anything outside his own body. The world is veiled in an impenetrable mystery, and in every dark corner a god can be easily imagined. The neo-mysticism of the ultra-modern empiricists installs God on the throne of man's ignorance.

That is how the crisis affects the life of civilised man-kind as a whole. Intellectual and institutional equipment cannot cope with the requirements of the time. It is not a choice between two authoritarianisms. There must be a third alternative. The prophets of a revival of the ideological view of life as the only way to bring man back to his moral moorings, preach spiritual-authoritarianism as against the temporal brand. The remedy may be more dangerous than the disease.

Sorokin, Maritain and Berdyaev are the most outstanding advocates of this doubtful “cure. All of them claim to

tion of the contemporary world is described and explained.

Sorokin's theory of culture-cycles is dogmatic. Why should human history be cast in an *a priori* conceived pattern? Is there any reason to assume predetermined culture-cycles? The belief in a First Cause or Prime Mover obviously lurks behind Sorokin's "rationalist and scientific" theory. The religious essence of the theory is also evident in its very structure. Idealist culture is the highest culture, and there is no ambiguity in Sorokin's conception of idealist and ideational cultures. Both are spiritualist, while sensate culture is materialist. Materialism may be held up as the devil of the drama; but determinism cannot be easily disposed of, because, the Ideological view is also deterministic. The movement of human history in the vicious circle of recurring culture-cycles is a determined process. Indeed, it is predetermined. Because, the determining factor is not inherent in the process; it is a *deus ex machina*. Sorokin is frankly an advocate of religious revivalism; he pleads, for the restoration of faith.

Maritain and Berdyaev do not say anything essentially different. The substance of their doctrine also is that man wanders away from the moorings of faith, experiences fear and insecurity, and comes back to the safety of the harbour of faith. The common cry of all is: Back to the religious mode of thought. The modern religious philosophy is differentiated from orthodox revivalism by a discriminating association with rationalism and scientific knowledge. But yet another attempt to reconcile faith with reason, mysticism with Humanism, mediaevalism with modernism, is bound to be futile.

A cry for a return to rationality and some sort of moral

the reliability of scientific knowledge, makes of it a cry in the wilderness. The result is an all-round despair and spiritual destitution. If one starts from doubt about the objective validity of scientific knowledge, about the possibility of a non-transcendental metaphysics, there is no escape from the moral crisis which has overtaken the civilised world. The only alternative is-to search for the criterion of truth and sanction for morality in the super-sensual world of delusions or in the dreamland of the religious experience of godless men.

Sensitive minds are tormented by the imaginary uncertainties of value judgment; the pathological, these unbalanced souls, who are overwhelmed by the crisis,, talk of anguish as the leitmotif of a whole philosophy of life. The bewildered bulk of modern mankind perceive only two ways out of the moral chaos and intellectual confusion: the lure of protection offered by a totalitarian State and the certainty of a regimented economic, social and cultural existence; the other way is the stampede of modern men in search of God.

In neither way will civilised mankind overcome the crisis. Both mean defeat. One means relapse into barbarism, civilised indeed, but barbarism nonetheless—a, social order and cultural atmosphere which is' bound to breed Koestler's "twentieth century Neanderthalers." The other implies lowering of the standard of the revolt of man raised four-hundred years ago, a standard under which during a relatively short period of time mankind achieved the greatest advance in the age-long quest for freedom and search for truth. It means return to spiritual slavery, surrendering the right of freedom; a shameful admission

of evolution. In short, the second way out of the wilderness of the crisis of our time is return to mediaevalism in search, of certainty and security in faith.

Is there no other way? Is modern civilisation then doomed? Has the human species exhausted all its potentialities, human creativeness reached its limit? Is freedom an empty concept? Has the age-long quest for freedom been a wild-goose chase? Must we come to the conclusion that knowledge is impossible, to seek solace in the bliss of ignorance?

The choice for civilised mankind is not limited to the two alternatives indicated above. There is, a way out of the crisis—a way which opens up a new perspective, a new horizon. The cry for a return to rationality and moral behaviour in public life can be satisfied only with a reinforcement of the conviction that, growing out of the background of a law-governed Universe, man is essentially rational; that the concept of a law-governed Universe is not a mere projection of the metaphysical Pure Reason; that instincts and intuition are not elementary indefinables, categories not to be further analysed, but are rational behaviour of organisms.

The corollary to the conviction is that a secular morality is possible, and that the sanction for moral behaviour, the criterion for value judgment, is furnished by the innate rationality of the human being. But the human being does not appear as a finished product. Human existence consists in an endless process of unfoldment of the potentialities which are of biological heritage.

It may sound like dogmatism to those who want to shirk the responsibility of human civilisation. But, if

ellectual pursuit is not a mere pastime of the solipsist elite, all difficulties disappear, the robust spirit of enquiry broadens our intellectual horizon, and widens the scope of human knowledge.

Clear ideas and firm convictions are necessary for fruitful action; conversely, experience gained in action contributes to the clarification of ideas and reinforcement of conviction. Purely intellectual preoccupation, whether of the philosopher in his study, or of the scientist in his laboratory, or of the academician in the classroom, without any reference to the various coordinates and correlates of life as a whole, tend rather to magnify difficulties and mystify issues than contribute to the solution even of the theoretical problems. Abstract thought and logical thinking are indispensable for keeping life on an even keel. But purposiveness is of the decisive importance. Without it, abstract thought and logical thinking may degenerate into intellectual irresponsibility. Professorial scepticism of the ultra-modern intellectual is not to be equated with the scientific spirit of enquiry. In order to avoid dogmatism, one need not fight shy of any conviction. Human knowledge will be always defective, because always there will be more to know. But that does not necessarily lead to epistemological nihilism, which, subconsciously perhaps, represents an atavistic cultural tendency; it implies neo-mysticism or transcendental metaphysics, if not a religious revivalism, of course with the sanction of science.

The critics of the physical-realist (if the old term “materialist” is really objectionable) approach to the problems of rationality and moral behaviour maintain that Materialism, as a cosmology or as a metaphysics, or again

basis of rationalism is a negation of the possibility of a non-transcendental philosophy. The ultra-modern academic intellectuals scornfully reject Materialism as old-fashioned. They vehemently protest if their critical and sceptic attitude is described as idealistic. They benevolently smile at the simple proposition that one must either be a Materialist (Physical-Realist) or an Idealist. They refuse to face the fact that, as a negation of Materialism, idealist philosophy is logically associated with a mystic metaphysics of super-naturalism. They prefer to take up an intermediate position, and offer the bewildered world a variety of sophisticated systems of newfangled philosophies, such as Critical Realism, New Realism, Logical Positivism, so on and so forth. The essence of all these systems is a mystic notion of reality: Neither ideas nor matter are real. Nor again is reality a synthesis or combination of the two fundamental categories. What is it, then? Instead of a straightforward answer to a simple commonsense question, the ultramodern scientific scholasticism takes shelter in sophistry. The ultimate reality of life must be either man or a non-ego, something other than man himself and beyond his comprehension. The mystic incomprehensible something may be placed outside, to be worshipped as God or contemplated as the Cosmic Principle or Universal Harmony or Moral Order or Metaphysical Unity. In that case, we have an essentially ideological view of the world, which cannot admit of freedom, either as choice or as man's creativeness. Alternatively, the mystic incomprehensible something, which belongs to the world neither of matter nor of ideas, is placed inside man, conceived as intuition. In that case, we have an out-and-out mysticism. This philosophy of ultra-

he forfeits his humanness. The robot is not a creator; he is an instrument of creation, by some other agency. Intuitionism, that is to say, scientific irrationalism of Bergson, for example, laid the philosophical foundation of Fascism. The Fascists also appeal to biology and anthropology for a scientific sanction of their contempt for human personality and individual freedom, of their glorification of war, of their cult of racial jingoism.

The latest scientific knowledge undoubtedly calls for the rejection of certain hypotheses and postulates of the eighteenth and nineteenth century science. The materialist philosophy also must be accordingly revised and elaborated as Physical Realism. Its fundamental principles, however, have not been invalidated by the present greater and more accurate knowledge of science. It is not a closed system of thought. It is a logical coordination and integration of empirical knowledge into an all-embracing explanation of existence. Therefore, it requires continuous readjustment, amplification, enrichment and precision.

The greatest defect of classical Materialism was that its cosmology did not seem to have any connection with ethics. It further appeared that a materialist historiography could do without a moral philosophy. Now that defect can be removed by building a bridge over the imaginary gulf between physics and psychology. The Cartesian psychophysical parallelism is no longer valid. By tracing the roots of rationality through the entire process of biological evolution to reason in nature, human rationalism can be regarded as an expression of physical determinism, of the harmony of the Universe. A mechanistic cosmology and a rationalist ethics can thus be integrated in a general

lity of a non-transcendental moral philosophy. If reason is conceived as a metaphysical category, rationalism can hardly be distinguished from mysticism; the distinction between rationalism and irrationalism loses all meaning. Associated with metaphysical rationalism, which is only another name for intuitionism, ethics must rely on transcendental sanctions: Only godliness can be goodness, and truth is only revealed to the seer. The world of reason and morality being the world of gods and saints, the mortal man who believes in himself and wants to be the architect of his own destiny cannot have any place there. Only as a Materialist, man as man can believe in himself, and have the conviction and confidence to act as the architect of human destiny, including his own.

Modern political theories, originally formulated in the seventeenth century, all started from the individual. The problem was regarding the origin of society: How was civil society founded? The creation of modern political institutions was to be guided by the knowledge of the origin of civil society. In the last analysis, the problem was about the nature of man. The origin of society was explained variously by the different thinkers who applied themselves to the problem. They all assumed implicitly that man was a rational animal. The doctrine of original contract, expounded ever since the sixteenth century, ultimately became the Bible of Democracy. But philosophically, it was interpreted differently. Rousseau's interpretation differed from that of Locke. Liberalism based on Locke's doctrine retained the humanist principle of the sovereignty of the individual. Rousseau was the prophet of totalitarianism, which was heralded by the doctrine of the General Will. A metaphysical concept of

completely forgotten that, from the time primitive society was formed, all institutions had been created by man as so many instruments to serve the purpose of his being and becoming. Ultimately, it came to be believed that the creation was of greater importance than the creator, to the extent that it was entitled to claim the creator for its first victim. That has been the curse of modern political philosophy, and the breeding ground of the present social crisis.

Modern democracy was, indeed, an improvement on mediaevalism. But its individual units eventually became constitutional fictions; it eclipsed the man of flesh and blood, endowed with intelligence, will and emotion. In modern Liberalism, the individual became the economic man. That degeneration of the humanist tradition of modern democracy culminated in the philosophical Radicalism of the nineteenth century, which still held individual freedom as an article of faith. But in the context of the capitalist society, the economic man could exist either as a slave or as a slave-holder. That debasement of the individual discredited the liberal democratic doctrine of individual freedom and gave rise to Marxist collectivism, which simply recognised the fact of the total eclipse of man by institutions and argued with a measure of plausibility that reconstruction of society frankly as a totalitarian institution would restore human freedom. Ultimately, democracy was destroyed in a fierce clash of totalitarian dictatorships, and civilised mankind was overtaken by the crisis of our time, perhaps the greatest of all in history, being not only political or economic, but moral and spiritual—a total crisis affecting the whole of human existence.

at the head of the declining plane of decay, the moment it broke away from the tradition of Humanism; subordinated man to institutions; set up the cult of worshipping imaginary collective egos with the offering of the reality of human intelligence and human reason; celebrated the nation as something bigger than the sum total of the human beings composing it; when an abstract conception of society was considered to be something greater than the concrete correlation of individuals. As a result of these wrong notions, there developed various kinds of political doctrines, which not only went against the tradition of Humanism, but actually set up collectivist philosophies denying any value to the individual. Modern civilisation is threatened with destruction because of the betrayal of its source of inspiration.

Ever since the original ancestors of man came down from their arboreal abode, and, instead of growing longer and longer limbs in the struggle for existence, learned to break branches to pluck fruits from the trees for nourishment, man has been creating his world. Yet, with the experience of this age-long creative effort, man has lost faith in himself. A greater tragedy has not been written in any language. The solution of the crisis of our time, therefore, lies in the revival of man's faith in himself, in a humanist revival.

The crisis of our time is all-pervading, though it is not felt by the people at large as acutely as by the more sensitive and more alert few. Indeed, the victims of the crisis are not at all conscious of it. That makes it all the more difficult of solution. Therefore, to create a widespread consciousness of the crisis is the first thing to do. Whatever may be the

natural or social. Previously, in quest of freedom men ran away from life. Why fight an incomparably stronger adversary? It was wiser to withdraw from the losing battle and be in peace outside society, with the illusion of being beyond the reach of the forces of nature. Once upon a time, that might have been a possible escape. But today, none can really run away from the world. Human realities hunt the inhabitants even of the monasteries, *Maths* and Ashrams, if they are not callous hypocrits or mountebanks. The vicissitudes of human life cannot be ignored as illusion.

Man must fight for freedom. Spiritual liberation must be attained in this material world, unless it is to be a vain dream, a time-honoured deception. In proportion as man feels that he has the power to resist the various temptations of life, to that extent he is spiritually free. Man can not only want to be free, but is capable of attaining freedom, not only in imagination, but in actual life. That is the essence of humanist philosophy, which contributed more to the development of modern thought and culture than any other system of thought. But having provided the initial impetus for the tremendous development of modern times, why did Humanism cease to influence human affairs? The cause was that man's knowledge of himself lagged far behind his knowledge of the physical world. Man was given the place of primacy, yet man remained unexplained, to become in course of time a mystery to himself.

Such an idea of man was not consistent with the scientific spirit of the age, and Humanism came to be regarded as a romantic notion, which could be the subject matter only of art and literature. But since then, man's knowledge of

inherent in the process. Since so much more is known, than fifty years ago, nobody could reasonably maintain that man's knowledge about himself has reached the limit. We may not know everything about life as yet. But there is nothing unknowable. Whatever exists is accessible to human understanding.

Rising out of the background of the physical Universe, man incorporates the best of creation. If there is any creative power, that is in him; it can operate only through him. It is held by many that man is bad, immoral, unthinking, and therefore there is no hope for the world. But the present knowledge about man allows the proposition that man is essentially rational. Every human behaviour, in the last analysis, is rational, however irrational it may appear. Morality results from man's intelligent response to his surroundings. Therefore, it can be deduced from his innate rationality. Since rationality is inherent in human nature, it is only necessary to remind him of his biological heritage, and he will regain faith in himself and undo the harm done to him. Having realised the mistakes of the past, and trying to rectify them,, modern mankind will find a way out of the crisis of our time, and begin marching forwards to much greater achievements than those of the past.

The burning problem of our time is the problem of morality, particularly, of social morality, of finding a common norm for moral behaviour. If moral sense is referred to intuition, one can never tell how two men will act in a similar situation; because, it is not known how intuition or instinct operates. So, there can not be a common norm for human behaviour. Intuitional morality, therefore, cannot be normative. In the absence of objective

from facts. In this manner, we can have objective standards of morality. Only when goodness can be rationally conceived, then there can be a common norm of goodness. The understanding of the essence of man, the discovery of the fact that man is essentially rational, solves the problem. As biological beings, all men are similarly constructed, and therefore are likely to react more or less in a similar manner under similar circumstances, provided that a minimum background of knowledge is given. With the ability of discrimination and judgment, all men, being similarly constructed, can be expected to react similarly in a similar situation, and the ability can be cultivated. That is the hope for the much desired introduction of morality in politics and generally in public behaviour. The realisation of the possibility of a secular rational morality opens up a new perspective before the modern world. The time-honoured concepts of man's dignity, personality, sovereignty, creativeness, become full of meaning. The feeling that by himself man can never be good fills him with a sense of helplessness, and hopelessness follows. Spiritual liberation is the condition for social and political liberation. It must be realised that human existence is self-contained and self-sufficient; and that therefore man can find in himself the power to work out his destiny, to make a better world to live in. This self-realisation in the revealing light of the knowledge about himself will restore man's confidence in himself and create the condition for the resolution of the moral crisis of our time.

These ideas will certainly appeal to all sensitive human beings. But most of them will still be doubtful about the possibility of practising them. And that is the core of the crisis of our time: it shows how man has lost faith in

There have been innumerable moralists, from time immemorial. They have preached high ideals, which were never practised. In order to introduce morality in public life, some people must begin with practising the ideas they will preach. The modern world does look like a madhouse. Appeal to reason gets lost in the storm of emotions running wild. Preaching, therefore, is futile. But a group of men who will live rationally and morally will make miracles, and the example will become an irresistible contagion.

By merging man into the masses, politicians and social engineers have created a monster which responds riotously only to appeals to passion—hatred, greed, lust for power. Man has been debased to the level of unthinking beasts, to serve the purposes of power politics. Political parties need votes to come to power. It is easier to sway the people by appeals to their emotions and prejudices than to their reason. The more backward a people, the more easily they are swayed by appeals to emotions and prejudices. Therefore, to keep the people in backwardness has become the result of modern democratic politics. They -say that power corrupts. But it is believed that power corrupts only the corrupt people. The ‘incorruptible have never any chance to come to power. Therefore, democracy has everywhere degenerated into demagoguery. The other alternative of capturing power through violent revolution, and then imposing social changes from above, has also not produced any better results.

CHAPTER XII

THE WAY OUT

ALL THOUGHTFUL believers in a future of humanity must be deeply perturbed by the gloomy perspective of the contemporary world. But they must not simply stand aghast, paralysed by the feeling of helplessness amounting to fatalism. They must think furiously so as to lay bare the cause of the malady threatening the very existence of the civilised world, and act boldly to exterminate it.

To begin with, the voice of reason must be raised to warn the progressive world against the different varieties of orthodoxy and blind passion which are creating an atmosphere of stark madness. It is singularly thoughtless and almost criminally irresponsible to take the fatalistic view that yet another war is inevitable and to hold that it will finally dissolve the old world and clear the ground for a new. This view may be in consonance with the Marxist doctrine of economic determinism; in reality, it betrays a woeful ignorance of the dynamics of human culture and represents the cynicism of the unfounded conviction that the so-called “pre-history”¹ is bound to be ruled by the law of the jungle.

One does not require a very high degree of imaginativeness to realise that another world war will have the most disastrous consequences, most probably amounting to a complete breakdown of modern civilisation. The greatest possible efforts must be made to head off that threatening catastrophe. That object can be attained only by replacing antiquated political doctrines and theoretical postulates about a Utopia which history has mercilessly exploded.

which the world is drifting as it were by fate. Neither of the rivals provides a sufficiently inspiring leadership capable of taking the contemporary world out of the crisis. One has only a threadbare institutionalism to offer as the panacea for all evils; the other, on the contrary, still holds out an ideal which, in the process of realisation, has lost all the fascination of a Utopia, and appears to be repelling for all who fought to free the world from totalitarian domination and spiritual regimentation.

The progressive world, which still pursues the ideals of democratic freedom and economic equality, and cherishes the human heritage of cultural values, is torn between the two rivals for the leadership of the post-war world. In the absence of a common code of behaviour and standard of values, there can be no unity of purpose, and therefore no cooperation. The result is the present atmosphere of tormenting doubts, corroding suspicions, cynical efforts to stab each other in the back, and the general instability and fear of an impending catastrophe. In this gravest crisis of its entire history, the civilised world needs a new hope, a new faith, a new ideal—a new philosophy of truly revolutionary theory and practice suitable for the conditions of our time.

The philosophy which will give modern mankind a new hope and a new faith must put a concrete content into the concept of freedom. If the liberating possibility of social organisation and political institutions is still to be judged by divergent ideological prejudices, discordant doctrines and conflicting dogmas, common efforts for overcoming the present crisis and for promoting human progress will remain a matter of wishful thinking. A common standard of

search for knowledge, which enables him to be progressively free from the tyranny of natural phenomena and physical and social environments. The quest for freedom, therefore, is a continuation of the biological struggle for existence. In modern society, an individual, to be free, must not only be able to enjoy economic sufficiency and security, but live in a psychological atmosphere free from cultural regimentation and helpful to the development of his intellectual and other human potentialities. Progressive attainment of freedom in this wide sense by the individuals composing society should provide the criterion for judging the merits of social organisation. Guided by the dictum of ancient wisdom that man is the measure of everything, the philosophy of the future should proclaim that the merit of any pattern of social organisation or political institution is to be judged by the actual measure of freedom it affords to the individual.

Whether it is the nation or a class, any collectivity is composed of individuals. Society is a creation of man in quest of freedom. Cooperative social relationships were established originally with the purpose of reinforcing the struggle for existence, which the primitive man had undertaken as individual. As such, it is the basic urge for all social advancement. The function of social relationships, therefore, should be to secure for individuals, as individuals, the maximum measure of freedom. The sum total of the quanta of freedom actually enjoyed by its members individually is the measure of the liberating or progressive significance of any social order.

No political philosophy nor any scheme of social reconstruction can have more than a very limited

rational human endeavour, collective as well as individual, should be the attainment of freedom in ever larger measure, and freedom is real only as individual freedom.

A new world of freedom will not result automatically from an economic reorganisation of society. Nor does freedom necessarily follow from the capture of political power by a party claiming to represent the oppressed and the exploited classes. The abolition of private property, State-ownership of the means of production and planned economy do not by themselves end exploitation of labour nor lead to an equal distribution of wealth. By disregarding individual freedom on the plea of taking the fullest advantage of modern technology, of efficiency and collective effort, planned economy defeats its own purpose. Instead of ushering in a higher form of democracy on the basis of economic equality and social justice, it establishes a political dictatorship. Economic democracy is no more possible in the absence of political democracy than the latter is in the absence of the former.

It is assumed that planned economy will guarantee the greatest good to the greatest number; in other words, it will mean equal distribution of wealth and establish social justice. In that case, it should be possible to reconcile planning with freedom. Dictatorship of any kind, however plausible may be the pretext for it, is inconsistent with the ideal of freedom.

The practice of western democracy is equally disappointing. Traditional democratic Socialism, therefore, also does not inspire any confidence of success. Democracy must reorientate itself. It must revert to its humanist tradition. It must not be limited to the counting of

gence. Under the formal parliamentary system, intelligence, integrity, wisdom, moral excellence, as a rule, count for nothing. Yet, unless the purifying influence of these human virtues is brought to bear upon the political organisation and administration of society, the democratic way of life can never be realised.

It is idle to condemn dictatorship on the ground that regimentation precludes the creation of human values, so long as those values are not allowed to influence public affairs even under the so-called democratic regimes. To wean the unthinking world away from the appeal of dictatorship, postulated as a short-cut, indeed as the only way, to freedom, democracy must recover the humanist tradition of modern culture. Man must again be the measure of things. Intelligence, integrity, wisdom, moral excellence, should be the test of leadership. Democracy can no longer be taken simply for granted. Today all thoughtful lovers of freedom are perturbed by the challenging question: Is democracy possible? The fundamental democratic principle—the greatest good to the greatest number—can be realised only when the conduct of public affairs will be in charge of spiritually free individuals who represent their own conscience before anybody or anything else.

Moral sanction, after all, is the highest sanction. The real guarantee of parliamentary democracy is not law, but the moral conscience of the majority in power. In the last analysis, dictatorship also rests on a moral sanction: it claims to be the means to a good end. But group morality is a doubtful guarantee against the temptation of power. Values operate through individuals. Therefore, a

The demand is not for a rule of the intellectual elite, but a social organisation which will give unlimited scope for the unfolding of the creative genius of man by placing the executive power of the State under the control of free individuals—free from the influence of vested interests and also from the vagaries of the collective ego, so very susceptible to demagogic appeals. Democratic practice should not be confined to periodical elections. Even if elections are by universal suffrage, and the executive also is elected, democracy will still remain a mere formality. The delegation of power, even for a limited period, destroys democracy for all practical purposes. An government for the people can never be a government of the people and by the people.

Democracy can be real only when the State is reared on a foundation of local republics. The primary function of the latter will be to make individual citizens fully conscious of their sovereign right and enable them to exercise it intelligently and conscientiously. The broad basis of the State, thus coinciding with the entire society, will be composed of a network of local political schools, so to say. The right of recall and referendum will enable organised local democracies to wield a direct and effective control on the entire State machinery. They alone will have the right to nominate candidates for election to various legislative bodies. Such a democracy will transcend the limits of party politics. Individual men will have the chance of being recognised on their merits. Party loyalty and party patronage will no longer eclipse intellectual independence, moral integrity and detached wisdom.

What is needed is creation of conditions under which

Renaissance, based on rationalism and cosmopolitan Humanism, is essential for democracy to be realised. Such an atmosphere will foster intellectual independence dedicated to the cause of making human values triumph. Moral excellence alone can mould a community together without sacrificing the individual on the altar of the collective ego, be it of the nation or a class. Individuals possessed of that great virtue will command the respect of an intelligent public and be recognised as the friends, philosophers and guides of society.

The inspiration for a new philosophy of revolution must be drawn from the traditions of Humanism and moral Radicalism. The nineteenth century Radicals, actuated by the humanist principle of individualism, realised the possibility of a secular rationalism and a rationalist ethics. They applied to the study of man and society the principles and methods of the physical sciences. The positive knowledge of nature—living as well as inanimate—being so much greater today than a hundred years ago, the scientific approach to the problems of man's life and inter-relations is bound to be more successful. Today we can begin with the conviction that it is long since man emerged from the jungle of pre-history, that social relations can be rationally harmonised, and that therefore appreciation of moral values can be reconciled with the efforts to replace the corrupt and disintegrating *status quo* by a new order of democratic freedom. A moral order will result from a rationally organised society because, viewed in the context of his rise out of the background of a harmonious physical Universe, man is essentially rational and therefore moral. Morality emanates from the rational desire for harmonious and mutually beneficial social relations. Any effort for a

practice of political action and economic reconstruction, therefore, can be called New Humanism—new, because H is Humanism enriched, reinforced and elaborated by scientific knowledge and social experience gained during the centuries of modern civilisation.

So many doctrines have been preached, so many theories expounded, that one more will not deserve the attention of seriously thinking people, unless it is really something new. But at the same time, there is nothing, entirely new under the sun. History is not a succession of standing miracles. Something never comes out of nothing. The new is only an emergent value. Novelties result from the unfolding of the potentialities inherent in man. The ideas here presented as the outlines of a new philosophy of revolution have been crystallising in the minds of thinking men throughout the world, who all reacted to the greatest crisis of human history in the like manner. They result from a philosophical interpretation of human history, from a revaluation of the values which, as the common heritage of mankind, transcend space and time. In the revealing light of this reorientation, the civilised mankind will be able to penetrate the gloom that hangs on the modern world, and see what the future holds in store for it.

Ever since the days of Plato, the fundamental problem of politics has been the relation between the State and the individual. All this time, the problem baffled political thinkers to such an extent that modern political philosophy poses the individual as the antithesis of society. If it is true that the individual is antithetical to society, that social progress is not possible except at the cost of individual freedom, which cannot be harmonised with social

fundamental problem of the relation between society and the individual, between the individual and the State.

Political thought has gone from one fallacious doctrine to another because of the failure to reconcile this relation. In ancient times, the failure was unavoidable. Ignorance shrouded the origin of man and also of society. Under those circumstances, it was imagined. But it is no longer necessary to grope in the dark and set up political theories on metaphysical assumptions. Biology and anthropology have acquired enough empirical knowledge to trace the descent and evolution of man and also the origin of society. There is no room for any doubt that society is a creation of man. The individual, therefore, is prior to society and the State. The latter are the means for attaining the end of freedom and progress-of man. Nevertheless, the end has been forgotten, and the means has become all in all. A false idea about the place of man in society is the cause of reversing the relation between the end and the means, and the separation of ethics from political practice and social engineering—Even sociological doctrines which reject Marxism preach that the individual is an abstract concept. It is argued that, like the atom in modern physics, the individual is an abstraction—a non-existing social atom. The corollary to this doctrine must be that society was created by some super-human agency. Nevertheless, curiously enough, the collectivists also maintain that man is the maker of the social world. So, after all, it is admitted that society is a creation of man. Why did man create society, and how? He did it in course of his struggle for existence. Coming out of the background of biological evolution, the human species starts its struggle as individuals. In course of time the isolated individuals

tened to crush them. They wanted to be free from those forces. That urge for freedom is a continuation of the biological struggle for existence. It is the basic incentive of all subsequent human progress. Thanks to that urge for freedom, mankind organised itself into society with the object of carrying on the struggle for existence on a higher level. It is not rational to hold that the instrument which man created in his struggle for freedom should ultimately deprive him of his freedom. On the other hand, it is indeed a fact that in course of time society did forge chains of slavery for man. In our time, man created the machine and has been enslaved by it. But the biological heritage of the urge for freedom could not be altogether throttled. Man struggled for freedom through the ages. He is still struggling. The record of that struggle is the history of the world.

The basic idea of a new revolutionary social philosophy, therefore, must be that the individual is prior to society, and individual freedom must have priority over social organisation. But how is it possible for an individual to be free in a highly centralised modern society? Neither capitalist free enterprise nor parliamentary democracy could solve the problem, although both professed the principle of individual liberty. Socialism or Communism frankly rejects the very notion of individual freedom. A solution of the crisis of our time, therefore, presupposes the possibility of an alternative political organisation of society, which will reconcile individual freedom with social organisation.

A revolutionary social philosophy capable of showing a way out of the crisis must be based on scientific knowledge

a mere marionette in the hand of the Providence of the forces of production, how could he ever make history and remake society to suit his purpose?

Idealism, not in the sense of denying the objective reality of the material world, but of having due regard for the fact that ideas have always played an autonomous role in history, is implied in the doctrine that man creates society; and that humanist doctrine underlies the Marxist theory of revolution. The refusal to recognise the fact that from time immemorial ideas, born in man's brain, itself an outcome of the process of biological evolution, have preceded human action and thus stimulated historical developments, logically leads to teleology, if not theology. Only sophistry can distinguish between absolute determinism of any sort and predestination. If the events of life and society were predetermined, man could never have any control on them or even conceive the idea of changing them. It makes no difference whether the absolute determining factor is believed to be a divine Providence or the mysterious economic law or the means of production. In any case, man is not a sovereign entity, and therefore incapable of making his own destiny. Marxist economic determinism is no less antithetical to the idea of social revolution than the religious teleological view of nature, life and society.

The Marxist theory of social evolution suffers from yet another fallacy, and curiously enough it is the old fallacy of *regresso ad infinitum*,—another similarity with the religious view. The doctrine that social evolution is determined by the development of the means of production begs the question: who created the first means of production, and how? The question is not analogous to that

sophical anthropology no longer worries about the problem, which can be solved by conceptual thought, imagination, if you please.

One can imagine an exceptionally clever anthropoid ape hitting upon the idea of breaking a branch and using it for beating down fruits, instead of taking the trouble of climbing to the top of the tree. The first non-bio logical, extra-organic tool was created. The ability to prolong his arms with the help of some external means freed the descendant of the ancestors of man from the biological necessity of adaptation by growing limbs. The production of the original means of production was not economically determined; nor was it to be referred to some supernatural creator. As a mutation in the process of biological evolution, it was .determined, but physically, not economically. The production of the first tool was a deed done by an animal possessed of a highly developed brain capable of rudimentary thought. An idea in the brain of the first ancestor of man—perhaps it could not as yet be distinguished from biological impulse—preceded the act of producing the original means of production. The first non-biological, extra-organic tool (limbs are also tools) was created by the ancestor of man in course of the struggle for existence, which provides the basic impulse of pre-human biological evolution.

The origin of the laws of social evolution must be traced in anthropology, in the nature of man. Man is not a living machine, but a thinking animal. An impulse felt by an anthropoid ape, approximating rudimentary thought, marks the birth of the species; the nature of man is determined by that event. In it, thought precedes action. Consequently,

chemical combination resulting from the entire process of biological evolution. The origin of idea is scientifically explained by tracing it in pre-human biological impulses. Biological evolution, in its turn, takes place in the context of physical nature, called the world of dead matter. The discovery of the physical origin of the mental phenomena solves the problem of dualism, which has baffled philosophy through the ages. Freed from the fatal fallacy, philosophy can proclaim the sovereignty of man; and thus liberated from the venerable belief that he is not an end by himself, that there is something beyond his life on this earth, that there are forces or factors which he can never understand or control,—man can at last logically conceive of the idea that he is the master of his destiny. This principle of scientific Humanism provides the solid foundation of a truly revolutionary social philosophy.

Human history, like natural history, is a determined process. But it is self-determined; and it is not absolute determinism. There are more than one determining factor, and they mutually limit their scope of operation. The dynamics of ideas and the dialectics of social development are parallel processes, both stimulated by man's biological urge for freedom. They naturally influence each other. A truly revolutionary social philosophy must recognise this basic truth of history. Only then it will inspire the will to reconstruct society without destroying individual liberty. If man is treated as an automaton, a small wheel in the gigantic social machinery, a puppet in the hand of the economic Providence called the forces of production, then the purpose of social revolution will be defeated. Instead of a commonwealth of free men, there will be a stream-lined, electrified prison-house where a deceptive sense of

charge social responsibilities without surrendering liberty. A free community can be composed only of free men—men capable of being free. Thanks to his archetypal potentialities, man can take his place in a highly complicated modern society as a sovereign entity with the object of unfolding his potentialities in cooperation with others also pursuing the same purpose.

The impulse leading to the creation of society being, the biological urge for survival felt individually by man, the social responsibility of individuals need not be obligatory. Under normal conditions, it is bound to be discharged voluntarily, because the preservation and evolution of society are necessary for enabling each of its members to unfold his or her potentialities. The concept of individual freedom, therefore, is not incompatible with social responsibility.

By tracing the roots of the urge for freedom in the background of the higher stages of biological evolution, a concrete content is put into the time-honoured concept. Man's struggle for freedom is a continuation of the biological struggle for survival, on a higher level. Therefore, freedom must be defined as progressive disappearance of the manifold impediments to the unfolding of the potentialities biologically inherent in man. Otherwise, memorable declarations, made ceremoniously in critical moments of history, such as "man is born free" and "freedom is man's birthright", would be meaningless. If man as a biological being was not possessed of infinite potentialities of development, freedom would be a vain dream, an ideal never to be realised. It can be claimed as the birthright of man only when the struggle for it is known

concrete biological heritage, there can not be any mysticism about them.

Countries may be nationally independent, economically prosperous and militarily powerful. It may appear as if the Utopia of "the Great Society" has been attained. Yet, individuals composing them are not free, though their chains of servitude may be chains of gold. With the discovery of a concrete standard to measure freedom, fraud and fiction may no longer delude. To experience freedom being the purpose of life, social progress can be empirically measured. If in the twentieth century man has not conquered greater opportunities for the unfolding of his biological potentialities, there is no reason to hold that the human race has progressed since the preceding centuries. Progress is not merely a succession of events in time. It consists in the significance of the succession, and the significance of any change can be judged correctly only by the position of the individual: the measure is the opportunity afforded to individuals to be better, more developed, more integrated, more articulate human beings. In other words, it is the advance made in the quest for freedom and search for truth.

Another distinctive feature of a truly revolutionary social philosophy results from the discovery of the interrelation between freedom and truth. In old social philosophies, freedom is an instrumental value; the new philosophy raises it to the status of a primary value. Freedom is an experience or ideal of human life, whereas truth is a metaphysical category. How can the one be related to the other?

On the human level, the biological struggle for existence

relation between truth and freedom thus is evident. Discovery of truth is the result of man's quest for freedom. On the other hand, expanding knowledge of nature increases man's power to conquer nature. Truth being the content of knowledge, its relation with man's quest for freedom is again evident.

Truth is correspondence with objective reality. Scientific knowledge does give us at least an approximate picture of what we are studying, either of the whole of nature or of any particular sector thereof. Therefore, truth can be described as the content of knowledge. We have the knowledge that two plus two is four. That is a truth. You can take any two things and add two more things, and the result will always be four things. That is an invariable phenomenon. It happens under all circumstances. It is said that truth is a mathematical concept. But mathematics is only a manner of measuring things, otherwise immeasurable, of judging statements of facts beyond the reach of direct experience. Thus, quest for freedom does result in knowledge, and the content of knowledge is truth; knowledge always is acquaintance with reality. Truth being correspondence with reality, the content of knowledge is truth. Thus, freedom, knowledge and truth can be woven harmoniously in the texture of one philosophy explaining all the aspects of existence—material, mental, moral. Such an all-embracing philosophy eliminates dualism, reconciles idealism with materialism, and accomodates ethics with naturalism. The search for truth being a corollary of the quest for freedom, itself a purposive continuation of the biological struggle for existence, the recognition of universal moral values cannot be repugnant to any theory and practice of social reconstruction, provided that it is undertaken with the purpose of promoting human freedom.

The social science cannot be isolated from the natural sciences. Because, society is a part of nature, and biology traces the origin of life to the world of dead

matter. The knowledge derived from the study of the natural as well as social phenomena, integrated into one logically coherent system of ideas, will be the philosophy of our time. As such, philosophy will be the science of sciences, a distinction traditionally attached to it; it will also be in a position to guide human behaviour so as to harmonise social relations.

When dealing with the problems of economic and political practice, the problems of adjusting human relations and building institutions, one is advised to take what is called a practical, pragmatic, point of view. In other words, the contention is that such activities should not be circumscribed by any theoretical convictions or philosophical principles. Politicians and economists must be practical men. They must try to solve their problems according to the possibilities of a given situation. It is said that, handicapped by preconceived ideas, guided by one or another system of philosophy, one can neither be a successful politician nor a practical economist.

This idea of philosophy deluded the best of men, the noblest of souls. In quest of truth and search for knowledge, they kept themselves aloof from the affairs of the world, engaged in contemplation and introspection with the vain hope of finding the infinite in their finite selves. On the other hand, the bulk of mankind was not concerned with this sort of philosophy. If philosophy was indifferent to their problems, they had no use for philosophy. The artificial differentiation between the world of spirit and the world of matter led to the belief that there was no place for truth and moral values in the latter, which is therefore destined to be ruled by the laws of the jungle.

Confronted with this terrible tragedy, one must be constrained to admit that until now human behaviour generally has not been guided by rational thinking nor by the love of truth and moral values. It could not be otherwise so long as those virtues were placed in the

world of spirit; and the conduct of the affairs of the world of matter, the world of human being and becoming, of human sorrows and happiness, did not have the benefit of a philosophy which placed the knowledge of truth within the reach of the human mind. The practice of the virtues of rational thinking, of the love of truth and moral values, by a growing number of men concerned with the problems of this world, is the crying need of the day. The world needs a philosophy to bridge the gulf between spirit and matter, mind and body, and harmonise thought and action.

But generally, philosophy is still believed to be of no concern for the people who are interested in the affairs of this world. Philosophers are supposed to be indifferent to the troubles and tribulations of the temporal life, and themselves to live in the world of mind and spirit. That is a false conception of philosophy, which has created a good deal of confusion and contributed considerably to the chaos of the modern world. Therefore, a restatement of the very conception of philosophy is necessary so as to leave no doubt about its practicability, its bearing on the daily life of human beings.

A hundred years ago, Karl Marx suggested that philosophy must come down from the dizzy heights of speculation to this world, if it was to serve any human purpose. His famous Theses on Feuerbach conclude with the declaration that, until now philosophers have tried to explain the world; the time has come to remake it. Since then various formulas and prescriptions for remaking the world have been offered. Nevertheless, today the hope of building a better world seems to be gone for ever. The modern civilisation is threatened with the danger of complete destruction. The crisis of our time affects not only the political, economic and social aspects of modern civilisation; it goes deeper, and therefore it has been rightly characterised as a moral crisis— a crisis involving not only the corporate life of mankind,

.not only its social existence, but the very being of man, man's mind, his spirit, his soul.

It is a gravely disturbing situation which breeds unbounded scepticism about the values of modern civilisation. But there are thoughtful people who have not lost all hope about the future of mankind, who still believe in the creative power of the human mind, who do not share the gloomy Spenglerian view that modern civilisation is doomed to perish. They are naturally anxious to find a way out of the crisis.

It goes without saying that any way out of the crisis presupposes action. In order to come out of the present situation of political uncertainty, economic insecurity and social chaos, which breed the danger of war, civilised mankind must act with determination. But action presupposes ideas; and a philosophy is a logically coordinated system of ideas. All classical schools of philosophy claimed to be rounded-up closed systems. That notion of philosophy had to be discarded under the impact of scientific knowledge. No philosopher of our time offers a closed system of ideas. Ideas have a dynamics of their own, and no idea, however sublime, can claim finality at any period of the history of thought. Nevertheless, to be creative, human action must be guided by rational thought. In the last analysis, the cause of the present crisis is a loss of equilibrium in human behaviour—preponderance of emotion over rational thinking and critical analysis.

It has even been maintained that thought paralyses action; that the spirit of enquiry leads to scepticism; that rational thinking confronts one with the fact of the limitation of human knowledge and the frustration of human endeavours. With this view, a thoughtful person, particularly a philosopher, tends to relapse into quietism, believing that no human effort can change the affairs of the world. The corollary to this so-called philosophic attitude is neo-mysticism. It is reinforced by those schools of modern psychology which attach supreme

importance to intuition and come to the conclusion that human action is primarily guided by mysterious urges, uncontrollable by reason or intelligence. The contention is that emotions cannot be analysed to a rational foundation. If that is a biological truth, then no human action can be controlled. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain if emotions are the only incentive to action; and if emotions themselves cannot be controlled by reason.

All the promising formulas and prescriptions for a reconstruction of society failed, because, instead of appealing to reason, they also attached primary importance to emotions; their protagonists inflamed one set of emotions against another. A critical examination of those promising, but pragmatically disappointing, panaceas is a precondition for the discovery of a way out of the present crisis. The effort is being made individually or in cooperation by sensitive minds throughout the world. It is significant that they have reached the same conclusion. The common demand is for a humanist revival. It is a reaction to the cult of collectivism running rampant throughout the world for the last two generations.

All the conflicting schools of current political thought—conservative, liberal, socialist, communist— have one thing in common; to submerge man in the mass. Society is a creation of man. History is a record of human activity. Political institutions were created by man. Yet, these creations of man have reduced man to nothingness. The complete subordination of the creator to his creation is the core of the present crisis. Therefore, a humanist revival, that is, restoration of man in his proper place of primacy and sovereignty, is the only way out of the crisis.

CHAPTER XIII

NEW HUMANISM

EXCEPT ON the basis of a philosophy embracing the totality of existence, all approaches to the problems of individual as well as social life are bound to be misleading. In other words, a sound social and political philosophy must have a metaphysical foundation. It is of great importance to trace the relation between philosophy, science and society. The bearing of science on society is obvious. Ethics must be given a high place in social philosophy, including political thought, if the crying need of honesty and decency in public life is ever to be satisfied. But for that purpose, moral philosophy must be related to science. Social thought and political practice could not be harmonised with moral values so long as there appeared to be no relation between science and philosophy.

Associated with religion, meaning belief in the supernatural, and engaged in speculation about reality behind appearance, philosophy differentiated itself from science, allotting to the latter the inferior function of enquiring into transitory natural phenomena. However, in reality, notwithstanding the pretensions of metaphysicians to discover the final cause in the light of pure reason, and clannishness of professional philosophers, science and philosophy have always been interrelated with alternating priority.

In the earliest period of the history of human thought, science, of course in a very primitive sense, preceded philosophy. In the next period, speculative thought overwhelmed the early quest for the knowledge of the material world—of experience. Towards the close of the Middle-Ages, at the dawn of modern civilisation, philosophy inspired the resurgence of science. Since then,

science forged ahead, unravelling the mysteries of nature, one after another. But philosophy smiled benevolently on the pretentious illusions of the impetuous daughter, maintaining that truth and reality were beyond the reach of empirical knowledge, that the pure reason of speculative thought alone could penetrate the mysteries of the supersensual transcendental realm to which they belong. As a part of speculative philosophy, ethics refused to recognise its secular sanction revealed by the light of biological knowledge, and failed to find its roots in man himself. On the other hand, social and political philosophy came under the influence of rationalism, though as yet largely metaphysical, and of anthropology, philology and ethnology. It seemed that there was no causal relation between ethical values and the world of science. Moral philosophy was baffled by the problem of deducing values from facts. Social behaviour and political events, also being empirical facts, appeared to be beyond the jurisdiction of axiology. Religion, in the last analysis, remained the only sanction of morality. But in proportion as science undermined the faith in the supernatural, religion became a mere conventionality. Consequently, the position of morality in public life became very precarious. With the modern believing man, religion is the anchor or a mere preoccupation of private life. Having no bearing upon the public life, it logically cannot dictate the norms of his social behaviour and political practice. The latter were thus completely divorced from moral values which, anchored in religion, could have meaning only in man's private life. The position is much worse with the frankly religious, whose number is legion in the modern world.

Fortunately, the end of an epoch has been reached. Science and philosophy can no longer be kept in watertight compartments. The disappearance of the traditional differentiation between two currents of human thought is the most outstanding feature of the advanced intellectual life of our age. Time, space, substance, and

causality used to be categories of pure thought, problems of metaphysical speculation. They have come under the jurisdiction of the empirical (including mathematical) enquiry of science, which has solved the problems.¹ On the one hand, what used to be called philosophy proper—cosmology, ontology and epistemology—has been merged into science; and on the other hand, the influence of science, and its byproduct, technology, on social development and social philosophy, is undeniable. The result is the possibility of constructing a system of logically co-ordinated thought, embracing the totality of existence—nature, life and society. The roots of the problems of social and individual life can now be traced down the entire process of biological and physical evolution, and the problems themselves be solved by the application of scientific knowledge. The riddle of the relation between facts and values disappears, because values themselves are also facts. Modern civilisation, in the sense of man's mind being enlightened by scientific knowledge, should not necessarily snap his moral moorings, because it is in its own self.

The urge for spiritual freedom, though it has remained largely in the realm of the subconscious, has been the lever of entire human development, ever since the birth of the species. It is the striving to feel that man is a free agent, that he can act according to his judgment, and is capable of discriminating good from evil and right from wrong without being haunted by the preoccupation that he is helplessly at the mercy of some capricious superhuman power. Religion itself was an expression of man's urge for spiritual freedom. The history of religions, which traces critically the evolution of faith from animism to ideological rationalism, reveals that the tendency to outgrow itself is inherent in religion.

¹ See *Science and Philosophy*, by the author, and also "The "Concept of Causality" and "Probability and Determinism," by the same, in *The Humanist Way*, Vol. IV, Nos. 2 & 3.

The desire for freedom in social and political life, being an expression of the basic human urge for spiritual freedom, can be satisfied only by actions according to general principles deduced from a world view which does away with the necessity of assuming a supernatural power or metaphysical sanction. Only in a self-contained, self-operating, self-sufficient world, can man as a part of it claim to be free.

The question which has troubled man's mind from, time immemorial is: How can man be free in this mortal world of experience? The purpose of social and political philosophy is to answer that old question, and the reply should include a prescription for practice. A satisfactory reply presupposes the possibility to prove that freedom is really man's birthright. The idea of the sovereignty of man acquires a greater meaning than a religious dogma or an *ad hoc* postulate of political philosophy when it is known that the urge for freedom is a biological heritage and it is proved that man is capable of spiritual freedom, that is, to cast off the faith in a supernatural power or providential will. Modern scientific knowledge provides the evidence. The capacity to be free is in each individual; by being conscious of it, he becomes free; and a free society will be the creation of such spiritually free men.

At the close of the Middle-Ages in Europe, the archetypal man revolted against the tutelage of God and started moving towards the realisation that he could be self-sufficient and self-reliant. The classical revolt of man, reinforced by the expanding scientific knowledge, reached the highwater mark in the eighteenth century, when a great advance was made in the agelong effort to formulate a humanist social philosophy, including a secular ethics, on the basis of a materialist metaphysics. Since then, science penetrated deeper and deeper into the mysteries of life as well as of the physical nature. Nevertheless, philosophical thought generally failed to keep pace, for reason explained in previous chapters.

The tradition of the eighteenth century naturalist Humanism and of its development in the nineteenth century alone can inspire a philosophy which will set man free, spiritually as well as socially. Most appropriately, this philosophy should be called New Humanism; it is new, because it is scientific and integral; because it conceives human sovereignty not as a differentiation from the mechanistic processes of nature, but as their highest product.

The former conception of the sovereignty of man,, associated with classical as well as romantic Humanism, logically leads to two alternative conclusions: one is the doctrine of free will; and the other is the old Stoic faith taken over by Christianity, that man is a moral entity, because through his soul he is in unison with the universal moral order. If it is not traced to the mechanism of biological evolution, free will assumes a mystic connotation: it is simply given in man as the token of his sovereignty; its origin cannot be traced. This mystic conception of free will imperceptibly converges towards transcendentalism. The alternative doctrine of man's-sovereignty is frankly deduced from faith; therefore it could be taken over by Christianity. Granted its premiss, the Christian doctrine of morality is logically sound; a good case can be made out of it. But it breaks down as the foundation of a revolutionary social philosophy, revolutionary in the sense of regarding social evolution as the expression of man's inexhaustible creativeness. Transcendental morality, the belief that man can be moral only by the grace of God, destroys its own premiss. Man is a moral entity; therefore he is sovereign. But his sovereignty is derived from a greater or higher power. So, he is really not sovereign. The corollary is denial of human creativeness.

The choice between these two alternatives confronts any social philosophy and ethics, because the doctrine of human sovereignty is the common point of departure, If the latter is chosen, as was done previously by all

orthodox systems, the idea of freedom, whether social or spiritual, must go by the board. Sovereign by proxy, so to say, man can never be a free agent. Free will, consequently, becomes a mere euphemism. With such an equivocal sanction, ethics hangs in the air, and can have an apparently stable position only by laying down dogmatic norms of behaviour.

But without a sounder ethical doctrine, no really revolutionary social philosophy is possible. The central problem of ethics is that of the sanction of its values. If it could be found in man himself, the problem would be solved. But this solution brings back the problem of free will. The mystic conception atomises the individual and precludes the possibility of social organisation, cooperation and harmony in human relations. If man is simply given as God walking on earth, fully sovereign, absolutely free to act as he wills, and his will is of a mystic origin, then, the necessity of cooperation disappears, and society disintegrates.

The moral philosophy which traces the sanction of its values to intuition, may try to distinguish itself from the fundamentalist religious faith, but is nonetheless transcendental. If intuitions were not analysed down to mechanistic biological impulses, they must be traced to some mystic origin beyond human comprehension. So, in the last analysis, the elementary undefinable of the intuitive moral philosophy must be referred to some unknown and unknowable supernatural source. The alternative is to trace its roots down the entire process of prehuman biological evolution. Otherwise, intuitive morality cannot disown the charge of dogmatism.

For a more satisfactory solution of the problem of the sanction of morality, it is necessary to dig deeper in the subsoil of human existence. Previously, moral philosophers either raised their eyes to the heaven or searched for God in man. An appeal to his animal ancestry will yield more satisfactory result. A truly revolutionary social philosophy capable of inspiring action to lead

modern civilisation out of the present crisis requires a revision of the classical doctrines of ethics, whether religious, rationalist, idealist or intuitive. If the sanction of morality is to be found in man himself, man must cease to be a mystic entity of the conception of early Humanism, classical and romantic alike.

The mystery of man has been solved by modern biology. Man is the outcome of biological evolution. In order to find the sanction of morality in man himself, and avoid at the same time the morass of mysticism, the roots of what is called conscience or moral sense must be traced in mechanistic biological functions articulated as instincts and intuitions. Biological evolution takes place in the context of the physical Universe, its mechanism being a part of the cosmic mechanism. Life grows out of the background of inanimate matter. The descent of man, therefore, can be traced to the law-governed physical Universe. Man's rationality and moral sense, which are causally connected, are the expression of cosmic harmony. Therefore, it is in the nature of man, as a biological organism, to be rational and moral, and as such he is-capable of living with others in peace and harmony.

These arguments lead to the conclusion that a philosophy which can give man complete spiritual freedom and thus enable him to build a free and harmonious society will be a reformulation of old-fashioned Materialism. Indeed, Materialism, restated with the help of the latest scientific knowledge, is the only philosophy possible. Any other, in the last analysis, merges into religion or ends in the absurdity of solipsism. Indeed, ever since the dawn of civilisation, Materialism has been the most plausible hypothesis for rationalist philosophical thought and fruitful scientific investigation. The alternative views of life—religious, ideological, idealist, mystic—are also so many hypotheses. None of them could ever prove its assumptions and verify its postulates. Materialism was the most plausible hypothesis, because the categories of its metaphysics were not unknowable,.

even if unknown as yet; its theorems could be proved because they did not invoke the authority of the super-sensual. It provides the soundest philosophical foundation of the humanist view of life because, by abolishing the supernatural, it sets man spiritually free, capable of creating a world of goodness and harmony.

However, to provide the metaphysical foundation of a secular humanist ethics and a revolutionary social philosophy, Materialism must be dissociated from certain notions which have been rendered untenable by the latest discoveries of science. Physics has discarded the old conception of matter, but it has not dissolved the physical Universe into nothingness or the fantasy of disembodied minds. The world is not made of indivisible atoms—"the hard lumps of reality" of the Newtonian natural philosophy. But at the same time, physics cannot do without the concept of substance— 'the substratum of the world of experience. The field is not an abstract mathematical construction; it is measurable; therefore, it is a physical entity.

For these considerations, all really scientific objections to the term Materialism should be obviated if the new philosophy was called "Physical realism".² Even so revised and renamed, to avoid confusion, Materialism is vindicated as the only philosophy possible, provided that philosophy is defined as a logical coordination of all the "branches of positive knowledge in a system of thought to explain the world rationally and to serve as a reliable guide for life.

Evolution is diversification. But the search for a unity underlying diversity is the oldest urge in man; and it is the foundation of philosophy. Attempts to understand and explain the world of experience have, throughout

² This thesis I have expounded in detail, on the basis of an extensive survey of the latest discoveries of physics, biology and psychology, in a book entitled *The Philosophical Consequences of Modern Science*, which will be published in the near future.

the ages, induced the human mind to trace the diversity of the phenomenal world to a common foundation. If that is anything other than matter, as it appears in the world picture of modern physics, then it must be something beyond the reach of human comprehension; something metaphysical in the mystic sense; in other words, an object of faith. The only alternative to Materialism, thus, is religion. If modern science really compels rejection of the view that the Universe is a self-contained unitary whole, which functions without intervention of any force from outside, then, continuing his primordial search for unity, man must fall back on the primitive postulate of a creator or prime mover. This atavistic tendency is, indeed, gaining ground; the modern world is full of scientific men in search of God. That curious phenomenon only reveals the profundity of the crisis of our time; it threatens a relapse into mediaevalism.

However, physical science does not warrant this dangerous atavism. There has, indeed, been a revolution in the notion of substance, but only perceptually, not in the conceptual sense. As a metaphysical (onto-logical) category, substance is a conceptual reality—an “object of abstraction, of pure thought. Empiricism puts new content in it without affecting its validity as an abstraction. That is the relation between pure (speculative) thought and empirical knowledge, which together reveal truth.

Science is not pure empiricism. Conceptual thought and scientific method are not two different things. Both have a common foundation. Experience creates concepts which are mental pictures. It taught man to speak, and through the medium of language, he constructed concepts which, in course of time, became integral parts of the mind. Conceptual thought is generalisation of an abstraction from experience. Scientific thinking is stimulated by empirical knowledge, and is also informed and guided by man's conceptual equipments. These are not *a priori* categories.

Mental moulds and habits of thinking are not simply-given. They represent empirical knowledge acquired by *homo sapiens* from time immemorial. Even the so-called verbal statements are statements of empirical knowledge. In this sense, the conceptual notion of substance is an *a priori* category of thought. So also are the notions of space, time and causality. Originally, the notions were acquired empirically, and in course of time conceptualised. Therefore, though in a sense categories of pure thought, creations of the human mind, they are not mental phenomena. They are abstractions of experience. New experience can ever nullify them; it only enriches their ontological content.

Modern physical researches have revealed that the unitary substratum of the world of experience is not so-constructed as it used to be conceived previously. It is differently constructed; but the conceptual notion of substance remains. The knowledge of reality has grown.. The suggestion that substance is “mind stuff” or “mental stuff” cannot stand a searching criticism. However, it is admitted that there is a unitary foundation of the diversified existence. It being mathematically measurable, it must be a physical entity. If the world picture of modern physics was a creation of the physicist’s mind, then there would be little difference between scientific ‘theories and poetry or any other work of art. Then, the physicist could dispense with his instruments of observation; and even do without the instrument of mathematical reasoning. Except in measurement (quantitative judgment), it is pointless to insist upon accuracy or exactitude; and measuring presupposes the existence of a measurable thing.

It goes without saying that the mind of the scientist with its conceptual equipment representing previously acquired empirical knowledge is as essential as the object he studies. Scientific knowledge is not purely objective. There is nothing like that in the world of experience. Not only in psychology, but even in physics, the distinc-

tion between the subjective and the objective is meaningless and misleading. The scientist is a part of the objective world; the conceptual moulds of his mind reflect objective realities, because they are created by earlier experience of *homo sapiens*. But these considerations do not warrant denial of the physical world as an objective reality, its dismissal as a projection of the mind, something like a piece of art created out of imagination. The contention that physics can do without the concept of substance logically leads to the absurd notion of disembodied mind. The body of the physicist is undoubtedly material. If substance is unreal, it is equally so. The scientist is mind without body.

Until now, philosophers postulated a world of matter and a world of mind, and created a vicious circle of dualism. The way out of the apparent difficulty is to be found in a combination of conceptual thought and empirical knowledge, of abstract reasoning and statements of facts. Materialist philosophy, restated as Physical Realism, shows the way out.

Protoplasm being a physical substance, there cannot be any unbridgeable gulf between the inanimate physical nature and the living world. All the manifestations of life—consciousness, intelligence, will—can be traced down to a common origin, which is a physical substance. There is a red thread of continuity running through the entire process of cosmic evolution, including the biological evolution. The vital and mental phenomena need no extra-physical explanation. Instincts and intuition are not mysterious things, simply given, to be regarded as elementary undefinables. The soul is a sum total of the intellectual and emotional attributes of the human being. Scientific knowledge of the biological phenomenon, man, thus, rounds up the monistic philosophy of Physical Realism. Applied to the problems of social existence, it can be called New Humanism. It indicates a fully satisfactory approach to the problems of life in the light of a world view which does away with the nece-

ssity of assuming extra-physical categories. Man can be free because he is a part of a world which is self-contained and self-operating.

The Universe is a physical system. Having grown out of that background, the human being is also a physical system. But there is a great difference: The physical Universe is law-governed, the laws being inherent in itself, whereas man possesses will and can choose. Between the world of man and the world of inanimate matter, there lies the vast world of biological evolution. The latter has its own specific laws which, Jhowever, can be referred back to the general laws of the world of dead matter. The living matter grows out of the background of dead matter; consciousness appears at a much later stage. Therefore, human will cannot be directly related to the laws of the physical Universe. It is rooted in the intervening biological world. But inasmuch as the entire process of biological evolution takes place in the context of the world of dead matter, human will cannot be an antithesis to the law-governedness of the physical Universe. Reason harmonises the two; and reason results from the consciousness of man's (the whole man's) being an integral part of the law-governed physical Universe.

Man did not appear on the earth out of nowhere; with his mind, intelligence, will, he is an integral part of the physical Universe. The latter is a cosmos—a law-governed system. Therefore, man's being and becoming, his emotions, will, ideas, are also determined. Therefore, man is essentially rational. The reason in man is an echo of the harmony of the Universe. Morality must be referred back to man's innate rationality. Only then can man be moral, spontaneously and voluntarily. Reason is the only sanction of morality, which is an appeal to conscience; and conscience, in the last analysis, is nothing mystic or mysterious. It is a biological function, on the level of consciousness. The innate rationality of man is the only guarantee of a harmonious social

order, which will also be a moral order, because morality is a rational function.

The axiology of New Humanism deduces all values from the supreme value of freedom. Freedom is the supreme value of life, because the urge for freedom is the essence of human existence. Indeed, it can be traced all the way down the entire process of biological evolution. Since all ethical values are derived from the biological heritage of man, they require no sanction which transcends human existence. To be moral, one needs only be human; it is not necessary to go in search of divine or mystic metaphysical sanction. Humanist morality is evolutionary.

As soon as it appeared on the earth, the human species had to undertake the struggle with environments for survival. That was the beginning of an endless struggle for freedom. Since then, all human achievements—cultural progress, scientific knowledge, artistic creations—have been motivated by the urge for freedom. In the last analysis, the environment of human existence is the whole Universe. The latter being unbounded, man's struggle for survival is eternal; he will never conquer the Universe. His urge for freedom, therefore, is undying, eternal. He may not be always conscious of it; often, he is not. Nevertheless, it is the basic incentive for him to acquire knowledge and conquer environments by knowing them. In course of the struggle for freedom, man discovers truth. It is neither a mystic-metaphysical category nor an abstract value. It is the content of man's knowledge. Therefore, it is a fact, objectively real.

The hierarchy of humanist axiology, thus, is freedom, knowledge, truth. They are not autonomous; they are interrelated, logically as well as ontologically. Therefore, freedom cannot be attained by immoral means, nor an enlightened man be a liar.

In the past also, Humanism proclaimed the sovereignty of man. But man remained unexplained, and speculation about the essence of man led to mysticism

and revival of religion. Thus, Humanism defeated itself. Thanks to the enrichment of scientific knowledge, it can now be freed from all fallacies. It needs no longer be misguided by mystic and metaphysical notions about the essence of man. Starting with a clear understanding of the being and becoming of man, Humanism can now rule out all such speculation as in the past led to the subordination of man to imaginary forces beyond his comprehension. All human attributes—intelligence, reason, will, instinct, intuition—are rooted in the process of biological evolution antecedent to the appearance of *homo sapiens*. The capacity to acquire knowledge, as distinct from the common biological property of awareness, differentiates man from his animal ancestry. Knowledge endows him with the power to carry on the endless struggle for greater and greater freedom, and the search for truth.

Scientific knowledge liberates man from the time-honoured prejudices about the essence of his being and the purpose of life. It reveals the truth about human nature. Man is essentially a rational being. His nature is not to believe, but to question, to enquire and to know. He gropes in the darkness of ignorance, helpless victim of the blind faith in forces beyond his comprehension and control, until knowledge illuminates his path. The only truth accessible to man is the content of his knowledge. When the light of truth makes his innate rationality more manifest, he can discard old hypotheses based on ignorance.

New Humanism proclaims the sovereignty of man on the authority of modern science, which has dispelled all mystery about the essence of man. It maintains that a rational and moral society is possible because man, by nature, is rational and therefore can be moral, not under any compulsion, but voluntarily; that the sanction of morality is embedded in human nature.

In so far as it shows a way out of the crisis of our time, New Humanism is a social philosophy. But as

such, it is deduced from a general philosophy of nature, including the world of matter and the world of mind. Its metaphysics is physical-realist; and its cosmology is mechanistic. Conceptual thought and sense perceptions are harmonised in its epistemology. It merges psychology into physiology, and relates the latter to physics through chemistry. It bases ethics on rationalism, and traces the roots of reason in the orderliness of nature and harmony of the physical Universe.

By tracing will and reason, emotion and intelligence, to their common biological origin, New Humanism reconciles the romantic doctrine of revolution, that man makes history, with the rationalist notion of orderly social progress. History being the record of human endeavour, and man being an integral part of the law-governed Universe, history is not a chaotic conglomeration of fortuitous events. Social evolution is a determined process. But New Humanism rejects Economic Determinism, which is deduced from a wrong interpretation of the materialist philosophy. Human will is the motive force of social evolution; it is, indeed, the most powerful determining factor of history. Otherwise, there would be no place for revolutions in a rationally determined process of social evolution. A revolution is acceleration in the tempo of the evolutionary process, brought about by the will of a minority of men. But human will, as well as ideas, can seldom be referred directly to economic incentives.

Ideation is a physiological process. But once ideas are formed in the mind of man, they exist by themselves, governed by their own laws. The dynamics of ideas runs parallel to the dialectics of social evolution, the two influencing each other mutually. But in no particular period of history can a causal relation be traced between social events and movements of ideas. Patterns of culture and ethical systems are not mere ideological superstructures of established social relations. They are also determined, but by the logic of the history of ideas.

New Humanism holds that, for creating a new

world of liberty and social justice, revolution must go beyond an economic reorganisation of society. The urge for freedom being the basic incentive of life, the purpose of all rational human endeavour must be to strive for the removal of social conditions which restrict the unfolding of the potentialities of man. The success of this striving is the measure of freedom attained. The position of the individual is the indicator of the progressive and liberating significance of any collective effort or social system.

New Humanism lays emphasis on the basic fact of history that man is the maker of his world—man as a thinking being, and he can be so only as an individual. The brain is the instrument of thought; and it is individually owned. It cannot be possessed collectively. Revolutions are heralded by iconoclastic ideas conceived by gifted individuals. A brotherhood of men attracted by the adventure of ideas, keenly conscious of the urge for freedom, fired with the vision of a free society of free men, and motivated by the will to remake the world, so as to restore the individual in his position of primacy and dignity, will show the way out of the contemporary crisis of modern civilisation.

In the last analysis, education of the citizen is the condition for such a reorganisation of society as will be conducive to common progress and prosperity without encroaching on the freedom of the individual. New Humanism advocates a social reconstruction of the world as a commonwealth and fraternity of free men, by the cooperative endeavour of spiritually emancipated moral men.

New Humanism is cosmopolitan. A cosmopolitan commonwealth of spiritually free men will not be limited by the boundaries of national States,—capitalist, fascist, socialist, communist, or of any other kind,—which will gradually disappear under the impact of the twentieth century Renaissance of Man.

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